# Neg

## Topshelf

### DA

#### U.S-Japan Alliance is strong, but fragile

Glosserman et al 15 — Panel of Experts: Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, James Miller is Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy for National Security Council policy-making and crisis management, Catherine Kelleher is a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, Kori Schake is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, 2015, ("Reassurance: What Should Allies Expect?”, Carnegie Endowment, March 23rd, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/files/07-Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

On the operational level we’re seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South Koreans. We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like Ambassador Ho-young this morning, the news today **that there’s a deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out**, so we’re seeing a stepping up of the presence. It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that that’s what the allies are looking for. We get the fact that **there’s a demand for more**. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need to be expecting, is a demand for the United States for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, the alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides, a receptiveness to the needs. Finally, I think, we’re seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic connection between the three countries.

#### Strengthened US-China engagement creates a perception of weakened commitment to Japan causing them to nuclearize, which creates an Asian arms race.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH)

U.S. Security Commitment

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors. US China Relations The course of the relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.

#### East Asia Prolif leads to nuke war

Tan 15 — Andrew T.H. Tan, Used to work in King’s college in London, recently appointed as Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, MA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2015 (Security and Conflict in East Asia, April 14th, Available Online at <https://books.google.com/books?id=33OhCAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=Security+and+Conflict+in+East+Asia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiA3q-YqsHNAhVM0h4KHUndBboQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=east%20asia's%20arms%20race&f=false>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

## Uniqueness

### US-Japan Alliance Strong

#### US- Japan alliance is high now but could break in the future

Schoff 15— James L. Schoff is a senior associate in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japanese relations and regional engagement, Japanese politics and security, and the private sector’s role in Japanese policymaking, 2015 (“Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia”, July 16, 2015, Accessed at 6/29/16, Available online at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliances-in-northeast-asia-pub-60750>, JRR)

Overall, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances are in good shape today, thanks in part to consistent bipartisan support from the U.S. government over the years and careful attention paid most recently by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Polls show broad support on each side of these two alliances, and political change (back and forth) in all three countries over the last two decades has not disrupted their relationships.1 In fact, the alliances are arguably as strong as they have ever been. Quick and robust U.S. support for Japan in the aftermath of its 2011 tsunami and nuclear crisis was the right thing to do not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also from a U.S. strategic standpoint and as a close friend. Although current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe often remarks that his party’s return to power in late 2012 helped “repair” U.S.-Japan relations, the fact is that alliance cooperation was solid during the last two years the Democratic Party of Japan was in power, and this emerging “bipartisan” support for the relationship in Japan should be celebrated. It is a long-term asset for the alliance. Acrimonious trade battles are largely a thing of the past (though not extinct), which has strengthened a sense of partnership. U.S.-Japan cooperation initiatives in a variety of fields— including energy, the environment, health, science and technology, and development aid (including the recently established U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue2)— have been a staple of the post-Cold War period and deliver value to the allies and to the world. Bilateral defense cooperation continues to broaden and deepen in an evolutionary manner, amidst a deteriorating security environment. In recent years the allies have conducted more frequent and complex military exercises, updated bilateral planning, collaborated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations including Pacific Partnership and Operation Damayan in the Philippines (among others), established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to consider alliance responses to nuclear threats, and announced new Guidelines for Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2015 to adapt to modern security threats.3 In addition, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed on a plan to reduce the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa and relocate the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station for a more politically sustainable posture, receiving permission from the local governor to initiate the project (although this relocation faces delays due to local political opposition and a new opposition-backed governor). The U.S.-ROK alliance has weathered numerous North Korean acts of belligerence and attempted intimidation in recent years, often emerging stronger for the experience. The allies approved in 2013 a new coordinated plan to respond to future North Korean provocations (enhancing deterrence) and added new bilateral working groups in the areas of cyber and space security policy.4 Another important bilateral initiative— the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee —began in 2010 for the same reason as the U.S.-Japan EDD (i.e., to discuss alliance options with regard to the growing North Korean nuclear threat), and it has been an important tool for facilitating bilateral communication on the topic and reassuring Seoul of U.S. intentions and capabilities. The realignment of U.S. forces in Korea has faced delays and hurdles in implementation— much like the situation in Japan— but progress is being made and the allies signed a new agreement last year on sharing the costs for maintaining the U.S. presence through 2018.5 Most notable about the U.S.-ROK alliance, however, is its expanding relevance beyond the Korean Peninsula and in areas other than hard security, a development foreshadowed by a Joint Vision statement issues by Presidents Obama and Lee in 2009.6 Adjusting and passing the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in 2011 has helped to expand bilateral trade in certain FTA-covered areas and provides a foundation for further trade liberalization in Asia.7 In addition, the allies are beginning to leverage their talents and resources more effectively in areas of nuclear nonproliferation, HA/DR, development assistance, and environmental protection and climate change.8 The aforementioned are all positive trends for the two alliances, reflecting mutual recognition of their ongoing value and a mature alliance management infrastructure that strives proactively to minimize policy differences and expand bilateral cooperation when possible. For both Japan and South Korea, public and government support for their alliances with the United States remains strong, and they recognize the alignment of our national interests with the agenda of stability, openness, and access.9 Still, U.S. fiscal restraints and political dysfunction, combined with China’s rise, raise doubts in Tokyo and Seoul about the long-term sustainability of American primacy in Asia, and they are taking different steps to hedge against relative U.S decline. The challenge for U.S. policy makers is to find feasible ways to reassure the allies without simply subsidizing their security at an unsustainable financial and political cost to America, essentially to live up to the policy promise of the so-called rebalance to Asia (in all of its political, economic, and military dimensions) in a consistent and practical manner. Before offering policy recommendations toward this end, the following summarizes Japanese and Korean responses to China’s military rise in the region, with some concluding recommendations for U.S. policy vis-à-vis its allies.

#### US Japan Relations are high now but could sour because of low Sino-Japan relations, Japanese nationalism and US engagement in China

Hayashi 14—Yuka Hayashi covers financial regulation at The Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, 2014 (“Tensions in Asia Stoke Rising Nationalism in Japan”, February 26, 2014, Accessed on 6/27/16, Available Online at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403492918900378> JRR)

Across Japan, there are signs that the collective mood—long shaped by pangs of regret over World War II—is in the midst of a shift as tensions with rivals, especially China and South Korea, escalate. Fearful of Beijing's muscle-flexing in nearby waters and worried about Japan's economic future, more people are expressing feelings of nationalism, mistrust and sometimes outright hostility toward their neighbors. "Ideas that have long been suppressed and locked away, like the desire to hate and discriminate, are now pouring out from many corners of the country and amplifying each other in an echo chamber," says Kiyomi Tsujimoto, a veteran opposition lawmaker. "That's fueling anti-Korea and anti-China sentiment." Pacifism still runs deep in Japan, and the shift to the right is in its early stages. But the tone is already influencing Japanese politics, with the emergence of a new wave of candidates—mainly in their 30s and 40s—who hold staunchly conservative views similar to those of America's tea party. In a Tokyo gubernatorial election earlier this month, Gen. Toshio Tamogami, a former air-force chief who heads a right-wing group known for its xenophobic rallies, snared an unexpectedly large share of votes, even though the country's traditional media had all but written him off as a fringe figure. An exit poll by the Asahi Shimbun daily indicated that 24% of respondents in their 20s had voted for Mr. Tamogami, who lost the race. The rise of a more-vocal nationalist minority in Japan is cause for concern among foreign officials not just in East Asia, but also in the U.S. Some leaders fear it could exacerbate regional tensions and increase the odds of a confrontation between China and Japan—the world's second-largest and third-largest economies after the U.S. Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, said in recent congressional testimony that the U.S. remained concerned about a "serious downturn" in China-Japan relations. He called on the nations to "lower tensions" and "turn down the rhetoric." With Japanese and Chinese fighter jets and patrol ships continuing cat-and-mouse chases near disputed islands in the East China Sea, other U.S. officials, including Vice President Joe Biden, have warned of the risk of dangerous clashes. Many Japanese officials and lawmakers interpret the changes differently. They say that citizens are finally responding to what they see as persistent and unjustified attacks from China and South Korea over wartime-legacy issues. They say those countries have refused to acknowledge Japan's repeated efforts to apologize and to atone for its wartime atrocities. Chinese and South Korean officials dismiss such notions. Criticizing Tokyo for what they see as revisionist history, leaders of the two countries have refused to meet privately with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe since he took office 14 months ago. "It is deplorable that leading Japanese politicians have recently been attempting to deny and even justify past wrong-doing with an attitude of historical revisionism," Kim Jung-ha, a senior South Korean diplomat, said at a United Nations meeting in January. Japan under Mr. Abe seems to be repeating the mistakes of Germany before World War I and those of Japan before World War II, said Yang Bojiang, a Japan expert at the government-backed Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in a commentary on Monday in the People's Daily, the Communist Party's newspaper. "This must arouse the vigilance of peace-loving countries of the world to prevent humanity from being dragged once again into the abyss of war," he said. China and South Korea have also seen nationalist bumps in recent years. But the trend in Japan is especially sensitive, given its historical role as an aggressor in World War II. The last time Japan saw a sharp rise in nationalism was in the 1920s and 1930s, the period leading up to war. At the time, the country was struggling amid the aftermath of a huge Tokyo earthquake and the global depression. Unlike in that era, today's Japan is a mature democracy that has contributed to international peace for decades. Its military is tightly under civilian control. Many political scientists say that Japanese society has the flexibility to push back the pendulum if it keeps swinging toward nationalism, as it did during similar episodes of regional tensions in the 1980s and 1990s. Regional confrontation isn't the biggest preoccupation for most Japanese. A Nihon Keizai Shimbun daily survey released Feb. 24 showed only 6% of its respondents saw national security as the most important policy priority for Mr. Abe, compared with 38% who mentioned social security and 30% who cited economic overhaul. And yet, it appears that many Japanese are feeling more vulnerable. A government survey last October found a record 81% of respondents said they didn't feel friendly toward China, up from 59% just four years earlier and 40% two decades ago. In another survey last year, 40% said their attitude toward South Korea had deteriorated over the previous year, with many citing Korean criticism of Japan over wartime-legacy issues. Such angst is spilling into popular culture. Weekly magazines are outdoing one another with sensational headlines attacking South Korea and China. "Uncover the Dark Side of Korea," was the title of a recent cover story in Weekly Bunshun. "China's Anti-Japan Propaganda, Big Intentional Lies," said a headline in Weekly Shincho. Books predicting doomsday for the Chinese and Korean economies, such as "China that Collapses, Japan that Prospers" and "Truth about Samsung," are flying off the shelves, according to best-seller lists in the country. Also slowly emerging: hostility toward the U.S. Given America's growing economic ties with China, some Japanese officials and lawmakers are skeptical as to whether America would come to its rescue if their country comes under China's attack. Some find it troublesome that Washington has kept pressure on Tokyo to show restraint. Many were particularly irked by the Obama administration's scolding of Mr. Abe's recent visit to a shrine that honors Japan's war dead, including convicted war criminals. "The U.S. said it was disappointed," said Seiichi Eto, a special adviser to Mr. Abe, in a video that was posted on YouTube and later deleted. "I must say it was we who were disappointed. How can the U.S. fail to such a degree to treat Japan, a significant ally, in the right way?" "The United States remains committed to our deep and long-standing alliance with Japan," a State Department official said on Wednesday, adding that the U.S. has made its position on Mr. Abe's visit to the shrine "very clear." The nationalist bent is especially pronounced among Japan's youth. A monthly current-affairs magazine named Will, known for attention-grabbing nationalistic headlines such as "South Korea, the World's Persona Non-Grata" and "China Crosses the Line," has seen its circulation grow 30% to nearly 100,000 over the past two years. Now, people in their 20s and 30s—including large numbers of women—make up 40% of its readership, which was previously predominantly male and over 50, according to Kazuyoshi Hanada, its editor. Meanwhile, the emerging cadre of young, conservative politicians is backing Mr. Abe. Among them is Kensuke Miyazaki, who gave up running a career-placement company to become a politician. "There are so many people in our young generation who can't have pride in our country and feel negative about its future," says the 33-year-old lawmaker. "It has a lot to do with our experience of being taught a self-torturing view of the history that we were a country of aggressors." Though most of the novice politicians have limited influence as individuals, their collective ranks, now in the dozens, give clout to Mr. Abe's aggressive diplomatic and defense stance. Japan's constitution limits its military strictly to self-defense; Mr. Abe is pushing to allow troops to fire back if friendly forces, such as from the U.S., come under enemy attack. Mr. Abe's recent visit to the Yasukuni war shrine offered further evidence of his popularity with young people. Although the move angered Japan's neighbors, one recent poll by the Asahi Shimbun daily showed 60% of respondents in their 30s supported such a visit, far higher than the overall population.

#### Relations are high now but tensions are rising

Economist 15— (“Japan and the United States Base issues”, April 25, 2015, Accessed 6/27/16, Available online at <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21649538-bilateral-alliance-has-served-well-decades-needs-makeover-base-issues> JRR)

Okinawan concerns about Henoko are heartfelt. But Mr Abe and his colleagues will countenance neither discussion nor a change of course. When the prime minister travels to Washington, DC, at the end of this month, both the Americans and the Japanese will try to sweep the long-running irritant in their relationship out of view. Okinawa, with nearly one-fifth of its land taken up by American bases, is a powerful symbol of that relationship. Neither side wishes any weakening of their close military ties. In fact, both want the alliance to adapt to long-running challenges, such as North Korea, and to new ones, above all the rise of China. In Washington Mr Abe will find an eager audience for his vision of a Japan less shackled by its war-renouncing (and American-imposed) constitution. America’s military presence in Okinawa is central to that vision. The island, says Gavan McCormack of the Australian National University, is the “war state” to complement Japan’s “peace state”. Okinawans have reason to grumble about that. Their main island has borne a disproportionate share of America’s security presence in Japan ever since the second world war. Perhaps 120,000 Okinawans, or over a quarter of the population, were killed in the “typhoon of steel”, as the Battle of Okinawa was called, many forced by Japanese commanders to commit suicide. But having liberated Okinawa, the Americans stayed. Three-fifths of America’s 49,000 forces in Japan are stationed on the island, even though it accounts for just 0.6% of Japan’s land mass. There are accidents and crimes, including rapes. Some 80% of Okinawans surveyed say that the bases, and much else about their lives, are not understood by other Japanese, for many of whom the American presence is invisible. Mr Abe would leave them to grumble: massing the bases on Okinawa leaves the rest of the country untroubled by a debate about burden-sharing. The deferential national press ignores the growing acrimony on the island. Officials in Tokyo are contemptuous of Okinawans: the islanders are grasping, because for decades they have pocketed government money in return for American forces being based on their island; and short-sighted, even downright treasonous, because opposition to America’s military presence in Okinawa endangers Japan’s security and its alliance with America at a time when North Korea is developing nuclear-tipped missiles and China is rapidly expanding its military capability. In Washington both Mr Abe and President Barack Obama would prefer to celebrate the way in which an alliance lasting more than six decades—by far America’s most important military alliance in the region—has underwritten peace and prosperity in East Asia (see Banyan). And Mr Abe will emphasise how Japan’s trade and security policies are being overhauled and re-energised to face new challenges. Japan appears to be finalising bilateral negotiations with America to join a new free-trade arrangement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which involves a dozen countries and a third of world trade. Mr Abe will be cheered by legislation introduced by Congress which, if passed, will give the president “fast-track” negotiating authority on such deals. As for security, at the time of the Soviet threat Japan could freeride on America’s defence guarantees while pursuing economic development. Those days are long gone. Though constrained by a pacifist constitution and a defence budget of just 1% of GDP, Mr Abe will lay out his strategy for Japan to do much more to bolster its own defence, reinforce the bilateral alliance and build closer security ties in the region with, among others, Australia, India, the Philippines and Singapore. China will gripe, but America will be pleased. It is all part of Japan’s new “proactive contribution to peace”, as Mr Abe will emphasise when he addresses a joint session of Congress on April 29th. That a Japanese prime minister is being granted such an honour for the first time is striking. Presidents of South Korea, America’s smaller ally in East Asia, have addressed a joint session six times. It is in part a reflection of past trade frictions with Japan—as well as initial distrust of Mr Abe for his dubious views on Japan’s wartime history. But these days the Washington establishment likes Mr Abe, the most confident Japanese leader in years—and one who, unlike Yukio Hatoyama when he held the job in 2009-10, does not question the key tenets of the alliance. Mr Hatoyama was ostracised in Washington after suggesting that the presence of American bases in Okinawa should be reconsidered; the discord ultimately led to his downfall. In Washington Mr Abe will blithely insist that the base relocation is on course. And with Mr Obama he will sign a new agreement on defence co-operation, the first update since 1997. In Japan’s heavily dynastic politics, policy can be inherited. Mr Abe’s own desire to update the alliance has a family dimension. It was his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who pushed through a revised security treaty in 1960. That has defined the alliance ever since. Mr Abe recalls sitting on his grandfather’s knee when crowds of left-wing students laid siege to the prime minister’s residence in protest. But then the motives for updating the alliance did not stem from a desire to be seen to be pandering to America—often a default mode among Japanese prime ministers. And neither do they today. Indeed Mr Abe is probably among those in Tokyo who do not always trust Mr Obama’s assurances of an American “pivot” or “rebalancing” (the administration’s preferred term) towards Asia. The American president’s own defence budget is under pressure, and he is distracted by the Middle East. Japanese officials see China upsetting the established regional order by, for example, by challenging Japan’s control of the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu islands in China) and building airstrips on disputed reefs in the South China Sea. They believe that America’s supremacy in East Asia can no longer be taken for granted—nor, perhaps, even its commitment to the region. That is why, in the words of one senior Japanese diplomat: “We need to play our own part in ensuring the pivot is not a sort of one-off, short-term policy.” Japan is revising its joint-defence guidelines with America to foster “seamless and effective” co-ordination between the two countries’ armed forces in areas such as logistics, intelligence, missile defence and cyber-warfare. This summer it is also pushing legislation through the Diet (parliament) that will radically change what its army, known as the Self-Defence Forces, is allowed to do. The new rules would legitimise collective self-defence, allowing the armed forces to come to the aid of allies, America in particular, in situations that have nothing to do with rebuffing direct attacks on its own territory. At present, if an American naval ship comes under attack in international waters a Japanese maritime self-defence vessel may not help it by opening fire on the aggressor. Japan and America want that to change, and want to abandon the idea of narrowly defined “non-combat” zones to which Japanese forces have to restrict operations if they are deployed outside Japan. (Japanese policymakers still smart at Australian troops having had to defend unarmed Japanese ones in Iraq in 2004.) Debate rages within the ruling coalition over how far such changes should go. Komeito, the pacifist coalition partner of Mr Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is cautious about overseas deployments. Some in the LDP want the Japanese navy to patrol with South-East Asian countries, Australia and India to counter Chinese assertiveness and guard sea lanes as far as the Strait of Hormuz. Mr Abe, at the time of the beheading of two Japanese nationals by Islamic State in Syria earlier this year, seemed openly to regret that Japan did not have a military mandate to retaliate.

#### U.S-Japan Alliance Strong Now

Sullivan 2015 — Alexander Sullivan 2015, Research Associate in the Asia-Pacific Security Program, 2015 (“The New and Improved U.S.- Japan Alliance: A Good Deal for Washington?”, National Interest, 5/1, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-new-improved-us-japan-alliance-good-deal-washington-12781?page=2>, RKim)

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States, including the first ever address by a Prime Minister to a joint session of Congress and much other pomp and circumstance, is without doubt a historic occasion. But what’s in it for the United States? On the defense side, a lot, as it turns out. The once-in-a-generation revision of the bilateral defense cooperation guidelines, which set out alliance roles and missions, makes the U.S. strategic position in Asia—to borrow a phrase from U.S. strategic documents and previous U.S.-Japan joint statements—more “geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.” This vision is key for the United States to continue playing its critical stabilizing role both in the defense of Japan and in building a broader regional order, and the new guidelines harbor the potential to advance it on all three counts. Geographically Distributed One of the most significant innovations in the new guidelines is enabling the alliance to respond to emerging threats to Japan in new places and with new partners. What exactly constitute “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security” is deliberately ambiguous and therefore flexible, but one plausible example is alliance defense of the sea lanes that carry Japanese goods and energy imports, as well as the skies above them. (Recommended: 5 Chinese Weapons of War Japan Should Fear) Previous policy allowed Japan to participate in defense of sea lines of communication, but with a radius of a thousand nautical miles from Japan—a range carefully delineated to preclude Japan’s involvement beyond the immediate environs of Taiwan. Moreover, Tokyo has for years operated under self-imposed constraints including abjuration of the right of collective self-defense. While gradual evolutions have widened the aperture over the years, Japan’s security activities have in the main been limited to bilateral cooperation with the United States. (Recommended: 5 Japanese Weapons of War China Should Fear) The new guidelines, however, permit both sides to contribute to maritime security across the globe. Recent reporting has suggested that the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) could take on a greater role in the South China Sea, including joint air patrols with the United States. Whether or not that specific proposal comes about, bringing to bear the world’s most capable bilateral security alliance will support the United States’ efforts to increase its security engagement with partners in Southeast Asia, including through joint partner capacity building and greater domain awareness in and above the South China Sea. Even if it is not directly present, Japan’s provision of logistics support in areas closer to its shores can ease the U.S. burden of conducting expeditionary training, humanitarian assistance, or other operations in Southeast Asia. At a higher end, the guidelines—contemplating Japan’s limited exercise of collective self-defense as sketched out by the Abe administration—allow for broad alliance cooperation in response to armed attacks against third countries “in a close relationship in Japan.” One could foresee a future in which the alliance declares that this policy applies to Vietnam or the Philippines—both countries with whom Japan is actively strengthening relations. (Recommended: Say Goodbye to Taiwan) Finally, as Abe mentioned in his speech, Japanese assistance with upgrades to facilities on Guam will provide a new venue for training, exercises, and other operations. Operationally Resilient Military operations are hard in Asia, and getting harder due to the proliferation of advanced technologies, including those in relatively new domains such as space and cyberspace. The tyranny of distance makes even low-end, cooperative activities—such as finding an airliner tragically gone astray—exceedingly difficult, as scarce capabilities must be spread over vast areas. In a potential conflict, China’s expanding and thickening anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) envelope seeks to deny U.S. freedom of maneuver within the first island chain, especially through massive numbers of shore- and sea-based guided munitions. Most visions of potential high-end U.S.-China hostilities involve ballistic and cruise missile attacks on U.S. assets forward stationed or deployed in Japan, to destroy combat assets and especially key enabling capabilities before they can enter the fight. In addition, China’s development of counterspace and cyberspace weapons is designed to attack U.S. and Japanese forces’ reliance on networked command and control for nearly all military functions. The new U.S.-Japan guidelines address all of these issues. With the alliance’s broader geographic scope and expanded provision for Japanese logistical support and integration with U.S. operations, the JSDF can supplement U.S. capacity across the spectrum of operations, including in scarce capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), airborne command and control, and boutique antisubmarine warfare and amphibious systems. The guidelines also commit both sides to study how U.S. forces can be dispersed throughout Japan, through both expanded steady-state shared use of JSDF facilities and emergency access to civilian airports and seaports, to “expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency” for the defense of Japan. Dispersal would significantly complicate the targeting problem for hostile missile forces, potentially deterring a strike to begin with and certainly increasing the ability of U.S. forces to survive any initial barrage. Thirdly, the guidelines devote significant attention to cooperation in space and cyberspace, neither of which was a contested domain when the guidelines were last revised in 1997. The parameters for collaboration are broad enough to accommodate the rapid changes in both domains, but portend deepened cooperation that will improve the resiliency of both militaries and societies overall. Indeed, beyond near-term matters, a new bilateral planning mechanism, as well as closer cooperation in intelligence, defense technology, and the defense industrial base, seek to enhance long-term resilience by making sure the alliance’s military edge doesn’t have an expiration date. Politically Sustainable The United States’ strategic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific has lent the region relative stability and enabled historic gains in prosperity, and is welcomed today by nearly all countries in the region. Nevertheless, as CNAS research has demonstrated, “the nature of America’s military presence in Asia must be based on viable and enduring political arrangements and conducted in ways that contribute to (or at least do not undermine) vital political support in host countries.” The announcements made during Abe’s visit contribute to the long-term sustainability of U.S. strategic presence in Japan and the broader region in at least four ways. Firstly, the statements accompanying the guidelines articulate a positive strategic vision that the two countries share: for “a strong rules-based international order based on a commitment to rules, norms and institutions that are the foundation of global affairs and our way of life.” This depth of common purpose lends the alliance a durability that makes a crisis or mere strategic drift unlikely to dislodge each nation from the other. Secondly, the alliance is more sustainable when it is stronger. The guidelines—especially the new seamless, whole-of-government standing alliance coordination mechanism—make it more capable and interoperable, and therefore increase its deterrent power. This lessens both the likelihood of a crisis erupting and the chance that any potential crisis could go wrong in a way that sunders the alliance. Thirdly and relatedly, the guidelines seek to “promote a more balanced and effective Alliance” by committing Japan to come to the aid of U.S. forces under attack even if no armed attack against Japan has taken place. This hedges against a potentially extreme disjuncture in the alliance in which Japan—under its old strictures—could not have used force to protect Americans in danger. A more equal footing for the alliance helps to secure its future for the long term. Finally, the Japanese government is dedicated to finding a sustainable footprint for U.S. forces on Japanese soil, including through the U.S. Marine Corps’ distributed laydown. As the U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement put it, Prime Minister Abe’s visit “marks a historic step forward in transforming the U.S.-Japan partnership.” Much will depend on implementation and could be attenuated by legislative battles in Japan. But the revitalized alliance is making the U.S. position in Asia more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Among many other achievements, this should be cause for celebration in Washington and Tokyo.

#### US and Japan working together to stop China

Fairclough 16 ­­­­­­­— Gordon Fairclough, South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal, The Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), 2016 (“U.S., India, Japan Begin to Shape New Order on Asia’s High Seas”, WSJ, June 15th, Available Online at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas-1466005545>, Accessed 06-29-2016, SP)

NEW DELHI—From the waters of the Philippine Sea this week emerged a partial outline of Washington’s vision for a new Asian maritime-security order that unites democratic powers to contend with a more-assertive and well-armed China.A U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships from India and Japan jointly practiced anti-submarine warfare and air-defense and search-and-rescue drills in one of the largest and most complex exercises held by the three countries. The maneuvers were being tracked by a Chinese surveillance vessel, a U.S. Navy officer aboard the carrier USS John C. Stennis said on Wednesday. Last week, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing hoped the training “will be conducive to regional peace, security and stability.” Washington and Tokyo have long cooperated closely on defense. And the U.S. has been working to deepen strategic ties with India and to encourage New Delhi to play a more active role, not just in the Indian Ocean but also in the Pacific, as China’s rise shifts the regional balance of power. “Americans are looking for those who can share the burden,” said C. Raja Mohan, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s India center. A strengthened three-way partnership among the U.S., Japan and India is “an important strategic shift.” India, which is proud of its tradition as a nonaligned state, is unlikely to agree to any formal military alliance. But the countries already have a trilateral ministerial dialogue process that began last year.

### Japan Assured Now

#### Japan Assured Now

Smith 15(Dr. Shane Smith is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His current research focuses on strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons in Asia-Pacific affairs, extended deterrence, and North Korea’s nuclear program. He is also a Special Advisor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Implications for Extended US Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia”, November 2015. http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf)

Japan is also wrestling with uncertainty about the future of US security commitments in a changing regional and global environment. Some analysts argue that Japan is at a critical juncture in its security policy, driven both by North Korea’s nuclear program and the rise of China.43 In the minds of some regional experts, the two threats are not mutually exclusive. North Korea is sometimes considered the “cat’s paw” in a Chinese strategy to push the United States out of the region, antagonize and distract Japan, and pave the way for China’s regional expansion.44 Regardless of the actual link between China and North Korea, the rising costs of US regional deterrence against multiple nuclear threats heighten Japan’s long-term anxiety over US security commitments.45 North Korea’s growing capabilities and threats generate three immediate kinds of concerns in Japan. First, North Korea could launch non-nuclear provocations against Japan while using nuclear threats to deter retaliation. Second, Japan would be a primary nuclear target during a conflict that it cannot control on the peninsula. Indeed, many Japanese take Pyongyang at its word when it states that “Japan is always in the [nuclear] cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first.”46 Third, once North Korea can target the US homeland with nuclear weapons, it can intimidate Washington in a way that leaves Japan vulnerable to coercion. For instance, one former Japanese defense official reportedly opined about the implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea, “we cannot completely rule out the possibility of Japan’s being cut off from US nuclear strategy.”47 Faced with these challenges, Japan has engaged in intense debate over new policies to address a changed and changing security environment. Calls in Japan for a more robust US nuclear presence or for independent capabilities are quieter than in South Korea. Public opinion and institutional opposition to nuclear weapons continue to shape Japanese discourse on such issues. However, a growing number of US and Japanese analysts argue that Japan’s indefinite renunciation of nuclear weapons cannot be taken for granted; it would likely consider changing course if the security environment deteriorated or if it lost faith in the US extended deterrent.48 As Richard Samuels and James Schoff suggest, since the 1950s, Japan has more or less made clear that it reserves the right, and maintains the capacity, to develop its own nuclear arsenal if the situation warrants it.49Meanwhile, Japan is already exploring other measures to augment the US deterrent, arguably in areas where it sees US assurances lacking. For instance, there is now debate in Japan over developing a conventional strike capability that could, as Prime Minister Abe reportedly told the National Diet, “hit enemy bases in accordance with the changing international situation.”50 A primary justification for such capabilities is the need to conduct preemptive counterforce operations against a nuclear-armed North Korea.51 Unsurprisingly, these discussions raise regional concerns about a fundamental shift in Japan’s military posture partly because the debate is taking place in the context of Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution to enable “collective self-defense” and the 2013 National Security Strategy that argues for the need “to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities.”52 Not only do these developments have the potential to aggravate Japan’s relations with both South Korea and China, but it is also not clear in the literature how the changes and new capabilities would work within the structure of the US-Japan alliance. A lack of coordination between the two could lead to dangerous and unhelpful escalation during conflict on the peninsula. In an effort to enhance consultation on future challenges and the role of US extended deterrence, the US and Japan established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. There have also been repeated statements from US political leaders recommitting the full range of US capabilities to the defense of Japan. The United States has also committed additional capabilities to signal its willingness and ability to uphold its security commitments, such as the deployment of additional missile defense assets to the region, including plans to increase ground-based interceptors for national missile defense; deployment of additional Aegis-equipped warships to the West Pacific; and the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to Guam. These may not be sufficient for assuring Japan in the future, however, as it faces an increasingly nuclear-capable and unpredictable North Korea.53

#### Assurance is stable now but perception of US-China relations is key.

Samuels & Schoff 13 (Richard J. Samuels Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and James L. Schoff, and Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond “Allergy” and Breakout,” Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age. Eds. Tellis, Ashley J., Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, http://www.nbr.org/Publications/issue.aspx?id=294)

Despite shifting threat perceptions among Japanese policymakers, Tokyo’s level of confidence in U.S. security guarantees remains high due to the Obama administration’s emphasis on diplomatic and military investments in Asia, Washington’s bipartisan emphasis on the importance of alliances, and robust U.S. support for Japan during the tsunami and nuclear disaster in 2011. In the medium term, however, Japanese strategists are closely watching the U.S. response to Sino-Japanese confrontation in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For many, this is a representative or test case of the United States’ capacity and determination to deter Chinese aggression.90 Moreover, an anticipated one-third drop in U.S. defense spending from 2010 to 2015 and congressional resistance to funding base realignment plans in the AsiaPacific raise doubts for some in Japan about U.S. staying power in the region over the long term. 91 Thus, while there is no imminent loss of confidence, certain trends are unsettling to the leadership in Tokyo. One of these trends is the decline in the qualitative advantage that the allies have traditionally held over China’s armed forces. As one analyst opined, “if the U.S.-China military balance in East Asia reaches parity, then the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will be gravely shaken.” 92 On this view, Chinese and North Korean nuclear-force modernization programs will exacerbate the decoupling problem for Japan. But such modernization could also accelerate U.S. rethinking of a possible Japanese breakout. Although a decision by Japan to acquire nuclear weapons may not be in the United States’ current interest, Washington’s ability and willingness to prevent it would wane over time if China’s capabilities were to continue to expand and especially if North Korea’s status as a nuclear power were to become a normal part of the strategic environment in Asia. Under such conditions, Japan’s desire for nuclear weapons would appear more reasonable and harder to counter.93

### Nationalism Now

#### Japanese nationalism exists in the SQ

Dennis McCornac, Ph.D. in economics from the City University of New York Graduate School, visiting Affiliate Professor at Loyola University Maryland specializing in economic development and Economies or East Asia, 2014. (“‘New Nationalism’ in Japan,” *The Diplomat,* August 21st, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/new-nationalism-in-japan/>, Accessed 06-26-2016)

The rise of China, both economically and militarily, along with North Korean nuclear ambitions, have prompted a number of Japanese groups to call into question the limitations on the role of the military. This has fostered a new nationalism in Japan that may portend a movement away from its previous method of conducting international policy, namely, “checkbook diplomacy,” and has led to an intense debate about the future of Japan’s foreign policy options.

Further fueling the nationalistic fire is the more conservative and hawkish stance taken by the present Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who not only engineered his eventual return to power in September 2012, but who has been promoting the theme around the world that “Japan in back.” The prime minister has been a leader in efforts to revise school textbooks and present what critics call a whitewashed version of Japan’s wartime history.

In mid-August of this year, two Japanese cabinet ministers and more than 80 lawmakers visited Yasukuni Shrine, seen by critics as a symbol of Japan’s past militarism. These visits, as expected, have sparked anger among its Asian neighbors. China’s official Xinhua news agency considers Yasukuni shrine “a place that honors Class A war criminals of the second world war and whitewashes Japan’s war of aggression.” In South Korea, President Park Geun-hye said the “actions of some Japanese politicians were splitting the two nations.”

There is also fear that Abe will soon follow through on his pledge to reinterpret Article 9 of the Constitution that outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes, to allow Japan to exercise its right to engage in collective self-defense. Abe often repeats his policy goal of enabling Japan to take on a greater security role, and in his recent message marking the anniversary of Japan’s World War II surrender, the previous pledge to renounce war was left out.

#### Japan nationalism is high- Abe is pushing hard

Lehmann 15— Jean-Pierre Lehmann emeritus professor of international political economy at IMD, 2015 (“The Resurgence of Japanese Nationalism”, July 22, 2015, Accessed 6/27/16, Available Online at <http://www.theglobalist.com/japan-shinzo-abe-nationalism-germany/>)

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s choice to beef up Japan’s military role, supposedly made to fulfill a commitment to his American ally, is emphatically the wrong choice: It enhances the chances of war. To see why, let us recall the historical context: Japan was engaged in constant military expeditions and wars against its Asian neighbors from the mid-1870s until 1945. Only seven decades after embarking on that aggressive path was it finally defeated by China and the United States. To its credit, since 1945 Japan has not been engaged in military conflict with its neighbors or with anyone else. In article nine of the country’s 1947 Constitution, Japan renounces the sovereign right to war and, to that end, undertakes not to maintain land, sea or air forces. In reality, that latter part of article 9 has been violated since the outbreak of the Cold and Korean wars. For appearance’s sake, however, the troops were referred to as “self-defense” forces. Japan was also protected through the military alliance signed with the United States in 1952. What has Japan been doing? Does the fact that Japan has not militarily invaded anyone support Tokyo’s claim that, for the last seven decades, it has been promoting peace and democracy? Not really. For the last seven decades, Japan has been a rather inward looking nation, not much engaged either with its neighbors or the world beyond in other than purely economic concerns — trade and outward foreign direct investment. Japan also became a major source of foreign aid. However, as is the case with foreign aid for any country, the donor often benefits at least as much as the recipient, especially in the case of so-called “tied-aid” deals, which are a core feature of aid provided by Japan. Beyond these purely economic dimensions, Japan cannot claim to have been an active Asian, let alone global, citizen. Indeed, in many ways Japan has remained closed to its neighbors. It has been a major importer of energy and raw materials from Asia and other resource-rich regions of the world. Other than that, however, its market has been closed to imports of manufactured goods from Asian industrializing economies. How Japan has differed from Germany The so-called Asian NIEs (“newly industrialized economies”) were able to achieve export-driven growth by penetrating, and profiting from, American and European markets, not that of their rich neighbor Japan. This is one of the many differences between Germany and Japan. Germany has been the major market for its European neighbors, including the emerging East European economies. In contrast, Japan has not played the role of regional economic locomotive. The other major difference between Germany and Japan is that whereas the former has atoned for its atrocities and has reconciled peacefully with its neighbors, Japan has not. Japanese shores have always been unwelcoming to Asian refugees, from the Vietnamese boat people of the 1970s to the Burmese Rohingyas of today. There are more Asian refugees and immigrants in tiny Belgium (population 11.2 million) than in Japan (population 127 million). The number of Asian immigrants, though possibly rising at present in light of Japan’s aging population, remains small. Very few non-Japanese Asians hold prominent positions in Japanese corporations or institutions, in contrast to the situation in many European countries and the United States. The roughly one million ethnic Korean inhabitants of Japan, due to discrimination, have had to form their own communities and enterprises. In some cases, notably Masayoshi Son, founder and CEO of Softbank, they were strikingly successful – but have still not been assimilated in the mainstream Japanese society. In addition, violent ultra-rightist anti-Korean gangs operate in Japan, which, as I was able to experience personally recently, can be quite terrifying. A weak civil society With regard to humanitarian causes, there are a number of remarkable individual Japanese who have undertaken impressive humanitarian initiatives. An outstanding example is Tatsuya Yoshioka, Co-Founder and Director of Peace Boat – an admirable NGO dedicated to “building a culture of peace around the world.” Peace Boat is not well known abroad, partly because it gets little support from its home country. Overall, though, the Japanese political culture is not NGO-friendly, whether to domestic or foreign NGOs. Hence, civil society is weak. The Tokyo claim that causes the most bewilderment globally is the country’s alleged promotion of democracy. Japan is, it is true, a democracy. Before 1945, there was a brief experiment in democracy that failed miserably as the country was taken over by an Emperor worship-based military dictatorship. It was only the post-war American Occupation that brought Japan democracy. The country represents a very rare case of a successful U.S. democratization initiative. Two former Japanese colonies, South Korea and Taiwan, have become democracies, not because a democratic regime was imposed by foreign forces, but because of strong domestic social forces from below. Japan played no role in the democratic transitions of Korea and Taiwan. Indeed, Japan is on very bad terms with its democratic neighbor South Korea and the two countries’ respective heads of government have not met for quite some time now. What a contrast with the ties that bind Germany and France! Internationalism versus nationalism The fact that Japan should be redefining its military role raises many questions, especially in light of the means by which the bill was railroaded through the Diet. Polls indicate that two-thirds of the Japanese population is opposed to the bill. There have been demonstrations and petitions. Fundamentally, the fact that Japan has not been an active Asian citizen would not per se cause grave concern. What is worrying is that this is happening in conjunction with the increasingly strident nationalism and revisionism of the Japanese political leadership. Although Prime Minister Abe has refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine since 2013 due to intense international pressure, it continues to be regularly visited by other prominent Japanese politicians, including members of Abe’s government. In the Yasukuni Shrine repose the spirits of 14 Class A war criminals, including Iwane Matsui, the officer responsible for the Nanjing Massacre that killed an estimated 200,000 civilians. This is as if, in Germany, members of Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Party visited and paid homage to the tombs of the Waffen SS. This act is a cruel provocation vis-à-vis Japan’s neighbors and erstwhile victims and thereby a major reason why there is no peace in Asia Pacific. Over half of Abe’s Cabinet, including Abe himself, along with some 150 MPs from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), are members of a powerful ultra-nationalist lobby known as Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference). Far from promoting democracy, it insists that the American Occupation and the Constitution emasculated Japan. That is the domestic political context in Japan that makes advocating re-arming Japan so troublesome. This same group praises the invasions, massacres and rapes of its East Asian neighbors as wars of liberation. Restoring the Emperor to his prewar divine position and cleansing the minds of students sullied by left-wing teachers, etc., are among its other causes. So much for promoting peace and democracy! Human rights violations The most heinous aspect of contemporary Japanese revisionism is the denial of the plight of the Korean — (and other) sex slaves (known euphemistically in Japanese as “ianfu,” meaning comfort women) — forced into prostitution by the Japanese army during the war. Japanese revisionists deny their existence — or, worse, claim they were just common whores. Their efforts contravene the historical record. As a group of Japanese historical associations has stated in a recent declaration, “the existence of forcibly recruited ‘comfort women’ has been verified by many historical records and research” and “those who were made comfort women fell victim to unspeakable violence as sex slaves.” If Japanese parliamentarians ceased paying visits to Yasukuni, if Nippon Kaigi were dissolved, if Prime Minister Abe were to go to Seoul and bow before the memorial erected in honor of the Ianfu, there would be far less concern about Japan’s increased military role. However, given the unrelenting chauvinism that pervades Japan’s political establishment, it is no wonder that in East Asia there is serious concern about the resurgence of Japanese militarism — and hence the prospect of war in Asia. Rather than being a de facto propellant of strident Japanese nationalism à la Abe, the U.S. government would be well advised to pursue a far more circumspect stance vis-à-vis the rearmament of Japan.

### China Japan Relations Low

#### Japan-Sino Relations Low Sino-Japanese relationship fundamentally flawed —memory politics and ontological security

Gustafsson 13 — Karl Gustafsson, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, PhD in political science from Stockholm University, part-time lecturer in political science at Stockholm University, 2013. (“Memory Politics and Ontological Security in Sino Japanese Relations,” *Asian Studies Review*, November 18th, Available Online http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2013.852156, Accessed 05-19-2016, p. 83-84, aqp) This article has argued that, while the focus of study has often been on perpetrator states (e.g. Japan), representations of the past in victimised states (e.g. China) also play an important role in bilateral relations. Chinese representations matter in several ways – attempts have been made by the CCP to use memory for ontological security purposes. Furthermore, political actors in Japan have politicised Chinese memory and made partly successful attempts to influence the content of museum exhibitions in China. Political actors may, as has been the case in both China and Japan, depict the cultural products or memory narratives of other states as a direct threat to the ontological security of citizens of their own state. In addition, Japanese actors have politicised Chinese exhibitions of the past as a threat to the identities of Chinese and foreigners because of a fear that those exposed to such representations may become anti-Japanese. According to this argument, if Chinese and other foreigners become anti-Japanese this may, in an indirect way, threaten both Japanese material interests and the Japanese identity envisioned by these Japanese actors. In other words, it is ultimately a matter of ontological security. The evidence presented in this article has revealed that many political actors share a fundamental understanding according to which people’s minds are affected by memory narratives. This rationale motivates their actions. They may not believe that their own minds are affected in such a way but they explicitly express the belief that others’ minds, most notably children’s, are thus affected. Some would perhaps argue that the primary reason that Japanese government representatives have raised the issue of Chinese war museums is to blame the Chinese side for bilateral tensions. Yet if this were indeed the main purpose, the Japanese government would certainly have made a greater effort to get its message across to a larger audience. Instead, Japanese government representatives have discussed the content of exhibitions with Chinese officials with the intent of having it changed in a discreet way. If the objective had been to shift blame it seems likely that the media would have been used. This further indicates that these Japanese actors actually do believe that people’s minds are affected by these museum exhibitions. Both Chinese and Japanese actors politicise threats to similar referent objects, but the threats identified by the CCP are often general, whereas those referred to by Japanese actors are specific. This, it seems, leads to different responses and measures for dealing with these threats. The CCP addresses them mainly through education, whereas measures taken by the Japanese government have chiefly involved attempts to make Chinese actors alter Chinese exhibitions. The Japanese actors believe that exhibitions threaten Japanese interests not only because the minds and identities of Japanese youngsters may be affected but also because Chinese and foreigners may be similarly influenced by Chinese exhibitions leading, in turn, to security threats to Japanese interests. In other words, the referent objects referred to by Japanese actors are not all domestic. Therefore, domestic measures, for example in the form of education, are insufficient. Even though educational reforms that emphasise patriotism have been implemented in Japan in recent years with the revision of the FLE, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats arguably operate under more far-reaching constraints than their Chinese counterparts. This means that domestic measures cannot be as comprehensive as in the PRC. An additional reason for the dissimilar responses could be the different nature of the threats. The threats against which Japanese actors attempt to secure Japanese identity consist of negative representations of Japan. Demands for changes to such portrayals might be seen as legitimate. Chinese actors, in contrast, appear to be more concerned with the positive portrayal of other countries. That foreign requests for changes to positive representations will be met, or even seen as reasonable, seems unlikely. This makes immunisation through education necessary

#### Sino-Japanese tensions high now

Baruah 15—Pranamita Baruah, Research Assistant at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2015.(“Abe’s China Policy Fuel Tensions in Japan–China Relations,” *East Asia Forum*, September 17th, Available Online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/17/abes-china-policy-fuel-tensions-in-japan-china-relations/>, Accessed 06-10-2016, aqp)

For a long time, relations between Japan and China have been plagued by historical and territorial disputes. So far, the frictions show no sign of abating. Instead, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken a nationalistic approach towards China. China has reportedly regularly intruded into Japanese territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and repeatedly demanded Japan to apologise for its wartime atrocities. These events have heightened tensions between the two countries. Demonstrators protest against controversial national security bills outside Japan's parliament in Tokyo, Japan, 16 September 2015. (Photo: AAP) The situation could become more complicated in the coming months, in the wake of Japan’s latest defence white paper, Tokyo’s fierce opposition to China’s development of offshore oil fields in the East China Sea, the enactment of Japan’s new security bills and Abe’s recent statement on the 70th anniversary of World War II. On 21 July, the Japanese cabinet approved the defence white paper for 2015. The paper expresses strong concern over China’s ‘coercive’ maritime advances in the East and South China Seas, stating that Beijing continues to ‘show an uncompromising stance toward realizing its unilateral claims’. These actions include the reported construction of new gas fields in the East China Sea, which the white paper calls for a stop to. The paper argues that the security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly tough due to China’s ‘high-handed’ activities that intend ‘to alter the status quo by force’. Therefore, it calls for Japan to boost its own defence capabilities. A day after the release of the white paper, the Japanese government released photos and maps showing China’s construction of offshore gas fields in the East China Sea. Tokyo seems to believe that by developing those fields, China not only infringes on Japan’s territorial rights, but also violates a tacit 2008 bilateral agreement on joint gas field development. Tokyo is equally concerned about the economic and security threats posed by those oil fields. Tokyo fears that China would eventually try to siphon off oil and gas deposits from the Japanese side of the East China Sea, hurting the Japanese economy. China could also convert the offshore gas fields to military facilities and threaten Japanese security. China has reacted strongly against Japan’s latest white paper, alleging that it is ‘artificially creating tensions’ and ‘stirring up fears about China’s military threats’. The Chinese foreign ministry has also insisted that by releasing the photos and maps of Chinese gas fields, Japan is not only provoking confrontation between the two countries, but also complicating the management of the East China Sea. Meanwhile, the enactment of Japan’s controversial new security legislation in September 2015 could exacerbate tensions. The bills enable Japan to exercise limited forms of collective self-defence, which has until now had been considered unconstitutional. China has been extremely sceptical about the bills, arguing that could allow Japan to remilitarise. The bills enable Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to respond to ‘grey zone’ infringements — incursions that fall short of an armed attack — in Japanese territorial waters and airspace. Such provisions certainly enhance the possibility of an armed confrontation between Japan and China if there is a miscommunication, even over a small incident, in the East China Sea. Abe’s recent statement on 15 August in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of World War II is another irritant in Japan–China relations. In the statement, Abe incorporated the four key phrases from the historic Murayama Statement: ‘aggression’, ‘colonial rule’, ‘deep remorse’ and ‘heartfelt apology’. But he did not offer a fresh apology for the atrocities wartime Japan committed in neighbouring states. Instead he argued that Japan’s future generations should not be destined to perpetually apologise. Clearly disappointed, China reiterated its demand for a sincere apology from Japan. China’s state-run Xinhua news agency was critical of Abe’s statement due to his ‘watered-down’ apology. It insisted that the ‘adulterated apology is far from being enough for Japan’s neighbours and the broader international community to lower their guard’. The current stand-off between Japan and China can be largely attributed to the lack of political will to resolve bilateral disputes amicably. Instead of assuaging each other’s concerns on issues of shared interest, the actions of both leaders have seemed to aggravate tensions. The Abe administration’s recent acts are likely to only exacerbate tensions further. The adverse repercussions have already become evident. Despite Japanese media reporting Abe’s intention to visit Beijing on 3 September 2015 to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Chinese foreign ministry dismissed such a possibility.

#### China Japan Relations declining now

Xue and Zheng 16 —Xue Li, Phd., Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Zheng Yuwen, master’s degree student at China Foreign Affairs University, 2016.(“Japan's Declining Place in Chinese Diplomacy,” *The Diplomat*, March 16th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/japans-declining-place-in-chinese-diplomacy/>, Accessed 05-04-2016, aqp)

After a three year hiatus, China, South Korea, and Japan resumed their trilateral summit at the end of 2015, which would seem a step forward in improving political and economic relations among the three countries as well as keeping peace and stability in Northeast Asia. However, problems between China and Japan will prevent further improvements. For the foreseeable future, China-Japan relations will probably remain lukewarm to cold rather than being truly friendly. Expect political zigzags ahead.

After three decades of its reform and opening-up policy, China’s comprehensive national power and international influence have risen enormously. It’s the right time for China to adjust its identity and diplomatic strategies. Therefore, the new Chinese government has proposed the “One Belt and One Road” initiative (OBOR), the top-level design for China’s foreign relations, which will consequently shape China’s foreign strategy in the coming years. From now on, China will again view itself as a central country in Asia writ large, as well as a main power on the Eurasian continent, instead of merely an East Asian country.

Based on that, China has obviously strengthened its diplomacy toward neighboring countries. Now China needs to discover which relationships have the most potential. It’s easy to see how most of China’s neighbors fit in to the OBOR plan. But what about Japan?

When it comes to Northeast Asia, South Korea has become China’s key sub-regional partner. In contrast, China-Japan relations are no longer as important as they were in the 1980s and 1990s when Japan was a very important country – behind only the United States — for China. Japan now has fallen behind Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, ASEAN, and South Korea on China’s diplomatic priority list. This situation will continue in the foreseeable future, thanks mostly to Japan’s own foreign policy.

### A2: Okinawa

#### Alliance robust and politically sustainable—Okinawa is small

Schoff 15 — James Schoff, Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate Program, 2015, (“Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia”, Carnegie Endowment, July 16th, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/2015/07/16/strengthening-u.s.-alliances-in-northeast-asia/, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

Overall, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances are in good shape today, thanks in part to consistent bipartisan support from the U.S. government over the years and careful attention paid most recently by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Polls show broad support on each side of these two alliances, and political change (back and forth) in all three countries over the last two decades has not disrupted their relationships.1 In fact, the alliances are arguably as strong as they have ever been.

Quick and robust U.S. support for Japan in the aftermath of its 2011 tsunami and nuclear crisis was the right thing to do not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also from a U.S. strategic standpoint and as a close friend. Although current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe often remarks that his party’s return to power in late 2012 helped “repair” U.S.-Japan relations, the fact is that alliance cooperation was solid during the last two years the Democratic Party of Japan was in power, and this emerging “bipartisan” support for the relationship in Japan should be celebrated. It is a long-term asset for the alliance.

Acrimonious trade battles are largely a thing of the past (though not extinct), which has strengthened a sense of partnership. U.S.-Japan cooperation initiatives in a variety of fields— including energy, the environment, health, science and technology, and development aid (including the recently established U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue2)— have been a staple of the post-Cold War period and deliver value to the allies and to the world. Bilateral defense cooperation continues to broaden and deepen in an evolutionary manner, amidst a deteriorating security environment.

In recent years the allies have conducted more frequent and complex military exercises, updated bilateral planning, collaborated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations including Pacific Partnership and Operation Damayan in the Philippines (among others), established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to consider alliance responses to nuclear threats, and announced new Guidelines for Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2015 to adapt to modern security threats.3 In addition, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed on a plan to reduce the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa and relocate the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station for a more politically sustainable posture, receiving permission from the local governor to initiate the project (although this relocation faces delays due to local political opposition and a new opposition-backed governor).

### A2: Cooperation Now

#### Cooperation is being replaced by Competition

Shambaugh 15 - David Shambaugh is professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. (David, 6/11/15, “In a fundamental shift, China and the US are now engaged in all-out competition”, <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out>, Accessed 6/29/16, MW)

The relationship between the United States and China has rightly been described as the most important relationship in world affairs. It is also the most complex and fraught one. These two titans are the world's two leading powers and are interconnected in numerous ways bilaterally, regionally, and globally. It is therefore of vital importance to understand the dynamics that underlie and drive this relationship at present, which are shifting. While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship. This balance has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now trumps economics in the relationship. The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomaxtic, technological, even in the academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China. Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both publics view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers. The macro trajectory for the last decade has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits. Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time, provide similar stabilisation and impetus for movement in specific policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived, with only a matter of months passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes. The most recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia. But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws), human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel

#### Current cooperation is priced in, but if the US further engages with China now it sends the signal of abandonment to our allies

Kazianis 2016 – senior communications manager for foreign policy and legal studies at the Heritage Foundation (Harry, "Is the United States and China Destined for a Deadly Collision in the Sky?," May 19, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-united-states-china-destined-deadly-collision-the-sky-16282?page=2)

To say the bilateral relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is ‘complex’ might just be the ultimate of understatements. Consider the facts: Beijing and Washington enjoy rich historic and cultural ties that date back generations. Over 300,000 Chinese students today attend American universities, only adding to the richness and cultural diversity of these important intuitions. And most important of all, the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship is worth over $591 Billion and rising. Bearing in mind how much both sides gain from a productive and strong partnership, many in Washington—and certainly many around the world—hoped that strong ties would serve as a springboard towards Beijing’s “peaceful rise.” Indeed, China’s economy is now the second largest by measure of gross domestic product (ranked number one if you consider purchasing power parity) and has only fueled hopes of Beijing becoming what is popularly termed a “responsible stakeholder”—that China, with a ‘stake’ in the stability of the international system thanks to strong global economic ties, would follow widely accepted international relations norms and practices. Cooperation on areas of shared and mutual interest would be emphasized with a clear hope any areas of competition—with a clear understanding that there would be competition in multiple domains—would not derail or weaken what had been accomplished. Sadly, such hopes have not transcended into reality. Unfortunately for the United States and its allies in Asia, it seems Beijing has decided to undertake a very different direction in its foreign policy and security goals over the last several years—one that very well undermines the very peace and security Asia has known for decades, the very bedrock of the region’s awe inspiring economic transformation. In what can only be described as an arch of instability stretching North from the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands all the way to the very southern edges of the South China Sea and now moving west to what is commonly referred to the Second Island Chain, Beijing has decided that an aggressive policy of slowly but surely weakening the status quo serves its interests. And Chinese actions clearly demonstrate the above approach. In just the last several years (and far from a comprehensive list), Beijing has sought to enforce lines drawn over vast expanses of the South China Sea along with building islands in this hotly contests area, declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea without any prior warning along with booting regional allies like the Philippines out disputed reefs far closer to the Philippines than China. The goal, many would argue, is to dominate Asia, but more importantly, displace the United States as the preeminent power in the region. In fact, it now seems America, along with its allies and partners, are slowly moving towards a much more intense security competition with China in the months and years to come, the consequences of which cannot be simply swept aside—especially considering Washington and Beijing both have nuclear weapons. Sadly, recent headlines only prove Beijing’s aggressive actions throughout the region could spark a superpower clash that has not been seen in decades. On Tuesday, a U.S. EP-3 Orion aircraft flying in international airspace over the South China Sea was approached by two Chinese advanced J-11 fighter jets. While close monitoring of a military aircraft or naval vessel in international space is certainly a standard practice this interaction was anything but normal. Chinese aviators came within 50 feet of the U.S. plane, prompting the pilot to descend several thousand feet out of safety considerations. Sound familiar? It should, as China has utilized this playbook before. In 2014, a Chinese fighter jet came dangerously close to a P-8 U.S. surveillance plane and preformed a barrel roll over it. According to reports, “the Chinese J-11 fighter passed the P-8 Poseidon at 90 degrees, with its belly toward the U.S. aircraft to show off its weapons.” Thankfully, recent incidents like the ones described above have not led to any injuries or deaths—but that has not always been the case. Back in 2001, an American EP-3 aircraft collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet. The pilot of the J-8 was killed while the U.S. aircraft was forced to undertake an emergency landing in China on Hainan Island. A tense standoff ensued. Thankfully the U.S. crew was released weeks later. When one considers carefully incidents like the above combined with Beijing’s clear attempts to alter the status quo, it is vital that Washington respond accordingly to not only reinforce America’s commitment to the region but demonstrate clear American leadership. There are two clear ways to ensure China understands American resolve despite its constant testing of the international order in Asia. First, Washington must ensure and forge deeper relations with other nations in East Asia—especially important allies. As explained in The Heritage Foundation’s recent Solutions 2016 report: The U.S. has five treaty allies in the Asia–Pacific region (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand). The U.S. should be unequivocal in its commitment to mutual defense under these treaties. The U.S. should engage these and other, non-ally nations in the region so that they do not perceive China as the sole game in town. Also, considering that China is using military instruments of power to push back against America’s place in the region, maintaining a strong U.S. military presence is vital—in fact, it should be only strengthened: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding and modernization programs should be fully funded. The U.S. should also invest in long-range power projection systems (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, bombers, and nuclear attack submarines) and other systems that would counter efforts to deny U.S. forces access to the region or interfere with the freedom of the seas. In addition, the U.S. should maintain robust bases in the region to support U.S. forces. Clearly the above only serves as a down payment in what can only be part of a comprehensive strategy to ensure China’s rise does not become Asia’s nightmare. It is clear that only Washington has the power to balance Beijing and keep its increasing assertiveness in check. While America will certainly work with China in areas of cooperation which are certainly vast, Beijing must know Washington will resist any attempts to alter the status-quo while preserving the peace, security and freedom of the Asia-Pacific region.

#### US-China cooperation is low now- general mistrust and tensions over Taiwan and NGO’s

Harding 15 —Harry Harding, former dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and the Frank Batten School of Public Policy at the University of Virginia, is now University Professor at the University of Virginia and Visiting Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2015 (“Has U.S. China Policy Failed?”, Fall 2015, Accessed 6/29/16, Available online at <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Harding.pdf>, JRR)

The immediate stimulus for the current debate over U.S. China policy is a growing and widespread dissatisfaction with China’s evolution both domestically and internationally, especially after the end of the global financial crisis and the emergence of Xi Jinping as China’s president and Party general secretary. A number of observers have analyzed the sources of the increasing U.S. displeasure with China, as well as the grounds for China’s corresponding unhappiness with the United States.2 Both are important—what the United States regards as disappointing Chinese behavior, Beijing and some Western analysts portray as a response to provocative conduct by the United States or its allies. However one assigns responsibility for the problem, the sense of mutual frustration has led to increasing mutual mistrust, at both the elite and popular levels.3 In the Some believe we may be reaching a tipping point toward an outright strategic rivalry. United States, the displeasure with China has reached the point that an avalanche of books, reports, and essays has appeared, all of them challenging some aspects of present U.S. China policy and proposing change. Many, although not all, of those analyses demand a tougher stand toward Beijing. Even at this relatively early stage in the debate, therefore, some analysts believe that the two countries may be reaching a tipping point at which their relationship will assume a fundamentally competitive character, even turning into an outright strategic rivalry.4 One source of U.S. disappointment is China’s domestic political evolution over the last several years, especially since the selection of Xi Jinping as Communist Party leader in 2012. Not only has Beijing failed to liberalize its political system, as many observers hoped would come about as the eventual result of the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis and China’s increasing prosperity, but it has actually tightened government and Party control over Chinese society, particularly over the press, social media, universities, and non-governmental organizations. What appeared to be promising trends in the past—such as the emergence of an active and lively cyberspace, the creation of non-governmental organizations to provide social services and promote better governance, and the emergence of lawyers and activists dedicated to combating violations of civil and political rights—have been suppressed or reversed. Of particular concern is a draft law on non-governmental organizations, released in the spring of 2015, that would place both domestic and foreign NGOs under the supervision of the domestic security apparatus, and place greater restrictions on their activities in China. Second, while achieving some welcome rebalancing of the Chinese economy— away from its previous dependence on exports, investment, and state-owned enterprises—the government and the party retain significant control and substantial ownership in core sectors of the Chinese economy. Small and medium enterprises still have difficulty raising capital from the state banking system, and Chinese citizens have few profitable vehicles in which to invest their savings. Chinese equity markets, which were presented as the solution to some of these problems, have experienced a severe stock bubble that, when it recently burst, triggered a round of extensive state intervention that has worried and disappointed those who had been hoping for further reform of the country’s financial sector. Many in the business community are also concerned that current Chinese policy is further restricting, rather than expanding, the opportunities for foreign businesses in China, including those from the United States. While the two countries continue negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty that may further facilitate U.S. investment in China, U.S. complaints about violations of intellectual property rights, the promotion of “indigenous innovation” 5 and “national champions”, 6 and the seemingly selective targeting of foreign ventures in the implementation of anti-monopoly and product safety regulations have not abated. The most recent survey conducted by the United States Has U.S. China Policy Failed? China Business Council has concluded that member companies “have seen little tangible impact from China’s economic reforms and report little improvement in any of the top 10 issues over the past year.” 7 Similarly, the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing has concluded that “challenges in China are on the rise, with a significant increase in the number of companies reporting that the quality of China’s investment environment is deteriorating.” 8 These concerns about China’s domestic politics and the Chinese economic environment are long-standing. When we turn to China’s behavior abroad however, we see the rapid emergence of a newer set of disappointments. Critics of Chinese foreign policy, including some U.S. former and even present government officials, have expressed their frustration that China has failed to become the “responsible stakeholder” in the international system for which Americans had hoped. The first complaint along these lines was that China is doing too little, acting as a “burden-shifter” rather than a “burden-sharer,” 9 or as a “freerider” 10 or “cheap-rider” 11 on the public goods provided by the United States and U.S.-led institutions. China was accused of failing to pull its weight on issues where it has both significant influence and major stakes such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. Citing Napoleon’s description of nineteenthcentury China as a sleeping giant that when waked would “shake the world,” Princeton professor and former deputy assistant secretary of State Thomas Christensen portrays China as “napping in the early twentieth-first century,” rather than fulfilling its international obligations.12 More recently, the problem has become just the opposite: China has awakened, but is still not turning itself into a responsible stakeholder in the existing regional and global system. Instead, China is viewed as increasingly challenging that system, in part by disparaging some of its major components, particularly the U.S. alliance structure in Asia, and also by sponsoring or endorsing new institutions intended to serve as alternatives or even competitors to existing organizations such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These include the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (more commonly known as the BRICS Bank), and the trade grouping known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for the Asia–Pacific Region (or RCEP). Some of these new institutions, in turn, will help finance Beijing’s new regional infrastructure project—the “One Belt, One Road” that will build a system of railroads, pipelines, roads, and ports linking China more closely to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Given China’s large domestic market and huge foreign exchange reserves, these new institutions and infrastructure projects have the potential to build a network of economic partners, strategic allies, and international organizations that may rival what the United States created in the decades after World War II. So far, it is unclear what conditions, if any, Beijing will place on the financing provided by these new financial organizations. Most important to many analysts, China is increasingly posing a security challenge to its neighbors in the Western Pacific, and thus to the United States as well. In the absence of what those analysts regard as any clear threat to its own interests, China is developing a variety of military capabilities—most particularly a bluewater navy—aimed at deterring Taiwanese independence and compelling Taiwan’s unification with China, denying U.S. and allied forces unfettered access to the Western Pacific, and controlling sea lanes of communications in the region. These capabilities include aircraft carriers, advanced surface ships and submarines, tactical and strategic missiles, and also a variety of asymmetrical weapons systems intended to negate U.S. technological advantages such as antisatellite weapons, multiple-reentry warheads, and cyber warfare techniques which can both engage in espionage and disrupt critical infrastructure. More recently, Beijing has used some of these capabilities to take unilateral actions to reinforce its claims to disputed reefs and islands in the South China and East China Sea, engaging in “land reclamation” projects to build up small islets and reefs that it controls, building runways and other facilities on those artificial islands, sending oil rigs to explore for oil and gas reserves in parts of the sea bed claimed by China, and conducting more aggressive sea and air patrols in areas claimed by others. It has announced an expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. Moreover, an increasing number of cyber intrusions against U.S. government and private institutions have allegedly originated in China.

#### US – China competition in Africa high

Lyman 15 **—** Princeton Lyman, Adjunct Senior Fellow on the Council of Foreign relations, 2015, (“China and the US in Africa: A Strategic Competition,” 10/10, Available online at <http://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/ChinaandUS_Africa.pdf>, Accessed 6/29/16)

On the other hand it is wise to look upon China as a formidable competitor for both political and economic influence in Africa than as only a benign participant. David Shinn has pointed out that China now has more diplomatic offices in Africa than does the U.S., and argues that in some countries Chinese influence counts for more. As noted, China is not deterred from investments and other activities in countries accused of major human rights violations, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, limiting the potential for UN sanctions and other international pressures on those regimes. In international fora, China has more consistent support from the African bloc than does the U.S. Commercially, China uses practices that disadvantage U.S. companies. For example, China often will combine a bid for oil or mineral concessions with promises of some aid projects, a practice which the U.S. is forbidden to do under rules of the Development Advisory Committee of the OECD, to which China does not belong. China also undermines some practices and principles of other donors. For example, against World Bank rules, China has African countries collateralize its loans with commitments of future oil or other mineral exports. At the same time, China is not immune from the risks and difficulties the U.S. and other western countries face in Africa. Chinese workers have been kidnapped and killed in Ethiopia, and kidnapped for ransom in Nigeria. China has sought to renegotiate its $8 billion infrastructure loan to the DRC, predicated on access to valuable mineral deposits, in face of (a) lowered commodity prices on the world market, and (b) continuing instability in that country. Years after making Nigeria an offer of $5 billion for railroad reconstruction, China and Nigeria have abandoned the project because of lack of agreement on conditions and other details. China has also abandoned its offer to buy one of Nigeria’s refineries in return for access to an oil concession. China is becoming aware that possible independence for southern Sudan in 2011 suggests moderating its almost rigid support for the Khartoum government, and has started to make advances to the southern Sudan administration as well as provide peacekeepers to the UN force there. All of these developments open the door to greater cooperation between the U.S. and China on matters of African security and stability, and hopefully on rules of the road for commercial and aid activities. But where the U.S. particularly needs to step up in response to Chinese activity in Africa is in developing a comprehensive approach to multilateral issues such as trade that will serve Africa better than what the BRIC offers. The U.S. needs to counter various international efforts that would split up or undermine African efforts to strengthen sub-regional trade areas and appeal to Africa on the basis of common U.SAfrican interests in trade negotiations. The U.S. also needs to engage Africa more on issues of democracy and good governance, and in trilateral discussions with China and African countries, focus on ways in which all donors and investors can reinforce those goals. Finally, the U.S. must recognize that much of China’s appeal in Africa is its willingness to respond to African development priorities, such as infrastructure, and to look at Africa as a promising area for investment. The U.S. only recently returned to infrastructure projects under the Millennium Challenge Account, after three decades of absence. American investment is still heavily concentrated in the natural resource sector. 5 China is not a strategic threat to the United States in Africa. But it poses serious challenges for political and commercial influence. Both in sharpening the U.S. response, and by engaging China more on common areas of concern, can the U.S. meet this challenge effectively.

## Link

### General Link

#### US-China engagement causes fear of abandonment and breaks Japanese self-restraint on regional activism

Zhu, 5/10/2010 (Feng, professor and director of the International Security Program at the School of International Studies @ Peking University, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact” Foreign Policy In Focus Accessed 6/23/2016 <http://fpif.org/an_emerging_trend_in_east_asia/> JJH)

Japan faces both domestic and demographic constraints on its regional activism. Even if Japan becomes a “normal” power more engaged in international security affairs, its nationalism makes regional cooperation more difficult. Japan’s tradition of “mercantile realism”—or, more popularly, “reluctant realism”—remains very difficult to change and also constrains Japan’s emergence as an independent strategic power. In this context, Japan has focused its emerging international activism on support for the U.S.-Japan alliance rather than pursuit of an independent international role. This quite limited contribution to regional stability will eventually cause growing dissatisfaction among Japan’s strategic-military specialists, given the Barack Obama administration’s “nuclear twin commitments,” as they are inclined to believe that a better relationship between Washington and Beijing might make the United States less likely to risk an outright conflict with China to defend Japan. However, Japan’s international stance is not fixed and unchangeable. China’s growing international clout is beginning to transform Japan’s long-held self-restraint in defense thinking. China’s military spending surpassed Japan in 2006, and the gap between Tokyo and Japan will continue to grow as long as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains bent on rapid modernization. China’s military spending will, sooner or later, produce less tolerant behavior from Japan. At the same time, the constructive U.S.-China relationship calls into question the U.S. commitment to protect Japan if Tokyo comes into conflict with Beijing. There is a remarkable tendency in Tokyo to see U.S. efforts to engage China as detrimental to Japan. Many Japanese aligned with the Liberal Democratic Party mistakenly interpret efforts to engage China as hostility, or at least, the malign neglect of their own country.

#### Increases US-China engagement furthers Japanese nationalism which causes rearmament.

Chu 2008 (Shulong, Professor of Public Policy and Management @Tsinghua University and CNAPS China Fellow 2006-2007, “A MECHANISM TO STABILIZE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN ASIA“ THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES January, Accessed 6/22/2016 <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/2736/uploads> JJH)

Japan’s potential to become a greater military power has been noticed by certain Chinese, American, and Japanese observers. In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Matthews wrote that the December 18, 2001, North Korean spy ship event demonstrated “that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force,” which suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense.… rising nationalism has taken hold in one of America’s closest allies. This development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan. … Japan is clearly moving in a different direction.2 Matthews argues that Japanese resentment over the United States’s shift of attention to China, coupled with Japan-China strategic tensions, has strengthened the hand of Japanese nationalists who think their country should once more possess military power to rival that of its neighbors. The lack of recognition of Japan in international institutions strikes many Japanese as profoundly unjust, and leads some to wonder whether military rearmament might be one way to help their country get the respect it deserves. In the words of Kitaoka Shinichi, a University of Tokyo law professor whom Matthews cites, “Remilitarization is indeed going on.”3 When Shinzo Abe was about to take office as Japan’s Prime Minister in September 2006, the New York Times and other news media published many articles and reports on the rise of Japanese nationalism, represented by Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. According to the Washington Post, Prime Minister Abe would encourage Japanese citizens “to take pride in their country…and promote the ideal of a proud and independent Japan.”4 Abe had a big vision for the future of Japan. “Rather than getting praised for wrestling a good round of sumo under the rules that foreign countries make, we should join in the making of the rules,” he said in televised debate in September 2006, “…I believe I can create a new Japan with a new vision.”5 The Post further reported that he would implement “a sweeping education bill, strengthening the notion of patriotism in public classrooms in a way not seen since the fall of Imperial Japan,” and would “rewrite Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow the country to again have an official and flexible military.” It claimed that “[t]he rise of Abe, an unabashed nationalist set to be Japan’s youngest post postwar prime minister and its first to be born after the conflict, underscores a profound shift in thinking that has been shaped by those threats.”6

### Decoupling Link

#### Increased US-China engagement accelerates Japanese fears of decoupling which damage the alliance and cause remilitarization

Glosserman 2013 — Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, 2013 (“The China challenge and the US-Japan alliance”, CSIS, 11/21, Available Online at <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/Pac1383.pdf>, Accessed 6-23-16, JJH)

The biggest issue for the US-Japan alliance is China. Washington and Tokyo must address the direct challenges that Beijing poses to regional security as well as manage the impact of China’s rise on their bilateral relationship. The latter is the more difficult of the two assignments: while there is considerable common ground in the two countries’ assessment of China, there is a growing gap between Americans and Japanese on how to respond to Chinese behavior. On paper, the two countries are in lockstep when it comes to China. The language of the last Security Consultative Committee meeting (the SCC, usually called the “2+2”) is explicit: The US and Japan “continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.” It sounds like boilerplate, but it hits the right notes, identifying concerns and telling Beijing what they expect it to do. But beneath this concord, there is discord. When it comes to China, Japan is channeling the spirit of Margaret Thatcher, who once warned President George HW Bush to “not go wobbly” when dealing with the Soviets. Japanese experts and officials voice two concerns. The first is a fear of “decoupling” the US and Japan, a worry since President Bill Clinton overflew Tokyo twice on his way to and from Beijing. Japanese worry that they have been eclipsed by China as the US’s preferred partner in Asia. There is teeth gnashing in Tokyo every time the US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue convenes, and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is still waiting for his shirt-sleeves Sunnylands summit with President Obama. Fears of decoupling have receded – but haven’t vanished – and Tokyo now frets over “mutual vulnerability” (sometimes called “strategic stability”), a world in which China’s nuclear arsenal makes Washington hesitant to respond to Chinese aggression. This leads to a “stability-instability paradox”: a situation in which the prospect of mutual pain creates stability at the strategic level (MAD provided this during the Cold War) but invites small-scale provocations or aggression locally. The geographic focus of this particular fear is the Senkaku Islands, uninhabited islets in the East China Sea that are held by Japan and claimed by China (and called the Daioyu in Chinese), that have become the locus of tensions in the JapanChina relationship. Even though the US has insisted for years that the islands are covered under the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese are not mollified. The standard US response is that the “US takes no stand on the claims to disputed territory, but the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the treaty as ‘territory administered by Japan.’ ” Japanese experts and officials urge the US to be more forward leaning, actually backing Japan’s claim to the islands as well as chastising China for threatening instability in the region. They prefer language from the Trilateral Security Dialogue (which includes the US, Japan and Australia), released a day after the SCC statement, which decries “coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea,” wording more explicit than that in the 2+2 declaration. What accounts for the gap in perspectives? One difference is obvious: Japan feels threatened now by Chinese actions. As a Japanese scholar explained, “this is the first occasion in which the Japanese people really sense the possibility that Japanese territory under control of their government may be menaced by an external enemy.” The US is also worried by Chinese behavior, but the threat is more distant, both in terms of geography and time, and more abstract (typically framed in regard to a shifting balance of power). This reflects a second difference: how each country ranks security threats. China tops Japan’s list, while the US identifies North Korea as its immediate regional concern. The US may be dragged into conflict in both cases, but Pyongyang is considered a more belligerent and unpredictable force than Beijing. Third, there is the context in which each country frames relations with China. China is among both countries’ top trading partners and the destination of considerable investment from both. But Washington sees relations with Beijing more broadly, engaging it as a partner across a range of endeavors, while Japan’s perspective is narrower – it sees China primarily as a threat. US references to a strategic partnership, or sometimes even cooperation, with China raise temperatures in Tokyo. Other factors tug on the alliance. The bitter, bloody history of Japan-China relations during the 20th century distinguishes regional analysis in Tokyo and Washington, creating expectations and obstacles for Japan that the US doesn’t face. (Ironically, in the 1980s, this history pushed Tokyo closer to Beijing than the US liked.) Beijing is quick to widen perceived gaps in thinking between Washington and Tokyo, playing up the image of an irresponsible US or an irresolute Japan. Some Japanese hawk a China threat because it supports their political agenda, whether increasing military spending or loosening constitutional restrictions on the Self-Defense Forces. Highlighting a China threat also reinforces the message that Tokyo is a serious ally, ready to pull its weight on regional security concerns. Unfortunately, while many in the US back these moves, Japanese messaging has been ham fisted, arguing that Tokyo must change the interpretation of the right of collective self-defense because in some cases Japan might not be able to defend its own territory, an argument that inadvertently plays up the image of an irresponsible ally. Some insist that problems in the US-Japan relationship spring from Japanese insecurities. That is true – up to a point. But those insecurities, real or imagined, are a problem for the alliance and need to be deflated. As a start, while pursuing cooperation with China, and urging Tokyo to do the same, Americans must push back against the notion that there is an equilateral triangle among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Our alliance fundamentally distinguishes the US-Japan relationship from that of the US and China.

#### Fear of decoupling true for Japan – multiple reasons.

Santoro and Warden, 2015 (David, senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, and John K., WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age” The Washington Quarterly Spring Accessed 6/23/16 <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf> JJH)

Together, China’s growing military power and political influence unnerve U.S. allies. They worry that because of the narrowing conventional military balance between the United States and China, the United States may prove unwilling to endure the costs of even a limited war with China, instead opting to concede on their core interests to prevent escalation. Tokyo in particular is concerned that the United States might begin to think that the U.S.–China relationship is more important than the U.S.–Japan alliance. As Ambassador Linton Brooks puts it, “a closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japan’s security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment.”59 For the United States, there is no easy solution to these assurance challenges, but there are important steps that can help mitigate allied anxiety. A large part of the allied perception that the United States is in decline relative to China comes from weakness at home. The U.S. economy continues to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, but has still not reclaimed its international reputation as the robust, resilient engine of global growth. Even worse, U.S. defense austerity combined with renewed calls for U.S. military engagement in Europe and the Middle East have caused Japanese officials and experts to doubt whether the United States has the will and capacity to maintain a long-term commitment in East Asia.60 The 2013 defense sequester continues to shortchange military investment and cripple effective long-term planning, and allies question whether the dysfunctional U.S. political system can right the ship.

### Zero Sum

#### Relations are Zero-Sum – engagement trades off

Govella, 2007 (Kristi Elaine, MA in Political Science from Berkeley, “Accommodating the Rise of China: Toward a Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2017” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 16 pp. 15-18. Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/57987/ichaptersection_singledocument/19b9c958-8d7a-4fd9-a6a2-f0b25006fef6/en/chap3.pdf> JJH)

Attitudes toward leadership in East Asia are permeated by a zero-sum mentality; according to this line of thought, either Japan or China can be the regional leader, and the U.S. will align itself with only one of the two countries to best pursue its interests. In reality, an exclusive alliance between the U.S. and either of these countries no longer makes sense in modern East Asia; instead, the task must be to build good relations between the U.S. and both countries. Consequently, the U.S. must strike a balance between supporting Japan through the U.S.-Japan alliance and facilitating China’s peaceful rise. The China portion of this equation is impossible to ignore, and indeed, giving China the incentives to progress down a path of peaceful integration and benign competition is a key part of a successful strategy in Asia. However, it is also vital that the U.S. avoid giving the impression (real or perceived) that Japan is being ignored or undermined by its long-time ally. In giving increased emphasis to relations with China, there is a natural danger that Japan might feel displaced. For example, in a 2007 report from the Japan Defense Research Center, Takayama Masaji cites Chinese “wish for a dissolution” of U.S.-Japan relations as a potential threat and cites the insult of President Bill Clinton’s failure to visit Japan after a 10-day visit to China in 1999. Takayama also mentions changes in American referents for China; he notes Clinton’s use of the term “strategic partner” and Bush’s movement from labeling the PRC a “strategic competitor” to recognizing it as a “stakeholder.” It is clear that Japan is highly sensitive to changes in its relative status, and consequently, the U.S. must tread carefully as it tries to accommodate the growing power of China.

### Perception

#### Perception matters – Japanese Psychology is against US-China engagement.

Koizumi, 2007 (Shinjiro, “Requirements for the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Rise of China” Issues and Insights Vol. 7 No. 16 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://kristigovella.com/portfolio/issuesinsights_v07n16.pdf> JJH)

However, China’s rise as a responsible stakeholder would require very careful alliance management by both Japan and the U.S. Historically, closer U.S.-China relations tend to create a perception in Japan of “Japan passing,” and Japan has tended to judge U.S. presidents on whether they are pro-Japan or pro-China. Hence the question is whether Japan can regard closer U.S.-China relations as a good stability in Asia. It is very difficult for Japan to welcome China’s bigger role if China’s rise means the advent of a new regional power balance: China as a regional leader and Japan as a country in decline. In order to prevent this, Japan needs to play a greater security role in the region by exercising the right of collective self-defense. This does not mean a hedging strategy against China. On the contrary, it gives Japan more responsibility and confidence to build stable Japan-U.S.-China relations. Japan is always looking at how the U.S. treats China and how it is treated by the U.S. vis- à-vis China. The U.S. must be sensitive to this Japanese psychology. Japan has been proud of its status as the world’s second largest economy and considers that part of its national identity, but it will lose the status sooner or later and face the painful reality that China and India are catching up at a frightening pace. Japan has a dilemma. On the one hand, it acknowledges that a China that follows a stakeholder scenario is in Japan’s interest. On the other hand, it worries that the stakeholder scenario would lead the U.S. to pay less attention to Japan. Japan would continue suffering from the dilemma as long as it maintains a limited security role under the current interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.

### Empirics

#### Changing international system and history makes Japan uniquely fear abandonment.

Dittmer, 5/26/2014 (Lowell, Visiting Professor of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, “JAPAN, CHINA AND THE AMERICAN PIVOT: A TRIANGULAR ANALYSIS” EAI Working Paper No. 163 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/EWP163.pdf> JJH)

So what do these parallel but diverging alliance experiences have to do with current Sino-Japanese relations? The post-Cold War period has been one in which China’s economic development has gone into overdrive while Japan’s economy has stalled. China’s 2010 passing Japan in GDP seems to have inspired more assertive Chinese claims regarding territorial disputes, with India and several Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan. Thus the realpolitik becomes one of “power transition.”21 This is probably more important than differing conceptualizations of alliances. The relevance of different alliance conceptions is that while the JUSA has been institutionalized and remains fully operational, China has divested itself of the Sino-Soviet Alliance and adopted a medley of interesting substitutes, none of which is entirely equivalent. This helps fuel Sino-Japanese tension by fostering the sense in China that two of the strongest countries in the world are combining forces to keep China down. And since China has no allies it can trust to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in case of hostilities (over, say, Taiwan), it faces a “Malacca dilemma” that it is strengthening the PLA Navy, fostering a security dilemma among other Asian countries dependent on the SLOCs. Meanwhile Japan, the US and other trade partners are rankled by trade imbalances and the sheer momentum of China’s growth. While these concerns bolster JUSA, Tokyo is not immune to anxiety about possible American abandonment in favor of Beijing. Thus, stunned in February 1972 by the “Nixon shock” visit to China, Tokyo quickly reversed course, dropping Taipei to recognize Beijing the same year; the 1998 Clinton visit to China occasioned similar anxiety because he did not (at Beijing’s specific insistence) make a Tokyo stopover. While the relationship among the three has many points in its favor—Japan and the US both have huge trade flows with China, China and Japan are geographical neighbors and share a Confucian cultural legacy—whenever tensions arise for whatever reasons, these tensions tend to reinforce JUSA solidarity and this in turn evokes China’s nightmare of being encircled by hostile forces [baoweiquan].

### Korea Link

#### Japan fears a reunified Korean peninsula – Causes rearm.

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH)

Future of the Korean Peninsula

Any eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula could further induce Japan to reconsider its nuclear stance. If the two Koreas unify while North Korea still holds nuclear weapons and the new state opts to keep a nuclear arsenal, Japan may face a different calculation. Indeed, some Japanese analysts have claimed that a nuclear-armed reunified Korea would be more of a threat than a nuclear-armed North Korea. Such a nuclear decision would depend on a variety of factors: the political orientation of the new country, its relationship with the United States, and how a reunified government approached its historically difficult ties with Japan. Although South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, many Koreans harbor resentment of Japan’s harsh colonial rule of the peninsula from 1910- 1945. If the closely neighboring Koreans exhibited hostility toward Japan, it may feel more compelled to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The United States is likely to be involved in any possible Korean unification because of its military alliance with South Korea and its leading role in the Six-Party Talks. U.S. contingency planning for future scenarios on the Korean peninsula should take into account Japan’s calculus with regard to nuclear weapon development.

### Link Magnifier

#### The Status quo is stable but fragile – frightens and already skittish Japan

Hooper 15—Mira Rapp Hooper is a Fellow in the Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Director of CSIS’s Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2015 (“Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes”, Spring 2015, Accessed 6/24/16, Online Available at <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Hooper.pdf>, JJH)

Finally, as already noted, the United States and China are not locked in a zero-sum standoff as the United States and Soviet Union were during the Cold War. Rather, they compete in some areas and cooperate in others. Washington’s desire to maintain a modus vivendi with Beijing helps to explain why it takes a position of neutrality on most sovereignty disputes, including those involving close allies. This balancing act makes good sense, but it adds a third level of complication to U.S. extended deterrence. If Washington remains officially neutral on its allies’ territorial disputes, it cannot easily signal an extended deterrence commitment to those territories if it has made one. Strong public statements that the United States intends to defend the disputed territory or clear shows of force in the vicinity hardly signal a neutral position on sovereignty. Moreover, while the United States and China are not sworn adversaries, China is rising rapidly, and this gives it the military capabilities and increasingly the will to advance its sovereignty claims, including those that pit it against U.S. allies. It can therefore employ what Thomas Schelling called “salami tactics”—limited probes of U.S. commitments that aim to advance Chinese interests incrementally and opportunistically without triggering U.S. intervention. When these factors are combined, they may lead U.S. allies to be especially fearful that their superpower patron will abandon them in conflicts arising from their territorial disputes. States are generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they formally abrogate the alliance treaty, fail to support the ally when the agreement’s casus foederis (or case for the alliance) arises, or decline to back a partner in a dispute with an adversary.10 Managing abandonment fears is a central challenge in any alliance. The ambiguous role of allies’ territorial disputes in U.S. treaties, the allies’ disparate stakes in these disputes, and the United States’ need to maintain a relationship with China, however, each inject additional uncertainty into already ambiguous U.S. extended deterrence commitments, and may provoke fears from U.S. allies that they will not have Washington’s support if a territorial dispute escalates and pits them against Beijing. Japan’s alliance fears over the Senakus Islands in the East China Sea, and the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea illustrate why these factors may elicit unusually high abandonment anxieties from U.S. allies, and why they present a management challenge for extended deterrence and allied assurance.

#### Lack of US commitment feeds Japanese defense insecurity

Auslin 16— Michael Auslin, former Associate Professor at Yale University, Resident Scholar and Director of Japanese Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, regular contributor to The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and National Review, 2016. (“Japan's New Realism,” Foreign Affairs 95(2), March/April, Published by Council on Foreign Relations, ISSN 00157120, p. 125-134, Proquest, Accessed 06-22-2016)

By slowly eliminating its restraints on security cooperation, by deepening its relationship with the United States, and by emphasizing more muscular, liberal rhetoric, Abe's Japan has positioned itself as a sort of anti-China in Asia and beyond. Yet many of the other restrictions on Japan's military remain in place, and these will not be revoked anytime soon. Japan's society would not allow its military to play a more normal role in dealing with foreign crises; the Japanese also remain highly wary of entangling alliances. Yet many of Japan's elites-who are worried about the threats from China and North Korea and who fear that the United States is distracted by crises in the Middle East and Ukraine-have embraced the country's new realism. Leading thinkers, including the journalist Yoichi Funabashi, the former diplomat Kuni Miyake, the political scientist Koji Murata, and the former defense minister Satoshi Morimoto, are among those writing and speaking about the need for a more muscular Japanese posture. Indeed, there is a growing community of academics, policy analysts, and politicians who believe that Japan must do more to ensure its own security, as well as to help support the global system that has protected it since the end of World War II. As Abe expands Japan's global role, his policies will include new activities abroad and entail deeper security cooperation with existing partners. The more unstable the global environment becomes, the more Japan will need to play a global role commensurate with its size and economic strength. That role should take advantage of multilateral organizations, but it will, realistically, privilege Japan's security.

## Internals

### US Key

#### US Commitment is a key driver in Japan’s decision to nuclearize.

Saunders and Feary, 2015 (Emily Cura, PhD Candidate in International Security and Arms Control and Bryan L., Senior Science & Policy Advisor for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or Not? Japan’s and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models” Chapter 3 From: Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges Editors: Samuel Apikyan, David Diamond Springer Link JJH)

Japan’s potential nuclear latency has been one of great debate and speculation since the end of the Second World War. There have been many theories as to why Japan would or would not pursue a weapons program, but the two variables identified in this paper, regional security and confidence in the United States’ extended deterrent, have strongly influenced this issue. Having been the sole victim of a nuclear attack, Japanese politicians have always taken great care with regard to their rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons. This rhetoric should be carefully monitored by the United States. Many of Japan’s nuclear options can be measured in this highly nuanced political rhetoric. For example, in 1957 under Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi, the Cabinet Legal Affair Bureau “confirmed that nuclear weapons were not unconstitutional.”40 Domestic pressure and outrage at this claim soon forced Prime Minister Kishi to resign; however, the taboo of talking about Japanese nuclear weapons had been broken.41 In the early 1960s Prime Minister Sato went so far as to explicitly tell President Johnson that he was not opposed to exploring a nuclear option for Japan, remarking that, “Japanese public opinion will not permit this at present, but I believe the public, especially the younger generation, can be ‘educated.’”42 Ironically, Prime Minister Sato ended up winning a Nobel Prize for what he deemed the Three NonNuclear Principles—no manufacturing, possessing, or presence of nuclear weapons in Japan.43 While this change in rhetoric was important, it did not end nuclear exploration in Japan. Several Japanese administrations since Prime Minister Sato have commissioned reports on the feasibility, both scientifically and economically, of developing nuclear weapons. In the context of these administrations the idea of latent capability surfaced. In a memorandum written by the director of the Japanese Defense Policy Bureau, Kubo Takyua, he makes this option out to be an insurance plan to keep the United States commitment strong. The memorandum reads, If Japan prepares a latent nuclear capability which would enable Japan to develop significant nuclear armament at any time, the United States would be motivated to sustain the Japan-US security system by providing nuclear guarantee to Japan, because otherwise, the US would be afraid of the stability in the international relations triggered by nuclear proliferation.44 The commitment of the United States is clearly an issue for Japan. They want to be assured that the commitments are strong, and if not, this memo suggests that they are willing to consider an independent deterrent if need be.

### Threat Levels Key

#### Increased threat levels will cause nuclearization.

Machida, 2014 (Satoshi, Associate Prof of Comparative Politics and International Relations @ Nebraska, “Who Supports Nuclear Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament” Asian Journal of Political Science Vol 22 Issue 2 Taylor & Francis JJH)

In a quickly changing environment in East Asia, it has been reported that Japan has been going through important changes. Surrounded by increasing levels of threat from its neighboring states, Japan has begun to adopt a more aggressive security policy with the growing capability of the SDF. Along with this tendency, the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament has become a focus of the debate involving both policy-makers and academics. The goal of this study has been to examine the prospect of Japan’s nuclearization. I investigated this question by paying particular attention to public perceptions of nuclear armament. The statistical analysis relying on the survey data in Japan has found that people’s threat perceptions powerfully determine their attitudes toward nuclear armament. Specifically, the results indicate that it is people’s perceptions of China as a military threat that significantly boost their support for nuclear armament. Consistent with the security model of nuclear proliferation, this study has verified that threat perceptions powerfully shape the content of public opinion regarding nuclear weapons (Beckman, 1992: 14). These findings have important implications for the prospect of nuclear proliferation involving Japan. As of now, most scholars dismiss the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament. Hughes (2007) suggests that a variety of domestic constraints that are deeply embedded in Japan will continue to prevent Japan from pursuing the option of nuclear armament. Similarly, Yoshihara and Holmes (2009) maintain that Japan will try to secure its survival in strengthening its ties with the United States rather than attempting to develop nuclear weapons (Hughes, 2006). Under the assumption that Japan is protected by the US security guarantee, Japan’s nuclear armament is unlikely. However, this does not mean that Japan will never consider the option of nuclear armament. Based on the findings from this study, we can predict that people’s support for Japan’s nuclear armament will grow along with increasing levels of military threat from China. As China becomes more aggressive with its growing military capability, the Japanese will be increasingly concerned about the situation. As a consequence, it is possible that Japan will eventually embrace the option of nuclear armament to counter the threat from China. As Japanese history shows, a state’s path can change drastically. A state that was dictated by the fascist ideology was transformed into a ‘peaceful’ country after the end of World War II in 1945. Facing external threat, one cannot deny the possibility that Japan may turn its course once again to become a more aggressive state in the international system. Indeed, one can observe a number of changes in Japan that could drive the country toward the option of nuclear armament (Tanter, 2005). The recent debate concerning the possible revision of the Japanese constitution should be understood in this context (Japan Times, 2013).

### Perception Key

#### Perception of allies drifting apart kills assurances and causes Japanese Rearm

Santoro and Warden 15 (David, senior fellow @ Pacific Forum CSIS and John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring2015_Santoro-Warden.pdf>)

Discussions about the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance are making a comeback. During the Cold War, U.S. analysts focused primarily on Western Europe, but in recent years the challenges of extended deterrence and assurance have been **starker in Northeast Asia**. Discussing the requirements for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance involves asking how the United States can deter its adversaries and assure its allies. In both cases, **the critical factor is perception**. According to analysts Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats, “In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.”1 In this paper, we primarily address the requirements of the latter, focusing on U.S. efforts to assure its two Northeast Asian treaty allies: Japan and South Korea. After analyzing the current security environment—specifically the assurance requirements in Northeast Asia in this second, post-Cold War nuclear age—we turn to the initial steps that the United States has taken to strengthen assurance. Finally, we explore the current assurance agenda with Japan and South Korea, highlighting key challenges and opportunities. Dubbed the second nuclear age,2 the current context has been widely discussed for its differences with the Cold War, or the world’s first nuclear age. During this first age, two nuclear superpowers were locked in a competition for global dominance with allies on each side, a handful of which developed small nuclear arsenals. U.S.–Soviet competition was intense, but remained cold in part because Washington and Moscow developed arms-control and crisismanagement mechanisms to regulate their behavior. Stability endured because even though Washington and Moscow did not control all the triggers, they had sufficient authority to keep bloc discipline and avoid becoming entrapped in a nuclear war. The security environment was always extremely dangerous because the possibility of global nuclear annihilation was omnipresent, but per the notorious formula, “a stable balance of terror” endured.3 The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters— that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation— both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the **potential for war, and** even **nuclear use**, **is growing**.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, **will continue to protect them from coercion** and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter **multiple nuclear-armed adversaries**, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia–Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.9 U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for **Tokyo and Seoul** to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely **eviscerate the remaining credibility of the** Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (**NPT**). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across **the entire U.S. alliance system**. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively **quickly**, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11

### A2: Abe Not Nationalist

#### Abe has slowed nationalist agenda because of US Credibility – plan reverses that which causes rearm and regional arms races.

Curtis 13— Gerald L. Curtis, Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, former Director of Columbia's Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Visiting Professor, Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies (Tokyo), former Director, Center for Korean Research, Columbia University, 2013. (“Japan's Cautious Hawks: Why Tokyo Is Unlikely to Pursue an Aggressive Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 92(2), March/April, Available Online at [ProQuest](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-03-01/japans-cautious-hawks), Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 77-86, aqp)

But such a change is unlikely. The Japanese public remains risk averse, and its leaders cautious. Since taking office, Abe has focused his attention on reviving Japan's stagnant economy. He has pushed his hawkish and revisionist views to the sidelines, in part to avoid having to deal with divisive foreign policy issues until after this summer's elections for the House of Councilors. If his party can secure a majority of seats in that chamber, which it does not currently have, Abe may then try to press his revisionist views. But any provocative actions would have consequences. If, for example, he were to rescind statements by previous governments that apologized for Japan's actions in World War II, as he has repeatedly said he would like to do, he not only would invite a crisis in relations with China and South Korea but would face strong criticism from the United States as well. The domestic political consequences are easy to predict: Abe would be flayed in the mass media, lose support among the Japanese public, and encounter opposition from others in his own party.

In short, chances are that those who expect a dramatic change in Japanese strategy will be proved wrong. Still, much depends on what Washington does. The key is whether the United States continues to maintain a dominant position in East Asia. If it does, and if the Japanese believe that the United States' commitment to protect Japan remains credible, then Tokyo's foreign policy will not likely veer offits (sic) current track. If, however, Japan begins to doubt the United States' resolve, it will be tempted to strike out on its own.

The United States has an interest in Japan's strengthening its defensive capabilities in the context of a close U.S.-Japanese alliance. But Americans who want Japan to abandon the constitutional restraints on its military and take on a greater role in regional security should be careful what they wish for. A major Japanese rearmament would spur an arms race in Asia, heighten regional tensions (including between Japan and South Korea, another key U.S. ally), and threaten to draw Washington into conflicts that do not affect vital U.S. interests. The United States needs a policy that encourages Japan to do more in its own defense but does not undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments to the country or the region.

#### SQUO checks Abe’s Nationalist agenda and changes in threat perceptions consolidate power causes rearm.

Berger 2015 — Thomas Berger, Professor of International Affairs and Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, 2016 (“Abe’s Perilous Patriotism Why Japan’s New Nationalism Still Creates Problems for the Region and the U.S.-Japanese Alliance”, CSIS, Available online at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/thomas-u-berger#sthash.Ii9uNqvJ.dpuf>, Accessed 6-24-16, RKim)

The relationship between the different components of the Japanese discourse on nationalism have evolved considerably over time. It is possible to discern a cyclic pattern where an apparent rise in Right-wing nationalist discourse was followed by a rejection of the conservative agenda and an extended period of ideological quiescence. These cycles occur with a frequency of every five to ten years and tend to follow a similar pattern.10 The initial trigger for an upsurge in nationalist rhetoric often comes from outside of Japan. Shifts in the international environment would emerge that created a widely shared sense that Japan needs to adapt its security policy in response. In the late 1950s, Japan’s reemergence as a major, independent international actor against the backdrop of a highly volatile East Asian security environment created a ground swell of support for revising Japan’s security arrangements, beginning with the original, highly unequal Mutual Security Treaty imposed by the United States at the end of the Occupation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, growing concerns regarding the U.S. security commitment in light of the Vietnam War and American domestic political disarray provoked a serious debate over whether Japan should continue to rely on the United States or develop a more independent defense capacity. In the late 1970s, the Soviet military buildup in the Far East seemed to pose a direct threat to Japan. After the Cold War, the emergence of new regional security threats in the shape of a nuclear North Korea and an increasingly powerful and assertive People’s Republic of China stimulated Japan to reforge its security relationship to the United States. In each instance, Japanese conservative nationalists formed a de facto alliance with more pragmatically minded centrists to push through much-needed changes in Japanese defense policy. Since for Right-wing nationalists, ideological issues are part and parcel of any effort to reform Japanese defense, changes in national security policy were always paired with highly nationalist rhetoric and changes in other policy domains. So for instance, in the late 1950s, the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty was accompanied by changes in educational policy aimed at clamping down on the influence of the powerful, Left-wing Japanese teachers’ union. The 1978 guidelines on U.S.-Japan defense cooperation was paired with the reintroduction of the Imperial calendar system and the old national anthem, Kimi ga yo. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone famously linked increasing the Japanese defense budget with reevaluating Japanese history when he visited the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. Hashimoto Ryutaro did much the same when he visited the shrine in 1995, while at the same time setting into motion the political process that led to the revision of the guidelines in 1998. 10 In each and every instance, these nationalist gestures and policies provoked howls of protest. The Japanese Left would warn that the conservatives were undermining the foundations of postwar Japanese democracy. The Left, as well as many critics abroad, would warn that Japan was about to remilitarize and become once again a threat to the rest of Asia. The Japanese public and centrist elites, however, would go along with the Right-wing, old-style nationalist agenda because they viewed it as the price that had to be paid to push reform through. Once necessary changes to defense policy had been made, and if the Right seemed to go too far in pressing for a nationalist revival, popular opposition would mount and Centrists would cease their support. Right-wing leaders then had two choices. They could tone down their nationalist rhetoric and satisfy themselves with having pushed the national debate a step further toward the right. This is what happened with Prime Minister Nakasone, who abandoned plans to visit Yasukuni after 1985. Or they could be forced out and be replaced with a more moderate figure, as occurred with Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1960. Some significant changes would be made in terms of defense policy, although those changes generally proved less dramatic in retrospect than they were typically portrayed as being at time. Ties with neighboring Asian countries would be mended and even improved. And the Japanese people would relapse into their semi-somnambulant, post-nationalist slumber. Prime Minister Abe today seems to fit very much the pattern described above. The confrontation with China over the disputed Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, which spiked up sharply since the summer of 2012, has provoked a profound sense of crisis in Japan. China’s relentless stance on the islands, combined with emotional anti-Japanese riots in major Chinese cities, created a perception of threat in the Japanese public greater even than at the high point of the Cold War. In 2007, Abe had been forced to step down as prime minister when his nationalist agenda led to a devastating defeat in elections for the Japanese Upper House. In the fall of 2012, however, Conservatives inside the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were convinced that Japan needed a strong, pro-defense leader to face up to the Chinese challenge. They gave Abe another shot at the prime minister-ship, choosing him as party leader over other, more moderate figures. Having learned his lesson from his first term in office, Abe took pains to reassure Centrists in the party, as well as the Japanese public, that his top priority was economic reform. Abe also put many prominent pragmatists such as Kishida Fumio, Yachi Shotaro, and Kanehara Nobukatsu in key foreign policy posts. Abe’s nationalist instincts, however, could not be denied. Inevitably, whether out of deep personal conviction or in order to appease his own Right-wing supporters, Abe combined his efforts at defense reform with all the elements of the postwar Japanese conservative agenda: constitutional revision, educational reform, and a revisionist stance of history as signaled by his trip to the Yasukuni Shrine and a reopening of the debate over the thorny issue of the “comfort women.” Predictably, Abe’s moves have provoked a storm of protest. Japanese liberal media outlets have accused the prime minister of opening the door to becoming embroiled in overseas military adventures and have been especially critical of what they portray as his undemocratic political methods. Beijing has sounded the alarm that Japan is once again turning to militarism and has tried unsuccessfully to convince Washington that Japan could be a threat to the region. Meanwhile, in Seoul the newly inaugurated government of Park Gyeun He has expressed intense displeasure with Japan, suspending cooperation across a broad range of diplomatic and national security areas and making common cause with China in condemning Japan’s historical revisionism. Will the Abe administration today follow the pattern of previous conservative administrations? There are some signs that this is in fact taking place. Public opinion data shows that support for the administration is declining despite signs of continued economic improvement.11 Opposition from within the government, in particular from his Buddhist coalition partners—the Clean Government Party—has forced Abe to water down parts of his agenda. He has abandoned for now pressing for constitutional revision and satisfied himself with merely reinterpreting the constitution. And even then, he has attached conditions under which the right to collective self-defense can be exercised.12 If the current cycle of Japanese nationalism holds true to past form, we can expect that Abe will either have to give up his nationalist rhetoric or be forced out of office, as his centrist allies and supporters abandon him and public support ratings plummet. In so doing, he will be replicating the fate of his grandfather and political role model, Nobosuke Kishi, who was forced out of power in 1960 as a result of the storm of controversy over the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States. History would repeat itself—as Marx one put it—not so much as tragedy but as farce. History does not necessarily repeat itself, however, and there are reasons to fear conditions have changed in such a way that the outcome this time around will be far more tragic than it has been in the past.

### A2: Militarization Inevitable

#### The status quo is just Japan contributing more to the alliance not militarization new policies still look to the US.

Lind, 2016 (Jennifer, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University, “Japan’s Security Evolution” Cato POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 788 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-788.pdf> JJH)

Japan’s constitution prohibits the country from having or using a military, but over the past several decades governments have passed laws to reinterpret constitutional restraints. The 2015 legislation, the most recent in this longtime evolution, enables Japan to participate in “collective security operations.” For the first time, Japanese personnel from its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can engage in combat to support the United States when it is defending Japan, or to support other security partners under attack. In such instances, the legislation stipulates that the situation must threaten Japan’s survival, that no other appropriate means of defense exist, and that the use of force will be restrained to what is minimally required. For example, according to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other proponents of security reforms, Japanese forces could defend an American ship that is attacked while evacuating Japanese citizens from a conflict. As news of the legislation spread around the world, headlines announced the end of Japanese pacifism. Before the vote, CNN declared, “Assertive Japan poised to abandon 70 years of pacifism.” The Japan Times said that the new legislation marked “a significant departure from Japan’s postwar pacifism.”2 Newsweek heralded it as “the most significant shift in Tokyo’s defense policy since World War II.”3 As Andrew Oros notes, “there is a palpable fear among many that Japan is on the verge of a major break from the past sixty years of peaceful security practice.”4 Such pronouncements, however, exaggerate both the extent of Japan’s previous pacifism and the magnitude of the changes. The legislation permitting engagement in collective security activities is indeed a significant moment in Japan’s 70-year evolution in national security. But it does not mark Year Zero of a new era in which Japan is becoming increasingly militarist. Japan’s reforms represent continuity, rather than change, in a pattern in which Japan relies upon the United States for its security, but contributes more to the alliance when its security environment worsens. From Washington’s standpoint, Japan’s greater activism and burden-sharing within the alliance is welcome news.

#### Japan rearm is based uncertainty with the US recent laws prove.

Lind, 2016 (Jennifer, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University, “Japan’s Security Evolution” Cato POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 788 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-788.pdf> JJH)

As Japanese politician Keisuke Suzuki observed, “The Chinese mainland is now behaving in a really aggressive way both in the South China Sea and East China Sea and they clearly have the intention to attack Japanese interests. This is a critical moment for Japan’s national security.”32 During the Diet debate over revising the guidelines, Prime Minister Abe argued that “These laws are absolutely necessary because the security situation surrounding Japan is growing more severe.”33 Japan’s increased military participation also conforms to a pattern in which uncertainty about its U.S. ally encourages greater Japanese activism. Advocates of the 2015 legislation argued that growing uncertainty about the United States — specifically, whether it would defend the disputed islands — requires Japan to play a larger role in the alliance. American officials, including President Obama, have repeatedly declared that, although Washington takes no position on the sovereignty of the islands, they are clearly “administered” by Japan and thus protected by the U.S.-Japan alliance. But despite such assurances, many in Japan question whether the United States would risk an unwanted and potentially devastating war with China — a nuclear-armed vital political and economic partner — over an issue in which the United States has no direct interest.

## Japan Rearm Impact

### Ext. Causes Arms Race

#### Japanese rearmament leads to arms race and war

Mizokami 15 — Kyle Mizokami, writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, 2015 (“China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With Nuclear Weapons”, The National Interest, October 31st, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimate-nightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal. To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here. Still, it’s an interesting proposition. Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan, the third largest economy in the world, couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack. Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would make their positioning more predictable. Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network. Strategic bombers Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission. A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons. Geography also makes strategic bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously vulnerable. Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air, but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. The cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive. Ballistic Missile Submarines This is the most attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself. Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine, missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline, Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile. In a sea-basing scheme Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads. There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128 warheads would be available. Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.

#### Japan rearmament causes East Asia arms race and war with China

Swaine et. Al 13—Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI is associate dean for academic programs and holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, MICHAEL L. BROWN is a retired Army officer, PAUL S. GIARRA is the president of Global Strategies & Transformation, where he conducts strategic planning and national security analysis for Japan, China, East Asia, and NATO futures, DOUGLAS H. PAAL is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, RACHEL ESPLIN ODELL is a research analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Raymond Lu research associate at the Yale China Law Center in Beijing, Oliver Palmer is the country director for China in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, XU REN is a junior fellow in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013 (“CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030”, Accessed 6/24/16, Available online at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/net_assessment_full.pdf>, JRR)

This scenario also posits a U.S. withdrawal from the region. However, in this case, this action would be badly prepared for, poorly executed, and excessively rapid (as described in the precipitate variant of the U.S. “Withdrawal” trajectory from chapter 4). Moreover, this scenario posits a China with ever-expanding economic and military capacity and a much more belligerent foreign policy stance (approximating the “Aggressive Ultranationalism” trajectory from chapter 2). Hence, the regional security environment in 2030 would be marked by considerable turbulence and uncertainty, including a possibly radical shift toward intensified rivalry between China and Japan. The escalatory dynamic generated by this more intense and direct Sino-Japanese competition would lead to significantly greater potential for instability, crises, and conflict in the region. Foreign and Defense Strategies Under this scenario, Beijing would seek to take advantage of the U.S. withdrawal by increasing pressure on Tokyo in a range of political and economic disputes, particularly those related to territorial and maritime disputes in the East China Sea and possibly historical issues. Out of a sense of insecurity fostered by the rapid U.S. withdrawal and provoked by this aggressive Chinese behavior, Tokyo would most likely implement a major realignment in its national security strategy, moving toward an independent military capability that includes the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Japanese insecurity could be particularly inflamed if Washington were to implement its withdrawal without maintaining a credible U.S. commitment to defend Japan from a distance. Such a scenario would probably constitute the “worst case” for the regional security environment in terms of its propensity toward conflict and instability. Military Competitions Under this scenario, a precipitous drawdown by the United States would almost certainly lead Japan to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent, not only to safeguard against (potential) nuclear blackmail but also to compensate for growing disparities in the conventional military balance against China. The Japanese decision to nuclearize could occur in the context of a rational calculation made at the outset of a period of strategic reorientation, or only as the result of a costly but abortive effort to develop more extensive conventional capabilities. But in either case, Japan would still find itself at a disadvantage against conventional Chinese antiaccess capabilities, with U.S. assistance in the event of a conflict likely to be delayed and of limited effectiveness. In stark contrast with the scenarios described above, the nuclear domain would see not only intense distrust but also a significantly elevated risk of confrontation. Without the benefit of in-theater bases or logistical support, the “tyranny of distance” would drive a wedge between Japanese and U.S. forces, reducing the size, frequency, and durability of reinforcements. Moreover, a low-capacity United States would be highly unlikely to possess long-range strike platforms with the numbers or capabilities to maintain existing levels of deterrence against high-end Chinese forces. Having focused much of its force modernization on defensive missions and rear-area support for U.S. forces, the JSDF would be forced to initiate expensive modernization programs in a variety of unfamiliar areas, and would probably remain vulnerable to many of the PLA’s most potent antiaccess capabilities. The Maritime Domain In the maritime domain, Japan would be able to mount significant resistance to Chinese area denial, but it would ultimately face a highly constrained operating environment. Although the JMSDF would have formidable antisurface warfare capabilities, it would be less likely to possess land-attack capabilities with the numbers, range, and speed necessary to counter Chinese ASBMs and shore-based threats to surface combatants. To be sure, a more competitive Japan would be better equipped to interdict Chinese submarines near the Ryukyu Islands while fielding additional submarines to hold Chinese surface combatants at risk, including PLAN carrier groups attempting to transit the region. But Japan’s impressive undersea capabilities would not reverse the growing presence of capable and integrated PLAN assets in the Western Pacific. As a result, the security of Pacific sea lines of communication would become a matter of great concern to Tokyo, were a Sino-Japanese war to break out. The Air Domain In the air domain, the JASDF could potentially prevent the PLAAF from gaining air superiority, at least in areas near the home islands. However, even Japanese fifth-generation fighters would find it difficult to penetrate China’s dense perimeter of land- and ship-based SAM batteries. At a minimum, China would thus be able to maintain a no-go zone around its 200-nautical-mile EEZ, from which it could continuously launch sorties, whittling away at airborne ISR and other assets necessary to prevent further incursions into the home islands.23 The Ground Domain In the ground domain, Japan would be hard-pressed to guard against potential Chinese saturation missile attacks. China could still expand its existing stockpile of medium-range ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles by several dozen or even a hundred missiles per year, while Japan would be unable to keep pace by purchasing and deploying the BMD systems necessary to shield ports and bases. Dispersal, hardening, and rapid repair could reduce the impact of a single attack, but Japan’s geography would work against its efforts in this area. The Space and Cyberspace Domains The effects of U.S. withdrawal would most likely not be felt as severely in the space and cyber domains. Japan would likely have access to U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance satellites in medium Earth orbit and geostationary Earth orbit, which would be less vulnerable to Chinese ASAT weapons. Although the United States’ physical absence from the theater of conflict would not substantially increase Japan’s vulnerability in this domain, an overall reduction in information sharing and cooperation between the two militaries could reduce the allies’ ability to defend their networks against intrusions. The Nuclear Domain Due in large part to deteriorating trends in the conventional balance described above, as well as its own doubts regarding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, Japan could perceive an independent nuclear capability as a cost-effective means of preventing Chinese attack or coercion. Consequently, the nuclear domain would become a locus of destabilizing competition between China and Japan, with a far greater likelihood of outright confrontation than in any other scenario. Japan would likely pursue a modest sea-based deterrent, most likely in the form of SSBNs, and would adopt a comparatively restrained nuclear posture that places an emphasis on retaliation against countervalue targets. But to maximize the deterrent potential of its arsenal, Japan could maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding the use of its nuclear weapons in very specific contingencies against overwhelming conventional threats. Although news of such an effort would likely break out within a period of months, Japan would probably require a few years to field the full suite of compatible warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms necessary to ensure a second-strike capability.24 During this period, China could be tempted to launch some form of preventive attack in order to neutralize the emergence of an independent and, in Beijing’s view, unpredictable nuclear power on its periphery. Such temptations could grow in the event of a total disintegration of the United States–Japan alliance, although the overall possibility of such a destabilizing and catastrophic scenario would be low. At a minimum, however, Japanese nuclearization and the open violation of nonproliferation taboos would most likely set off a regional arms race. Faced with a deteriorating security environment, China could be prompted to shift toward a limited deterrence posture, with an emphasis on a larger nuclear force capable of early attacks against military targets. In this instance, pervasive strategic distrust between Tokyo and Beijing and regular incidents and crises arising from their geographically proximate forces would raise the possibility of brinkmanship and confrontation. Command and Control The fracturing of the alliance would severely degrade the interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces while highlighting the PLA’s gains in conducting integrated antiaccess campaigns. A remilitarized Japan could attempt to integrate its forces under new, offensively oriented doctrines, but whether such a momentous reorganization of the JSDF would actually succeed—particularly by 2030—remains uncertain.

#### Rearming Japan ignites a regional arms race

Chelala, 8/15/2015 (Cesar Chelala, MD, PhD, is an international public health consultant for several UN agencies, 8/15/15, “Abe is wrong to rush toward militarization,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/15/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-wrong-rush-toward-militarization/#.Vc\_HIrJViko, 8/15/15, PCS)

The 23-minute ceremony aboard the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on Sept. 2, 1945, was the most significant event in Japan’s recent history, and the most painful. The ceremony established the surrender of the Empire of Japan and marked the end of World War II. After the horrific experience of the war, and to create the legal basis for the country’s future peaceful development, a new Constitution was enacted — the peace Constitution. Its defining characteristic is the renunciation of the right to wage war, contained in Article 9, and a provision for de jure popular sovereignty in conjunction with the monarchy. Article 9 states that the “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” To achieve this, the article provides that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” The extent of Article 9 has been debated since its enactment, particularly after the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, a de facto military force, in 1954. It is possible that originally the SDF was intended as something similar to what Mahatma Gandhi called the Shanti Sena, or soldiers of peace, or as a collective security police (peacekeeping) force, operating under the United Nations. However, in July 2014, the Abe Cabinet introduced a reinterpretation of this role, giving more power to the SDF and allowing it to defend Japan’s allies. This action, which potentially ends Japan’s long-standing pacifist policies, was supported by the U.S. but was heavily criticized by China and North Korea. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for a reinterpretation of those policies, asking that they allow for collective self-defense and for Japan to pursue a more active deterrence policy. Because of what many perceive as a decline in American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan may want to fill the power vacuum left by the U.S. and play a more assertive role in regional security. To that effect, Japan has reached some military agreements with countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam that are engaged in territorial disputes with China. At the same time, Abe wants to revitalize the economy and meet increasing social security demands. It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. In 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and this year hosted a trade show on military defense systems. Not everybody agrees with Abe’s push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from the Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe that the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something that absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan also carries the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences. Given the volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9.

### Ext. Asian Arms Race Bad

#### Asian prolif sparks an arms race and accidental nuke war

Cimbala 14 — Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, B.A. in Journalism from Penn State in 1965, M.A.in 1967 and his Ph.D. in 1969 both in Political Science, from the University of Wisconsin, Madison,has consulted for a number of U.S. government agencies and defense contractors, 2014("Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Perils and Prospects", Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 1, March, Available Online at <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/MASA6-1Eng%20(4)_Cimbala.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 24-5, aqp)

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 In Paul Bracken’s terms, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons to support either a “strategy of extreme provocation” or one intended to “keep the nuclear pot boiling” without having crossed the threshold of nuclear first use.20 In October 2013 there were reports of the DPRK renewing nuclear activities, and perhaps preparing for new nuclear tests.

A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would most likely increase the chance of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (a) some states in the region already have histories of protracted conflict; (b) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; (c) unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction resulting in an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch, by rogue commanders; (d) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

#### East Asian arms race causes nuclear war

Richardson 13 (Michael, journalist who writes for multiple major newspapers with a focus on Japan, “deterring an asia nuke race,” a.d. 6.15..15, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/08/commentary/world-commentary/deterring-an-asia-nuke-race/#.VX9ftkaPWy0,je)

Without mutual restraint in Asia, other regional countries with civilian nuclear reactor experience and the necessary resources and skills could also decide to protect themselves by developing their own nuclear arms. Such potential “threshold” countries include South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, a driving force for a nuclear threat reduction group of security specialists and former senior officials from 18 countries, cautions that when “a large and growing number of nuclear-armed adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used rises dramatically.” Another prominent member of the group, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, says that there is only a short time left to pull back from the edge of a nuclear precipice. “Asia is an important backdrop for this discussion, as a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens regional stability and could spark a new wave of proliferation,” he warns. Their comments follow a recent call by U.S. President Barack Obama for America and Russia to open new arms control talks to further cut their deployed long-range nuclear arms by as much as one-third. The last bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by Moscow and Washington in 2010, requires each nation by 2018 to cap its stockpile of fielded nuclear warheads at 1,550. So under Obama’s proposal, a new ceiling could become approximately 1,000 deployed strategic warheads apiece. Under the current START pact, the two former Cold War adversaries also agreed to limit fielded nuclear delivery vehicles, including bombers and missiles based on land and at sea, to 700, with an additional 100 allowed in reserve. But the START deal does not cover all nuclear warheads or delivery systems, only those classed as long range. Nor does it encompass all nuclear armed states, although at least 90 per cent of atomic arms belong to the U.S. and Russia. The SIPRI report estimates that at the start of 2013, eight of the nine nuclear armed nations had approximately 4,400 operational atomic weapons, with nearly 2,000 “in a state of high operational alert.” North Korea was assessed to have perhaps six or eight nuclear bombs, none of them operational. This evidently means they cannot yet be made small enough to be carried by North Korean missiles or bombers. SIPRI said that if all the nuclear warheads held by the nine nations with atomic weapons were counted, the total would amount to approximately 17,270 nuclear weapons, with a variety of short-, medium- as well as long-range delivery systems. The total warhead count includes spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads set to be dismantled, as well as operational warheads. Obama also called for the reduction of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons in Europe. These have never been officially counted or limited by any international treaty. One reason Russia gives for being reluctant to negotiate further bilateral nuclear cuts with the U.S. is that some other nuclear-armed countries are strengthening their warhead and missile capabilities. This is an evident reference to China among others, even though Moscow and Beijing have formed a “strategic partnership” to oppose U.S. and Western domination. China’s position is that the U.S. and Russia have the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, meaning those capable of traveling intercontinental distances and causing massive destruction. So Washington and Moscow should continue to make “drastic” cuts in their stockpiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Cheng Jingye, China’s top envoy to a U.N. nuclear nonproliferation conference, said last year that once this was done, “other nuclear-weapon states, when conditions are ripe, should also join the multinational negotiations on nuclear disarmament.” But when might that be? One of the concerns of U.S. critics of Obama’s latest proposals is that China could use any extended new round of START negotiations that involve only America and Russia to enlarge and modernize its own nuclear arsenal in secret. Some U.S. analysts say that this is already happening. The critics argue that if the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals keep dropping, China might be able to achieve numerical parity, or near-parity, quite quickly with the today’s two dominant nuclear powers. Nonnuclear Asian states, such as South Korea and Japan, look to their ally, the U.S., to protect them from nuclear attack under Washington’s extended deterrence policy. If U.S. nuclear strength and resolve appears to be weakening, they might become so alarmed at the heightened nuclear threats they face, whether from North Korea or China, that they would make their own dash for atomic arms.

#### Asian arms race leads to extinction

Adams 14 (Shar Adams, writer for Epoch Times, citing Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defense and security expert at the Australian National University, October 13, 2014. “Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror.” http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror/)

The world may be focused on the “war on terror”, but the arms build up in North-East Asia **poses a far greater threat to global stability**, says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former head of ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball’s expertise in command and control systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his concerns about North-East Asia. “North-East Asia has now become the **most disturbing part of the globe**,” Prof Ball told Epoch Times in an exclusive interview. **China, Japan and South Korea** – countries that are “**economic engines of the global economy**” – are embroiled in an **arms race of unprecedented proportions**, punctuated by “very dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, there are **no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation** in Asia. “Indeed, the **escalation dynamic** could **move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict**, including **nuclear conflict**,” said Prof Ball. “It is happening as we watch.” Arms Race Military spending in Asia has grown steadily over the last decade. According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report, China is now the world’s second largest military spender behind the United States, spending an estimated $188 billion in 2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the world’s top 10 military spenders. When North Korea and Taiwan are included, North-East Asian countries constitute around 85 per cent of military spending in Asia. But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the acquisitions. “The primary reason now for the acquisitions, whether they are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, is simply to match what the other [countries] are getting,” he said. While he believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military modernisation, he says it is China’s military provocation of countries across Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since China lay claim to all of the South China Sea, it has escalated territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. What started with skirmishes between locals and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial grabs – island building on contested rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: “China is looking to expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully formed artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its military strength in the South China Sea.” According to Filipino media, the artificial island falls within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Prof Ball says China’s behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but “in the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing” compared with conflicts in North-East Asia, where China and Japan are contesting claims over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyus by China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: “We are talking about **actual footsteps towards nuclear war** – submarines and missiles.” Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the point where sometimes there are “at least 40 aircraft jostling” over the contested area, he said. Alarm bells were set off near the Senkakus in January last year when a Chinese military vessel trained its fire-control radar on a Japanese naval destroyer. The incident spurred the Japanese Defense Ministry to go public about that event and reveal another incident from a few days prior, when a Chinese frigate directed fire-control radar at a Japanese military helicopter. Fire-control radars are not like surveillance or early warning radars – they have one purpose and that is to lock onto a target in order to fire a missile. “Someone does that to us, we fire back,” Prof Ball said. Counter Measures Needed Prof Ball is recognised for encouraging openness and transparency, and for his advocacy of multilateral institutions. He has been called one of the region’s “most energetic and activist leaders in establishing forums for security dialogue and measures for building confidence”. In his experience visiting China over the years, however, Prof Ball says gaining open dialogue and transparency with Chinese military leaders is difficult. He recounted a private meeting with a Chinese admiral shortly after the fire-control radar incident. Prof Ball had seen direct evidence of the encounter – “tapes of the radar frequencies, the pulse rates and the pulse repetition frequencies” – and wanted to know what had happened on the Chinese side and why it took place. “In a private meeting, I asked the admiral why … and he denied it to my face,” Prof Ball said. The Chinese admiral would not even concede that an incident had happened. “I don’t see the point of this sort of dialogue,” he added. With **so many players** in the region and **few barriers against conflict escalation**, the North-East Asian nuclear arms race is **now far more complex and dangerous** than the Cold War, he says. In the Cold War, there were mechanisms at each level of potential confrontation, including a direct hotline between the US and Soviet leaders. “Once things get serious here, [there is] **nothing to slow things down.** On the contrary, **you have all the incentives to go first,”** he said.

### Accidents Impact

#### Accidents are likely and go global – outweighs intentional wars

Hayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone,” <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/>)

Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat, and the ability of the threatened state to respond in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties. It is rare for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack, problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems, and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signals—nuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment. Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus, general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use them—thereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time.

### China-Japan War Impact

#### Sino-Japan conflict draws in the US and triggers nuclear escalation.

Ayson & Bell 14 (Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and Adjunct Professor at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre & Desmond Ball Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University, where he was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from 1984 to 1991., “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?”, Survival | vol. 56 no. 6 | December 2014–January 2015 | pp. 135–166)

Nuclear options and incentives

The role of nuclear weapons is one of the most important aspects of the escalation question in North Asia, as China has a nuclear arsenal and Japan relies on US extended deterrence. If Beijing and Tokyo engage in conventional military conflict, the prospects of direct Sino-American nuclear escalation come into play more clearly. One of the main concerns about the possibility of such escalation revolves around America’s superiority to China in terms of conventional fighting power.41 While China is closing that gap, some American conventional systems allow Washington to threaten China with accurate, destructive strikes that Beijing cannot hope to replicate. Should Sino-American hostilities seem likely to intensify, China could be tempted to utilise its nuclear forces. In such a conflict, however, Beijing should be aware that any attempted nuclear attack on the US would be almost guaranteed to generate a swift and probably disproportionate nuclear response. Mutual fear of surprise attacks and inadvertent nuclear war could not be ruled out, but nuclear deterrence might well operate effectively.42

In the early stages of a conflict involving only China and Japan, the nuclear question takes on a different perspective. Beijing would still face the prospect of relative conventional-military weakness, especially when it considered the possibility of American support to Tokyo. But if China decided to escalate by threatening Japan with nuclear bombardment, it would have to weigh the credibility of American extended deterrence, some portion of which would almost certainly swing into action. At the very least, China would have to deal with the costs of a strong conventional response by the US.

One might expect that nuclear threats, implicit or otherwise, would remain in the background. Washington could regard the threat of a nuclear response as effective leverage, discouraging China from escalating a conventional conflict with Japan without the need for heavy US involvement in a conventional military contest. Similarly, China might remind Japan about the existence of its nuclear forces, so as to highlight the potential costs of conventional escalation. Testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during early hostilities – rather like the 2014 Russian test, apparently longscheduled, during the Ukraine crisis – could be such a signalling mechanism.

If China suffers, or merely fears, a significant attack on its command and control systems, there are other material reasons why nuclear escalation could become more likely. Unlike the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China lacks separate, redundant theatre and strategic networks for C4ISR. This increases the likelihood that what Japan and especially the US view as an escalating conflict in the conventional domain could have quite a different appearance to Chinese decision-makers. Conventional escalation could easily cause the US to take measures that imperilled China’s control of its nuclear systems. Aware of its general C4ISR vulnerability, Beijing would already have experienced considerable pressure to use its antisatellite systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles (including the DF21-D) and other anti-carrier weapons, and to accelerate its cyber attacks.43 The US would likely respond to the use of these capabilities by destroying all remaining Chinese force elements in any way connected to them, which would have further C4ISR implications for China. America could be expected to forgo attacks on Chinese urban–industrial centres and many other force elements. Washington would seek to convey restraint and selectivity in its response, but would already have provided Beijing with a perverse incentive to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, out of fear that its capacity to maintain command and control of these systems was being destroyed in the conventional conflict.

### Japan Economy Impact

#### Japanese rearm collapses their economy

Gunnar 14 -- Ulson Gunnar, a New York-based geopolitical analyst and writer especially for the online magazine New Eastern Outlook. (Ulson, 7/25/14, New Eastern Outlook, Located at <http://journal-neo.org/2014/07/25/why-japan-s-rearmament-might-not-matter/>, “Why Japan’s Rearmament Might Not Matter <http://journal-neo.org/2014/07/25/why-japan-s-rearmament-might-not-matter/>”, Accessed 6/24/16, MW)

Acrimony and elation erupted on opposing sides of a growing geopolitical rift in the Pacific following Japan’s decision to sidestep its constitution and seek a more aggressive global posture. AP reported that, “Japan’s Cabinet on Tuesday approved a reinterpretation of the country’s pacifist postwar constitution that will allow the military to help defend allies and others “in a close relationship” with Japan under what is known as “collective self-defense.”” Those that remember when last Japan exerted military force beyond its borders are protesting the recent step which they see as yet another attempt to remilitarize the island nation and push it toward participating in yet another disastrous armed confrontation. This includes not only nations that were victims of Japanese imperialism during World War II, but even the Japanese people themselves who paid tremendously in blood and treasure during their ill-conceived attempt at achieving hegemony over the Pacific. Whatever lessons protesters may have learned from history appear lost on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, whose English speech in Australia sounded suspiciously like various speeches penned for American politicians in regard to the US “Pivot Toward Asia.” But for all the posturing the announcement involved, does Japan’s attempt to rattle its saber actually matter? Why It Might Not Matter Japan is a nation in decline. Its population is both aging and shrinking while its economy is mired in stagnation. Shifting toward greater militarization or cultivating adversarial relations with neighbors like China may be an attempt to rally its population around the flag, but that such a measure even seems necessary spells trouble for Japan. And Japan’s military contributions to whichever nations is applies “collective self-defense” to are moot, considering many of these allies are likewise in permanent decline, including the United States itself. It is unlikely Japan’s contributions will allow the US to break even in its Pacific calculus. America’s attempt to “pivot toward Asia” has experienced many setbacks and delays including the ousting of allied regimes in the region and the ever expanding sphere of Chinese influence chaffing against waning US hegemony. In fact, Japan’s remilitarization may only distract it further from devising sustainable socioeconomic reforms necessary for the nation’s recovery, let alone what it needs to thrive and expand. The other possible motive behind Japan’s saber rattling may be yet another collective effort by the West and its regional allies to force China’s hand toward an overreaching Soviet-style arms race and subsequent missteps before the hoped collapse of Beijing’s current political order. Should paranoia and bad intelligence get the better of Beijing, China may find itself overreacting to provocations, both political and tactical, along its borders and spheres of influence. It should be noted that similar saber rattling from Japan has taken place for decades. Similar rhetoric could be heard in 1989, when Japan and the US were seeking their way out of economic recessions. More recently, Japan has made militaristic announcements similar to its most recent declarations, all accompanied by the same condemnation and celebrations along predictable political fault lines. It may be that Japan’s socioeconomic condition is once again dire enough to warrant yet another round of distractions.

#### Japanese economic collapse drags down the global economy and sparks Asian conflict

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, “Japan's Downturn Is Bad News for the World”, Wall Street Journal, 2-17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123483257056995903.html)

If Japan's economy collapses, supply chains across the globe will be affected and numerous economies will face severe disruptions, most notably China's. China is currently Japan's largest import provider, and the Japanese slowdown is creating tremendous pressure on Chinese factories. Just last week, the Chinese government announced that 20 million rural migrants had lost their jobs. Closer to home, Japan may also start running out of surplus cash, which it has used to purchase U.S. securities for years. For the first time in a generation, Tokyo is running trade deficits -- five months in a row so far. The political and social fallout from a Japanese depression also would be devastating. In the face of economic instability, other Asian nations may feel forced to turn to more centralized -- even authoritarian -- control to try to limit the damage. Free-trade agreements may be rolled back and political freedom curtailed. Social stability in emerging, middle-class societies will be severely tested, and newly democratized states may find it impossible to maintain power. Progress toward a more open, integrated Asia is at risk, with the potential for increased political tension in the world's most heavily armed region. This is the backdrop upon which the U.S. government is set to expand the national debt by a trillion dollars or more. Without massive debt purchases by Japan and China, the U.S. may not be able to finance the cost of the stimulus package, creating a trapdoor under the U.S. economy. So far, Japan's politicians have been unable to find a way out of this mess. While another $53 billion stimulus package works its way through parliament, fully one-third of Japan's prefectures have instituted emergency economic stabilization measures. But the big issues elude short-term solutions. Though Japan's leaders are currently cutting back on military expenditures and domestic services, they're unable to agree on budgets or reform plans. They have no strategic road map for reining in the yen, opening up to international competition, or taking an economic leadership role in Asia that will promote growth and strengthen democratic, market-oriented societies. Things don't have to turn out this way. If Japan's leaders can craft a monetary policy that ends Japan's deflationary spiral by carefully expanding the money supply, recommit to structural reform, and halt the yen's rise, they can jump-start economic growth. They should also ignore the powerful domestic agriculture lobby and embrace a robust free-trade agenda, which would help them as well as the rest of Asia. Mrs. Clinton's visit cannot be a simple photo opportunity. This trip needs to result in a clear U.S.-Japan approach to restoring confidence and rebuilding a robust and open international system. Without action, Japan and America may go over the cliff together, dragging Asia and the world down with them.

#### Economic decline causes extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### Japan Econ Improving

#### Japan economy growing

Handley 15 — Paul Handley, Writer for Business Insider and Agence France-Presse, 2015 (“IMF sees global economy steady; Japan, Europe improve”, Business Insider, April 14th, Available Online at <http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-imf-sees-global-economy-steady-japan-europe-improve-2015-4>, Accessed 06-29-2016, SP)

Washington (AFP) - The International Monetary Fund said Tuesday that the Japanese and European economies were picking up pace as it stuck to its forecast for moderate global growth this year and next. The IMF trimmed its outlook for the United States but said the country would remain the driver of world output in 2015 and 2016 while many emerging economies struggle with low commodity prices and turbulence in financial markets. It also said in its semi-annual World Economic Outlook that the plunge in oil prices was not yet generating all the potential benefits of more spending money in consumers' pockets. And it warned that, to avoid being locked in a slow-growth mode over the medium term, governments need to be more aggressive in implementing market-friendly reforms and investing in infrastructure. "Legacies from both the financial and the euro crises are still visible in many advanced economies," said IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard. In addition, advanced economies are suffering from a decline in "potential growth", the result of the weight of an aging society, and lower investment in future productive capacities. "It would be wrong to speak, as some have done, of stagnation, but prospects are more subdued. And more subdued prospects lead, in turn, to lower spending and lower growth today." The global economy will grow about 3.5 percent this year, after 3.4 percent in 2014, and pick up pace to 3.8 percent next year, the IMF forecast. That was the same as its January predictions, although it increased its growth outlook for Japan and Europe and cut that for the United States. But for emerging countries, 2015 will be the fifth year of declining growth. With China slowing -- 6.8 percent this year and 6.3 percent in 2016 -- countries dependent on selling commodities to the second-largest economy will continue to face weak prices. The same goes for oil exporters, though their main problem is oversupply. Many are adjusting, but the impact of the 50 percent fall in crude prices since June is particularly hard on Russia and Venezuela, already beset by political and policy problems. - 'Complex forces' - Despite some bright spots, Blanchard characterized global output growth as "moderate and uneven." "A number of complex forces are shaping the prospects around the world," he said. "Legacies of both the financial and the euro area crises -- weak banks and high levels of public, corporate, and household debt -- are still weighing on spending and growth in some countries. Low growth in turn makes deleveraging a slow process." IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned last week of the "new mediocre" economy, a spell of naggingly turgid growth that leaves unemployment elevated in many areas. In the updated IMF outlook, several key countries look worse off than in January: - The United States, where the 2015 forecast has been chopped to 3.1 percent from 3.6 percent. - Russia, which faces a contraction of 3.8 percent, compared with 3.0 percent previously. - Brazil, where the IMF now expects a 1.0 percent contraction this year, rather than slight growth. Those where the picture looks better: - Germany, France, and especially Spain, which should grow 2.5 percent this year, up from the previous outlook of 2.0 percent. - Japan, where central bank stimulus has driven down the yen, boosted wages and pumped up asset prices, should deliver a 1.0 percent expansion in 2015, and 1.2 percent next year, 0.4 percent better than the January forecast. - India has been upgraded by 1.2 percentage points for a 7.5 percent expansion this year and next.

#### Japan econ high- Brexit actually boosted their economy

Nagata 6/24/16— Kazuaki Nagata is a writer for the Japan Times, 2016 (“Yen leaps on referendum surprise; Nikkei tumbles”, June 24, 2016, Accessed 6/29/16, Available online at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/24/business/financial-markets/brexit-referendum-forecasts-send-yen-soaring-to-an-almost-2%C2%BD-year-high/#.V3QrRWgrKut)

Japan braced for global market turmoil Friday as the yen briefly soared above 100 against the dollar and the Nikkei stock average tumbled over 8 percent as Britain voted in favor of leaving the European Union. The yen briefly touched 99 to the dollar — the highest since November 2013 — before retreating to 103.08 as of 5 p.m. in Tokyo. The benchmark Nikkei 225 tumbled by 1,286 points, or 7.92 percent, to close the day’s trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange at 14,952, the biggest dive in 16 years. Finance Minister Taro Aso indicated that the ministry was ready to intervene in the markets if necessary. “We are very concerned about the risks this will have on the world economy, finance, currency markets and other areas,” Aso told reporters. “In the foreign exchange market, we are seeing some very nervous moves, and so that these kinds of moves don’t continue, we are watching it with a sense of concern that is higher than before, and we will respond properly if needed.” Separately, Bank of Japan Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda said the central bank will do its utmost to stabilize financial markets in cooperation with its overseas counterparts. In a bid to protect currencies from fluctuating sharply, senior officials from the Group of Seven nations were on Friday preparing to hold a telephone conference. Some economists said the rising yen and tumbling Nikkei average were expected, but warned it could remain a long-term trend, depending on how Britain’s exit from the EU will affect the global economy, for example by spreading protectionism or triggering a potential financial crisis in Europe. The business community here expressed disappointment over the result amid concern it could damage firms whose European operations were centered in Britain. “Markets were to sell risk assets” including stocks, so “I think this was a natural reaction,” said Takashi Hiroki, chief strategist at Monex Inc. Hiroki said the Nikkei’s plunge occurred in part because investors had positioned themselves for a decision for Britain to remain in the EU. But the result was the opposite, which whipsawed the market, he said. How the decision will affect the Japanese economy is largely based on what will happen from now on, economists said. Hiroki said it would have been better for Britain to stay in the EU in terms of economic rationality, but the British did not take that into account. “This might not just end with the U.K. It might spread to other countries,” he said. That could lead to an increase in protectionism rather than globalism around the world, which would slow down global economic growth and eventually hurt Japanese companies’ overseas businesses, he said. In addition, whether Japan can somehow stem the rising yen and the decline of its stock prices will be based on how policymakers here, especially the Bank of Japan, react to the situation, Hiroki added. Shunsuke Kobayashi, an economist at Daiwa Institute of Research Holdings, said one thing to watch is whether high volatility in the markets leads to a credit crunch at European financial institutions that have already been struggling to cope with negative interest rates. “I won’t say that it will be as big as the ‘Lehman shock.’ But there is a possibility of credit crunch,” said Kobayashi, referring to a critical stage in 2008 of the global financial crisis. In that case, a strong yen will hurt profits at export-oriented firms, while falling stock prices dent people’s asset values and consumption, he said. Kobayashi said it was critical that European countries work together to prevent this. If the yen continues to surge, joint intervention will remain an option, he said. In the meantime, some major Japanese business associations said they were disappointed and also concerned about the impact of Britain’s referendum. “As we were expecting that (the U.K.) would remain, the fact that ‘leave’ overtook ‘remain’ is disappointing,” said Sadayuki Sakakibara, chairman of the Japan Business Federation, better known as Keidanren. According to Keidanren, Japan has invested over ¥10 trillion in the U.K., with more than 1,000 companies based there providing 140,000 jobs. “I am worried that the result of the vote this time will affect those companies’ businesses and plans from now on,” he said. Hitachi Ltd., which has a factory in Britain, said Friday that it will carefully evaluate how Britain’s exit from the bloc will affect the manufacturing giant’s operations there. Auto giant Toyota Motor Corp. said Friday it will “analyze the impact on our business operations in the U.K., and how we can maintain competitiveness and secure sustainable growth together with the U.K. automotive industry and other stakeholders.” Nissan Motor Co., which also runs a factory in Britain did not issue comment Friday, but its President Carlos Ghosn said in February that “remain” would be best for its business. “Our preference as a business is, of course, that the U.K. stays within Europe — it makes the most sense for jobs, trade and costs,” he said at the time. “For us, a position of stability is more positive than a collection of unknowns.”

### Independent Strike Impact

#### Japanese independent strike capabilities increase risks of conflict escalation and cause missile prolif uniquely turns heg and collapses the INF

Roberts, August 2013 (Brad, Visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013. From 2009 to early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf)

From a U.S. perspective, there are also a number of potential risks. There is a risk that China might go beyond negative political reactions to deploy new capabilities targeting Japan, such that the net effect of Japan’s decision to field strike capabilities would be an erosion of Japan’s security environment. There is a risk that the proposal could be so divisive politically in Japan and elsewhere as to undermine progress in other areas to strengthen regional deterrence and strategic stability. There is a risk also that autonomous strike actions by Japan could result in escalation that is unhelpful in crisis; this would be a function of the degree to which Japan develops the information, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities necessary for independent strike operations.42 Further, as Japan’s acquisition of strike capabilities would follow acquisition by South Korea, the message might well be taken by allies outside Northeast Asia that allies inside Northeast Asia are losing confidence in the United States to protect them, resulting in increased pressure from allies elsewhere to acquire strike capabilities of their own.43 There is also a risk that the further proliferation of regional strike systems would put renewed pressure on the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), especially if officials and experts in Moscow renew calls for Russian withdrawal so that it is at liberty to field counter-balancing systems.

#### Missile prolif causes war and undermines nuclear deterrence.

Mistry, 2003 (Dinshaw, Professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati. “Introduction,” in Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, p. 12.)

Missile proliferation can also increase the likelihood of interstate conflict in the long term. International conflict studies suggest that neighboring states are more likely to fight wars with each other, and that proximity correlates positively with conflict.9 Ballistic missiles can quickly strike distant states and thereby bring distant states “closer” to each other, which (especially if deterrence stability cannot be attained) could increase interstate tensions and the likelihood of regional conflict. Moreover, missile deployments can be provocative in a region where nuclear weapons are vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Missiles then undermine the stability of deterrence.

### NPT Impact

#### Japan nuclearization crushes global non-prolif and the NPT

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf> JJH)

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option. It could also undermine confidence in U.S. security guarantees more generally.

#### NPT prevents hotspot escalation and war

Cooper 2015 (Christian H. is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Pride of the Diplomats: Why the NPT Works” Global Policy Journal 5-19-15, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/05/2015/pride-diplomats-why-npt-works>)

The review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) this month is a once every five years chance to reaffirm and strengthen one of the strongest international norms: that against the proliferation and use of nuclear technology for military means. Representatives of 190 countries are gathered to examine the treaty itself and discuss new ways to increase global buy-in against nuclear dangers. This time, they might do so in a critical new way. Israel will be at the table for the first time in 20 years as an observer only (having not signed the NPT), and according to a senior Obama administration official, has agreed to begin working with Arabs on an agenda for a conference to discuss a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. This is a dramatic change from 2010, when Israel refused to even consider the idea. Incremental diplomatic wins like this one lie at the core of the truly transnational strategic interest on the path to complete nuclear weapons disarmament. This is precisely why ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear technology must remain a key component of all nations’ foreign policy doctrines. Perhaps one reason the NPT, and its review every five years, is often overlooked by the general public is because at face value, everyone agrees more nukes are a bad thing. However, the NPT, and the corresponding diplomatic collaboration surrounding nuclear weapons, go much deeper than simply halting the proliferation of such dangerous technology. It is through this nearly universal treaty the next generation of world leaders will likely see nuclear disarmament, avoid an open war with Iran over its nuclear program, and stop a Middle East nuclear arms race in its tracks. However, it wasn't always clear the NPT would be the resounding success it is. In 1961 when Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told U.S. President John F. Kennedy that Israel's nuclear program at Dimona was for peaceful purposes only, Kennedy’s National Security Council was simultaneously warning that by the 1970s there could be 40 nuclear weapon armed states (including Israel). If an America in the future faced rampant nuclear threats and could not believe a face-to-face conversation with a reliable ally, what could anyone trust? There had to be a better way, and the NPT was the answer: Never trust, always verify. In Israel's defense, the only NPT signatories who have violated the treaty since adoption— Iran, Iraq and Syria—have sworn to destroy the Jewish state. Remaining a non-signatory to the NPT and maintaining an opaque nuclear first strike nuclear capability was strategically the right choice for Israel (regional de-stabilization be damned), and one that could be revisited given their 2015 decision to consider an agenda for a nuclear weapons free Middle East. Israel's gambit to wait for the NPT to become as ironclad as it has paid dividends that we can all reap both in June with a comprehensive agreement between the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (including Germany, a group colloquially referred to as the P5+1) and Iran and well into the future. The defining trait of the NPT is reframing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from an act of national pride circa 1960 to an act contrary to international law by 1970. Thankfully, today we operate in a world that accepts nuclear power as a scientific pursuit but abhors its use for violence. This is also why Iran's right to domestically enrich as a signatory to the NPT will be a cornerstone of the P5+1 agreement that will be announced soon and likely ratified by the first of July. This comprehensive agreement will also implicitly underscore one of the pillars of the NPT: The gradual demilitarization of nuclear technology. And lest critics make the argument that the NPT can only be used to coerce pariah states like Iran, consider the actions of the major powers. Since the NPT entered into force, the United States has drastically reduced the number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile by 80 percent and completely removed multiple entry warheads from its nuclear strike capacity. In some respects just as importantly, Washington is currently targeting the open ocean; there is no longer a single ICBM aimed at the Russian Federation and nuclear-armed, long-range strategic bombers have been removed from daily nuclear alert. Russia has made similar progress, with both commitments and demonstrated progress in reducing deployed warheads as well as deployed and undeployed delivery vehicles. Moscow has also taken the lead in other areas where the United States has lagged behind, singing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. To be sure, complications—including Russia’s tendency to view their remaining weapons as a counterweight to all NATO stockpiles rather than simply that of the United States—still exist, but the fact remains that the norm created by NPT has reduced the potential for nuclear disaster across the globe. And where has all that potential destruction gone? Fully 10% of electric power in the United States over the last two decades came from down-blended, highly enriched uranium earmarked for Russian megaton nuclear bombs. Over 20,000 warheads (and their associated risk of accidental launches) were removed from service all thanks the spirit of the NPT. The spirit of bilateral cooperation remains strong; despite the tensions in Ukraine, both the United States and the Russian Federation are fully implementing the terms of the New START treaty, wherein each shares data on the movement of strategic forces and both engage in reciprocal inspections of military facilities. The NPT is not just about non-proliferation; it is a shift in mindset that nuclear technology will be shared with those who want it for peaceful purposes in return for de-arming those who have militarized it. It has been a resounding victory for the idea of internationalism and the fundamental idea that a community of nations can come together and, through mutually-reinforcing and verifying behavior, make strategic choices that defy the self-serving nature of states in an anarchic system. Moreover, it has been the bedrock of a norm that spawned a range of bi- and multilateral measures to protect the world against the terrible risk of nuclear conflict. Collective continued nuclear demilitarization is a win for the diplomats of the world. Progress on the biggest issues comes in small breaks, such as the Israeli decision to if not pull a seat up to the table, at least pay close attention on the sidelines. Through extraordinary burdens of verification and disclosure, the NPT will continue to make the world a safer place.

### A2: Won’t Escalate

#### We control magnitude and probability – Northeast Asia lacks security institutions and has historical animosity and nuclear capabilities – guarantees global nuclear war

Moltz, November 2006. (James Clay, Deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and associate Professor on the National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. “FUTURE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS IN NORTHEAST ASIA,” The Nonproliferation Review 13.3, Informaworld)

Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile regions of the world when it comes to nuclear weapons. Compared to other areas, it has a higher percentage of states with not only the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, but also the potential motivation.1 With the exception of Mongolia, all the countries in the region—Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—already have civilian nuclear power infrastructures. They also have experience with nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia has two established nuclear weapon states—Russia and China—and North Korea is a presumed nuclear power. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered “threshold” states—all have had nuclear weapons development programs and could resume them in the future. Adding potential volatility to the mix, Northeast Asia suffers from underlying political and security fault lines: the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula; enduring Korean and Chinese enmity over Japanese atrocities committed before and during World War II; Russo-Japanese disputes over the Kuril Islands; and the tensions created by China's growing effort to rein Taiwan into its governance. For these and other reasons, regional security institutions in Northeast Asia are weak and tend to be based around bilateral commitments (Sino-North Korean, U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-South Korean, and U.S.-Taiwanese). The nuclear character of Northeast Asia is further defined by the fact that the United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in August 1945 and eventually stationed 3,200 nuclear weapons in South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the formerly U.S.-held islands of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.2 Major and minor wars involving regional powers were fought in the years from 1945 to 1991: the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Given this violent history, it is remarkable that further nuclear proliferation did not occur. The role of U.S. security guarantees with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan clearly played a major role in this sometimes less-than-willing restraint. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of political support for U.S. forces in both South Korea and Japan. North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 also has caused both states to reevaluate their decisions to halt nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, the views of some top officials in the George W. Bush administration regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons may be eroding national restraint and increasing the willingness of countries to go the final step, using their nuclear capabilities to make up for any conventional defense gaps. This essay examines potential nuclear proliferation trends among the states of Northeast Asia to 2016 from the context of early post-Cold War predictions, current capabilities, and possible future “trigger” events. It offers the unfortunate conclusion that several realistic scenarios could stimulate horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation.3 Indeed, if left unattended, existing political and security tensions could cause Northeast Asia to become the world's most nuclearized area by 2016, with six nuclear weapon states. Such a scenario would greatly exacerbate U.S. security challenges and probably spark nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world.

#### Japan’s rearmament escalates all current tensions makes war more likely

Zhou 15 – Tony Zhou studied at Cornell in International Relations (Tony, 10/10/15, Located at <https://diplomacist.com/2015/10/10/the-dangerous-ramifications-of-japans-revised-security-laws/>, “The Dangerous Ramifications of Japan’s Revised Security Laws”, Diplomacist, Accessed 6/24/16, MW)

After weeks of contentious debate, vigorous civilian protest, and stiff political opposition, a set of controversial security laws passed the Upper House of the Japanese Diet on September 19th, already having passed the Lower House in July, handing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a twofold victory. First, it effectively overturned Article Nine of the Japanese constitution, which forbade the existence of a standing military and plans to wage offensive war — Japan is now allowed to rearm and engage in military operations on behalf of its allies’ defenses. Second, it increased Japan’s commitment to the US-Japan defense alliance, resulting in additional defense spending allocations and a more active deployment of Self Defense Force (SDF) troops in outposts and neighboring allies. Japan’s rearmament finds its roots in a long and murky political history. In 1926, Emperor Hirohito’s ascendancy to the throne led to an increase in ultra-nationalistic tendencies, which eventually transformed into aggressive imperialism and a desire for regional dominance, as was demonstrated in the 1937 provocations with China that led to the Sino-Japanese war and further invasions of the Dutch-East Indies and British Hong Kong in 1941. Post World War II defeat, however, Japan’s military capabilities were removed and codified as an illegal means of solving disputes through Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. Although the Self Defense Forces, a peacetime paramilitary force, were established in 1954, rearmament has been seen as a sort of taboo within both Japanese lawmaking and society due to the fear of a reversion back to the imperialist tendencies displayed earlier. However, recent security problems have brought the issue of rearmament back to the national spotlight. Beginning in 2012, Chinese naval encroachment into the Japanese-claimed Senkaku Islands has been on a steady uprise, and a lack of force projection by the Japanese could indicate weakness and encourage further encroachments. On the other side of the globe, two Japanese nationals were beheaded by the terrorist group ISIS in January 2015 — Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was not able to offer much retaliation other than a verbal condemnation of the group and increased humanitarian aid to the region. Thus, the question arises: does Japanese rearmament properly solve Japan’s security problem or does it ultimately cause more harm than good? To begin judging the effects of Japan’s rearmament, one can gauge the reactions of Japan’s neighbors. Without a doubt, the rearmament has caught the eyes of every major regional power in East Asia. In October 2013, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se announced, “There are many countries including us that are worried about Japan’s rearmament. A situation where [we] overlook Japan’s rearmament will not come.” Having succumbed to Japanese aggression and brutal colonialism in the early 20th century, the historical memory of South Korea shows a heavy societal and political disfavor toward any Japanese military capabilities. The closest effect of Japan’s rearmament may therefore be a significant decrease in relations between the two previously allied countries. While South Korea’s reaction may be purely diplomatic, rearmament may start a deeper provocation in two other countries: China and North Korea. Earlier this year, China’s foreign ministry released a powerfully worded statement condemning a Japanese defense white paper asking for appropriate increases in defense spending to combat the “China military threat.” The statement reads, “This kind of action completely lays bare the two-faced nature of Japan’s foreign policy and has a detrimental impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region” and that China would implement a “necessary reaction depending on the situation.” China has reiterated this threat multiple times, most recently by accompanying President Xi Jinping’s speech slamming Japanese aggression on September 3rd with a massive military parade through Beijing. Perceiving South Korea and the United States as key advocates for Japan’s endangering of North Korean national security, North Korea entered the fray with threats of escalation as well. In 2013, North Korean state media stated that ”The prevailing situation calls upon all Koreans to decisively smash the Japanese reactionaries’ attempt to exercise the right which has become undisguised under the backstage wire-pulling of the U.S. and the South Korean regime’s criminal collusion and nexus to help them.” Although both China’s and North Korea’s threats may only seem to be threatening rhetoric, their credibility and immediacy are both advanced by a real and publicized development in Japanese military capabilities. Backlash from either the economic and military superpower of China or the rogue military state of North Korea may lead to a fatal escalation of regional tensions that already lie on the brink — ultimately doing more harm than good to Japan’s security. For Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling LDP party, the development of a military beyond the Self Defense Forces may seem to be a proper defense against regional tensions as of late. However, after examining other countries’ reactions to the newly passed security laws, a definite conclusion can be drawn that Japan’s rearmament only exacerbates those tensions and further endangers Japanese security.

### A2: Prolif Slow

#### Timeframe – Japan and South Korea have the infrastructure and materials to go nuclear in months.

Moran, 10/15/2006 (Michael, Executive editor of CFR.org and a columnist for Globalpost.com. “Will nukes march across Asia?” Star Ledger, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11731/)

So far, the reaction of North Korea’s Asian neighbors has been moderate: careful condemnations, calls for sanctions, pledges to work for a peaceful solution, etc. This certainly is a far cry from Pakistan’s tit-for-tat, nuke-for-nuke response to India’s 1998 nuclear test. But those who make a living tracking proliferation threats remain concerned. Both South Korea and Japan are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the treaty North Korea renounced in 2003 before its final push for nuclear weaponry began. Yet, of all the non-nuclear states that have pondered, secretly or openly, the wisdom of going nuclear, none is more capable of fielding an actual arsenal as quickly and completely as Japan and South Korea are. As the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack, Japan has repeatedly vowed in the years since 1945 to never “develop, use, or allow the transportation of nuclear weapons through its territory.” It later emerged Japan had, in fact, studied the idea during the 1960s. By and large, however, Japan has been true to its word. Yet Japan, more vulnerable than any other major industrial nation to oil crises, also developed a civilian nuclear power in dustry larger than any outside France and the United States. This expanding network of nuclear plants, which Japan hopes will produce over 40 percent of national electricity needs by 2010, also produced spent plutonium at levels which alarm nonproliferation experts. While this is not “bomb-grade” plutonium in the strictest sense, experts believe Japan could quickly field an arsenal if it so chose. Michael Levi, an expert in arms control and proliferation at the Council on Foreign Relations, says Japan could nuclearize its military “in a matter of months, if not sooner.” This has led some to deem Japan a “paranuclear” state. Such thoughts would have been quickly dismissed a decade ago given the lingering taboo and trauma caused by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. In recent years, however, particularly since North Korea test-fired a missile in 1998 that crossed Japanese territory before splashing into the Pacific Ocean, some politicians have called for a rethinking of the pacifism imposed on Japan by the United States after World War II. Yasuhiro Nakasone, a former prime minister, told a reporter last month Japan needed “to study the issue of nuclear weapons.” Japan’s new prime minister, before winning power, expressed the opinion that nothing in the country's constitution specifically forbids development of a nuclear deterrent. Abe has been careful since the North Korean test to say Japan is not planning to go nuclear. But he clearly is aligned with those who feel a nuclear arsenal to be on the table for study. As with Japan, South Korea’s sophisticated domestic nuclear power industry is poised to nuclearize if it so chooses. From the 1950s until the late 1980s, in South Korea’s official accounts, Seoul pursued a nuclear weapons program as vigorously as its communist archrival to the north. In fact, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors who visited South Korea in 2003 discovered research on enriching plutonium continued until at least 2000. While the IAEA found no evidence of any military motive, it was a reminder of how little we may actually know about such activity there and elsewhere.

### A2: Can’t Build a Bomb – Perception Key

#### Japan doesn’t need to build weapons to cause the impact – changes in Japanese opinion cause the impact.

Bakanic 6/9/2008 (Elizabeth D., MA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The end of Japan's nuclear taboo” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://thebulletin.org/end-japans-nuclear-taboo> JJH)

So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitude toward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the nonproliferation regime, meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry serious security consequences for both. Historically, Japan has maintained complicated relations with many of its neighbors--specifically China, North Korea, and South Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist, creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from an outside perspective sets off alarm bells in the region. So what may seem like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be a destabilizing change for those less trustful and less objective. Therefore, if discussing nuclear weapons becomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a dangerous development and use it as an excuse to increase their military capabilities--nuclear or otherwise. In terms of the teetering nonproliferation regime, a change in Japan's attitude toward nuclear weapons would be a serious blow. To date, Tokyo has been a foremost advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, campaigning against proliferation and rejecting the idea of developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the best nuclear capability of any non-nuclear weapon state and having two nuclear weapon states near its borders. The binding nature of international agreements relies on such attention and support from its signatories. So although Japan may never violate the treaty, if Tokyo is perceived as being less supportive as it opens up domestically on the nuclear issue, the effect on NPT morale could be dire, which speaks directly to the NPT's current vulnerability. Some element of the changing attitude toward nuclear weapons in Japan must be due to discomfort with the status quo and a security need that the NPT or the country's other security partnerships isn't satisfying. Therefore, a disturbing factor of Japan's nuclear normalization is what it may symbolize for the NPT overall.

### A2: Can’t Build a Bomb

#### **There are no obstacles to a nuke weapon for Japan.**

Hunt 15 — Jonathan Hunt, Hunt is a postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand Corp, 2015 (“Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow”, Foreign Policy, August 5th, Available Online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to Pyongyang’s provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And if Tokyo invoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT, which has a 90-day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis, however, those numbers would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons, Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea — trilateral coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result.

#### **Japan has enough plutonium and tech capabilities to build a nuke.**

Keck 2014 — Zachary Keck, worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, 2014 (“Japan and China’s Dispute Goes Nuclear”, The Diplomat, 3/18, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/japan-and-chinas-dispute-goes-nuclear/, Accessed 6-24-16, RKim)

Japan and China appear to be trading nuclear barbs with one another. For some weeks now, China has been raising concerns about the amount of enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium Japan currently stockpiles. “We continue to urge the Japanese government to take a responsible attitude and explain itself to international community,” a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said at the end of last month. The following week, the same spokesperson asked: “Has Japan kept an excessive amount of sensitive nuclear material that is beyond its actual needs? Does one need so much sensitive nuclear material for peaceful use? Should one keep excessive weapons-grade nuclear material?” He added: “More importantly, does Japan have higher-enriched and weapons-grade uranium, and how much does it have? What are those used for? How can Japan ensure a balance between the demand and supply of nuclear materials? These are the real concerns and questions of the international community.” Japan has one of the most advanced civilian nuclear programs of any country without nuclear weapons. According to NBC News, Tokyo has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled in different places throughout Japan, while 35 tons of Japanese plutonium is stockpiled in different countries in Europe. Only about 5 to 10 kilograms is needed to produce a nuclear weapon. Japan also has an additional 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. It is also building a fast-breeder plutonium reactor in Rokkasho that will produce 8 tons of plutonium annually. Many experts believe that Japan could produce nuclear weapons within 6 months of deciding to do so, and some believe that Tokyo is pursuing a “nuclear hedging” strategy. Japan has done little to mollify these concerns. In fact, it has often encouraged them, with a Japanese official recently saying off the record that “Japan already has the technical capability [to build a nuclear bomb], and has had it since the 1980s.” Having a “bomb in the basement” largely suits Japan’s interests in its competition with China. By indulging Beijing’s concerns that Japan may build nuclear weapons, Tokyo is hoping to deter China from racketing up bilateral tensions too heavily. At the same, Tokyo is hoping to use its nuclear hedge strategy as leverage over the U.S. to ensure that Washington stays engaged in region.

#### **China has tech, resources, and political motivation to build and launch nukes.**

Yin Xiaoliang 2014 — Yin Xiaoliang , writer for China Daily, 2014 (“Japan has nuclear weapons capability”, China Daily, 3/24, Available Online at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014xivisiteu/2014-03/24/content\_17373447.htm, Accessed 6-24-16, RKim)

Let's take a quick look at Japan's stockpile of nuclear materials. According to the data released by the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, Japan possessed 44.3 tons of plutonium in 2012, of which 9.3 tons were stockpiled at home and 35 tons kept abroad in countries such as the United Kingdom and France. This even exceeds the 38 tons of weapons-grade plutonium the US previously claimed to hold. By the standard that 8 kilograms of plutonium are needed to produce a nuclear weapon, Japan's stockpile is enough for more than 5,000 nuclear weapons, an arsenal that is large enough to wipe out life on Earth. In addition, Japan has a competitive nuclear power industry and one of the most advanced civilian nuclear programs worldwide, which has laid a solid technological foundation for its manufacture of nuclear weapons. The country also boasts various types of nuclear reactors and the centrifuge techniques needed for the uranium enrichment process. All the aforementioned can be converted into military use to accommodate the changes in Japan's nuclear policies. It is impossible for a country to produce nuclear weapons without conducting weapon tests. However, given its possession of world-class supercomputers and its competence in inertial confine fusion, or ICF, a type of fusion energy research that attempts to initiate nuclear fusion reactions, Japan is highly capable of conducting simulated tests and is thus able to produce a nuclear weapon and guarantee its effectiveness, yield and explosive capabilities without actual physical testing. Still a nuclear weapon also requires delivery technologies and systems. Since the end of World War II, Japan has attached great importance to developing aerospace technologies and solid-fuel rockets. Japan already has highly advanced solid-fuel launch vehicles and has already accumulated the technical data needed for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. In theory, its H-II rocket, the satellite launch system, can be rebuilt into a ballistic missile to deliver nuclear weapons. Now let's take another look at Japanese politics, which plays a key role in formulating the nation's nuclear policies. In recent years, the Japanese political circle has shown an increasing inclination toward right-wing conservatism. Driven by this, the military circle has undergone some changes. First and foremost is the higher administrative status of the military bodies. Japan's Defense Agency, established in 1954, was upgraded to the status of a full ministry in 2007, and the Abe administration is seeking to upgrade the Self-Defense Forces to a full-scale national defense force. Besides, the ruling party intends to ease the self-imposed ban on weapon exports that has been in place since 1967 to boost the country's defense influence, and furthermore, Tokyo has gone beyond the concept of "static" defense within its own territory to adopt so-called dynamic defense, which allows SDF units to be dispatched abroad and military bases to be set up overseas. Given the inconsistency in its defense policy, it is not much a surprise that Tokyo maintains an ambiguous position over nuclear weapons. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles, namely that Japan should neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory, were first outlined in 1967 by then Japanese prime minister Eisaku Sato, but when visiting the US in 1969, Sato signed a secret agreement with then US president Richard Nixon, which allows the US to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in violation of the tenets. Japan also refused to sign a joint statement during the conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 2013, despite being the only country that has ever been the victim of atomic bombs.

#### Japan can create nuke bomb quickly, and China is scared of it

Windrem 14 — Robert Windrem, Award-winning investigative writer, reporter and producer for nearly 40 years, mainly in national security, graduated from Seton Hall University, 2014 (“Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy”, NBC News, March 11th, Available Online at <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

No nation has suffered more in the nuclear age than Japan, where atomic bombs flattened two cities in World War II and three reactors melted down at Fukushima just three years ago. But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall. Japan signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans it from developing nuclear weapons, more than 40 years ago. But according to a senior Japanese government official deeply involved in the country’s nuclear energy program, Japan has been able to build nuclear weapons ever since it launched a plutonium breeder reactor and a uranium enrichment plant 30 years ago. “Japan already has the technical capability, and has had it since the 1980s,” said the official. He said that once Japan had more than five to 10 kilograms of plutonium, the amount needed for a single weapon, it had “already gone over the threshold,” and had a nuclear deterrent. Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons. But pressure has been growing on Japan to dump some of the trappings of its deterrent regardless. The U.S. wants Japan to return 331 kilos of weapons grade plutonium – enough for between 40 and 50 weapons – that it supplied during the Cold War. Japan and the U.S. are expected to sign a deal for the return at a nuclear security summit next week in the Netherlands. Yet Japan is sending mixed signals. It also has plans to open a new fast-breeder plutonium reactor in Rokkasho in October. The reactor would be able to produce 8 tons of plutonium a year, or enough for 1,000 Nagasaki-sized weapons. China seems to take the basement bomb seriously. It has taken advantage of the publicity over the pending return of the 331 kilos to ask that Japan dispose of its larger stockpile of plutonium, and keep the new Rokkasho plant off-line. Chinese officials have argued that Rokkasho was launched when Japan had ambitious plans to use plutonium as fuel for a whole new generation of reactors, but that those plans are on hold post-Fukushima and the plutonium no longer has a peacetime use. In February, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua published a commentary that said if a country "hoards far more nuclear materials than it needs, including a massive amount of weapons grade plutonium, the world has good reason to ask why."

### A2: Tech

#### Japan has the material to create nukes

Rowberry 14 — Ariana Navarro Rowberry, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Rowberry gradutated from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, BA Peace, War, and Defense, and Political Science, works at the National Security Council in the Middle East Directorate, 2014 (“Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Brookings Institution, December 2014, Available Online at <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advanced-conventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-rowberry.pdf>, pg. 8, Accessed 06-22-2016, SP)

Outside of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, Japan maintains one of the world’s largest atomic energy programs, considered by many to be a strategic hedge. Prior to the 2011 Fukishima disaster, Japan received around 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. While Japan has idled its reactors in response to Fukishima, it hopes to maintain a robust nuclear energy program. In contrast to most other non-nuclear weapon states with large nuclear energy programs, Japan has both uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, as well as vast stocks of separated reactor-grade plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons.16 Right-wing Japanese officials have referred to the large stocks of weapons-usable plutonium as a deterrent, and some states, including South Korea and China, have expressed concern that Japan is allowed to possess weapons-usable materials.

### A2: Constitution

#### Japan Constitution allows for the development of nukes- even if it isn’t Abe doesn’t care

Ryall 16— Julian Ryall is a writer for South China Morning Post, 2016 (“Shinzo Abe’s government insists Japanese constitution does not explicitly prohibit nuclear weapons”, April 4th, Accessed 6/24/16, Available online at [http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1933540/shinzo-abes-government-insists-japanese-constitution-does-not#comments](http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1933540/shinzo-abes-government-insists-japanese-constitution-does-not), JRR)

The government of Shinzo Abe has stated that there is nothing in the nation’s Constitution that explicitly forbids Japan from possessing or using nuclear weapons. The government’s position on the issue was made clear in a written response to a question posed by two opposition politicians in the Diet on Friday. And although the present government interprets Article 9 of the war-renouncing Constitution as not banning Japan from having a nuclear deterrent, it emphasised in the written response that the government “firmly maintains a policy principle that it does not possess nuclear weapons of any type under the three non-nuclear principles”. I would assume this has come as something of a surprise to the Japanese public Analysts point out that Abe’s reading of the Constitution is actually consistent with the previous government’s interpretation, although the revelation has caused headlines in some left-of-centre newspapers and surprise among the majority of the public. In a statement in the Diet in 1978, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda said Article 9 does not “absolutely prohibit” Japan from having nuclear weapons, as long as they are “limited to the minimum necessary level”, the Asahi newspaper reported. That comment had largely been forgotten until Yusuke Yokobatake, the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, stated at a meeting of the Upper House Budget Committee on March 18 that the Constitution does not ban Japan from using nuclear weapons. That comment was seized upon by the opposition and led to questions to the prime minister. “I would assume this has come as something of a surprise to the Japanese public,” said Jun Okumura, a visiting scholar at the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs. “I was dimly aware in my youth that there had been serious talks about Japan having nuclear weapons, under the administration of Eisaku Sato in the late 1960s and early ‘70s. Donald Trump has raised the prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan. “But that was at the time of the cold war and nuclear weapons were being considered by several nations in the region, including Taiwan and South Korea. “It was not until much more recently – perhaps the last decade or so – that I learned that the right to have nuclear weapons is actually Japan’s accepted doctrine.” The government’s tacit position, now made clear, may cause renewed concerns among neighbouring countries already watching Abe’s administration warily, as well as a proportion of the Japanese public. It was only in 2014, for example, that an estimated 10,000 demonstrators gathered outside the prime minister’s official residence in Tokyo to protest Abe’s interpretation of the Constitution to mean that Japanese troops are permitted to go to the assistance of forces of allied nations in the event of a military incident. In addition, the new reading of the Constitution allows Tokyo to send troops to combat zones to assist in military operations. Abe had stated previously that he is keen for Japan to play a more proactive role that is more commensurate with its economic power in international peacekeeping operations and in other security hot spots. The government’s comments coincide with statements by Donald Trump, the front runner for the Republican Party’s nomination for this year’s US elections. Over the weekend, Trump reiterated his belief that the US should reduce its military presence overseas and, to pick up the security slack, Japan and South Korea should develop and deploy nuclear weapons. “I would rather have them not armed but I’m not going to continue to lose this tremendous amount of money,” Trump told supporters during a rally in Wisconsin on Saturday. “And frankly, the case could be made that ... let them protect themselves against North Korea. They would probably wipe them out pretty quick. “Good luck, folks. Enjoy yourselves. If they fight, that would be terrible, right? But if they do, they do.”

#### Japan Constitution does allow nuclear armament- prefer Prime Minster Abe’s interpretation

Glum 16—Julia Glum is a reporter for International Business Times, 2016 (“Japan's Constitution Allows Nuclear Weapons, Says Shinzo Abe's Government After Donald Trump Comments”, April 4th, Accessed 6/22/16, Available online at <http://www.ibtimes.com/japans-constitution-allows-nuclear-weapons-says-shinzo-abes-government-after-donald-2347884>, JRR)

Japan's constitution does not ban the country from having nuclear weapons, contrary to popular belief, officials under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insisted recently. The Japanese Cabinet wrote in a response to lawmakers' inquiries Friday that the nation could own and use nukes, the Asahi Shimbun of Tokyo reported. But it then noted that the government "firmly maintains a policy principle that it does not possess nuclear weapons of any type under the three non-nuclear principles.” The statement concerned Article 9 of Japan's constitution, which condemns war and establishes the country as a pacifist nation. The 1947 regulation prohibits Japan, the only country to suffer atomic attack, from having a traditional military and also renounces offensive weapons, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The provision has been reinterpreted over the past few decades, most recently by Abe, who in 2012 started his second period as prime minister. In July 2014, Abe allowed Japan's Self-Defense Forces to become more assertive and militarily assist foreign countries, in part to strengthen the relationship between Japan and the United States, the New York Times reported. Last week, Abe's government referenced a 1978 address by then-Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda suggesting that nuclear weapons were constitutionally acceptable, the Asahi Shimbun reported. “Even if it involves nuclear weapons, the constitution does not necessarily ban the possession of them as long as they are restricted to such a minimum necessary level,” it read. Jun Okumura, a scholar at Tokyo's Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, told the South China Morning Post of Hong Kong the recent announcement was likely "something of a surprise to the Japanese public." But residents might not need to worry: Yasuhisa Kawamura, a representative of the Foreign Ministry, declared at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington Friday that "it is unthinkable that Japan use or possess nuclear weapons," USA Today reported. Japan's defense policy also made international news recently when American presidential candidate Donald Trump suggested Japan and South Korea start to protect themselves "against this maniac in North Korea" (dictator Kim Jong Un) instead of relying on U.S. troops, according to CNN.

#### Constitution has allowed nuclear weapons since 1978.

Mina Pollmann 2016 — Mina Pollmann, received Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, majoring in International Politics with a concentration in Foreign Policy and received the Dean’s and the Peter F. Krogh Millennial Award and the Ernst H. Feilchenfeld Award.Yin Xiaoliang , 2016 (“Japan's Nuclear Weapons Conundrum”, The Diplomat, 4/6, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japans-nuclear-weapons-conundrum/, Accessed 6-24-16, RKim)

On March 18, Yusuke Yokobatake, director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, told the Upper House Budget Committee that, even though domestic and international laws limit the use of nuclear weapons, Japan’s Constitution does not necessarily ban nuclear weapons. Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet further clarified its position in a written statement provided on April 1. Even though the government continues to uphold the three non-nuclear principles, the statement argued that Article 9 does not prohibit the country from possessing the minimum armed forces needed for self-defense, and there is no distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons when it comes to this minimum requirement. “Even if it involves nuclear weapons, the Constitution does not necessarily ban the possession of them as long as they are restricted to such a minimum necessary level,” the statement said. In this, Abe’s Cabinet is not necessarily breaking new ground, as it conforms to then-Prime Minsiter Takeo Fukuda’s position, articulated as far back as 1978.

### A2: No Plutonium

#### Japan has a huge stockpile of plutonium- when they want to they can have tons of nukes

Lewis 14—Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 2014 (“Japan Has Enough Plutonium to Make Thousands of Nukes”, December 1, 2014, Accessed 6/22/16, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/01/japan-has-enough-plutonium-to-make-thousands-of-nukes/>, JRR)

Japan’s plutonium stockpile is a constant topic of discussion. Japan is the only non-nuclear weapons state that sits on tons of separated plutonium, which could be used to make nuclear weapons. Japan’s neighbors never tire of pointing out Tokyo’s stockpile of plutonium in the same breath as the empire’s wartime past. I doubt much of this carping is sincere, but Japan’s plutonium policies do create nonproliferation problems. Although I don’t believe Japan would use its civil plutonium in a bomb program, the stockpile — and Tokyo’s repeated comments about the importance of reprocessing for energy security — makes it much harder to convince countries with worse nonproliferation records (from Iran to South Korea) to restrain themselves. The Abe government should take advantage of the delay in operations at Rokkasho to think about setting a better example. Japan’s long-standing emphasis on nuclear energy reflects a national neuralgia about energy security. Japan has few traditional energy sources on its home islands. After all, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was a prelude to the seizure of the Dutch East Indies oil resources that Tokyo believed were essential to continue the war. Post-war Japan has been peaceful, but no less mindful of energy security issues. Today, Japan maintains the world’s second-largest petroleum reserve after Uncle Sam. And, more importantly, Japan has invested heavily in nuclear energy. Since Japan has no uranium, it spent vast sums to develop the infrastructure to recover and reuse plutonium from spent fuel. The massive $30 billion Rokkasho plant — where Japan will separate plutonium from spent fuel — is the centerpiece of this effort. Despite massive investments, however, Japan has never been able to develop the companion technology: a fast reactor that will consume the plutonium. Japan’s fast reactor at Monju — like others attempted in the United States, France, and elsewhere — is so hot it is cooled by molten sodium. Molten sodium explodes on contact with water. Guess how well that works out? Sodium-related nuclear accidents occurred in the United States in 1959 and again in 1964, the latter giving us the Reader’s Digest book, We Almost Lost Detroit. (We also got a great Gil Scott Heron song out of it, which has been sampled a couple of times.) Monju itself experienced a serious accident in 1995; regulators recently discovered it sits on a fault line. Japanese authorities are now considering pulling the plug on Monju. Without it, Japan will have to mix the plutonium with uranium in something called mixed oxide fuel(MOX) that can be used in existing reactors after a bit of conversion. The problem is that Japan has not yet completed the MOX plant at Rokkasho and only a small number of Japanese nuclear power plants were converted before the Fukushima accident. Like the rest of Japan’s nuclear power plants, these are not operating. That means that once Japan begins operating Rokkasho, there is no place for the plutonium to go. Its stockpile of plutonium will grow. And grow. And grow. Japan has more than 10 tons of separated plutonium — enough for thousands of nuclear warheads. And don’t let anyone tell you that plutonium produced in a commercial reactor can’t be used in a nuclear weapon. The United States did it in 1962. Here is the definitive statement on the matter from the U.S. Department of Energy: "a potential proliferating state could build a nuclear weapon from reactor grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that)." One kiloton is wimpy by modern standards, but it will still "suck the paint off your house and give your family a permanent orange Afro." Despite having nowhere for the plutonium to go, Japan has invested an enormous amount of money in Rokkasho. The local community in Aomori prefecture accepted the storage of Japan’s spent nuclear fuel based on the expectation that the spent fuel would be separated and the waste shipped elsewhere for long-term disposal. But there is no repository at the moment. Japan’s energy policy is screwed up, but things are usually screwed up for a reason. Tokyo started down this path in the 1970s when reprocessing was all the rage. (People had a lot of terrible ideas in the 1970s. Look how angry it made Mike Watt.) I understand how hard it would be for Japan to walk away from a $30 billion investment with no clear plan to store and dispose of the spent fuel.

### A2: Prolif Defense

#### Prolif in secondary states like Japan is uniquely destabilizing.

Lanoszka 12 – Alexander, Ph.D. in IR, Postdoctoral Fellow Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College, “Protection States Trust?: Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics” https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-Lanoszka-Protection-States-Trust-022012.pdf

4.3 Nuclear Behavior as Insurance and Bargaining As doubts over the superpower’s commitment increase, the secondary state will be more apt to explore military policies that insure against the effects of patron abandonment. They are more likely to adopt ambiguous nuclear postures or even begin pursuing their own nuclear weapons program. Having a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a robust insurance policy for the secondary state. Goldstein (2000) notes that the secondary state is not required to develop such an extensive and technologically advanced arsenal as those possessed by the US and the Soviet Union. Rather, it needs to have a sufficient number of weapons that are capable of second-strike delivery to deter the adversary from launching a direct attack. Indeed, the philosophy guiding the secondary state’s approach to deterrence is different from that of their patrons. Superpowers rely on the threat of ‘controlled escalation’ in which they proceed 21 through limited but gradually more intense exchanges to communicate their resolve in inflicting damage. Engaging in controlled escalation requires advanced command and control systems as well as the ability to absorb nuclear damage. These requirements are especially demanding for smaller states that are less able to meet them.16 Consequently, such states opt for a ‘poison pill’ strategy in which their deterrence policy rests on the threat of ‘uncontrolled escalation’. The high likelihood of both parties losing control of a nuclear exchange characterizes this form of confrontation. For such an exchange to occur there needs to be an element of risk that neither side could attenuate (Powell 1987, 719). A state’s technological capacity for managing its nuclear weapons poses such a risk if it is involuntarily underdeveloped and thus prone to accidents and other organizational failures. These concerns gain significance when it comes to secondary states. Their national command structures are likely to be small and more concentrated than is the case for superpowers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, they face a much higher probability of being thrown into disarray during the conflict’s initial stages. Nuclear retaliation, therefore, becomes less inhibited and results in the infliction of massive damage on the adversary (Goldstein 2000, 47-51). Backwards inducing from this possibility leads the adversary to refrain from direct military attack on the secondary state.17 Such are the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, but secondary states have to pass through various stages of nuclear development first. Indeed, there is a paradox underlining nuclear weapons acquisition. As much as having a nuclear arsenal might engender international stability, the process by which states finally acquire nuclear weapons generates instability (Sagan and Waltz 1995). Adopting an ambiguous nuclear posture or pursuing a nuclear weapons program provokes alarm amongst neighboring states, regardless of whether they are allies. Those states might be unsettled by the uncertainty of the potential proliferator’s intentions and the fear of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in the future. Moreover, though the secondary state acts to hedge against superpower abandonment in their effort to obtain greater foreign policy autonomy, they also risk punishment from the superpower for threatening to undermine its alliance structures.

### A2: No Domino Theory

#### Domino theory is real – countries don’t prolif only with explicit U.S. reassurance policies

Miller 14 (Nick, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, 10/6, “U.S. nonproliferation policy is an invisible success story,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/16/u-s-nonproliferation-policy-is-an-invisible-success-story/)

Even though five decades have passed, experts disagree over whether these policies were successful. Some public commentators and academics describe U.S. nonproliferation policy as a failure, emphasizing the inability of the U.S. government to arrest the nuclear programs of Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran. On the other hand, a large body of recent academic research on nuclear proliferation either pays little attention to U.S. policy or argues that there was not much proliferation for the United States to prevent. According to this school of thought, nuclear domino effects are a myth that have been proven historically invalid; leaders’ understanding of their state’s identity, domestic regime type, or the strategic characteristics of nuclear weapons make them much less attractive and “contagious” than traditionally believed. Research on the NPT, meanwhile, has seen it as a set of norms that affect states’ understanding of appropriate behavior, while downplaying the role of coercion and power. In contrast, my own research suggests that nuclear domino effects are real and that U.S. policy has been crucial in preventing them from reaching fruition. In the wake of the Chinese nuclear test, for example, India, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia all began moving toward developing a nuclear arsenal. U.S. efforts were important in preventing Japan, Taiwan, and Australia from following through. Moreover, while the U.S. failed to prevent India from testing in 1974, it responded by strengthening its nonproliferation policy further, instituting automatic sanctions policies that I argue have deterred states that are dependent on the United States from pursuing nuclear weapons. The policy has helped decrease the rate at which states begin to develop nuclear weapons programs. It also explains why recent proliferators have exclusively been “rogue” states outside the U.S. sphere of influence like Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. This stands in stark contrast to the roster of U.S. friends and allies that pursued nuclear weapons before the strengthening of U.S. policy, i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Israel, and France. This evidence is only one part of a burgeoning research program that is uncovering the long underappreciated role of American nonproliferation policy, including its efforts to prevent nuclear tests, induce compliance with the NPT, or coerce some of its closest allies into remaining non-nuclear. Much of this research has drawn on recently declassified documents from the National Security Archive and Cold War International History Project and has benefited from the support and resources of the Stanton Foundation and Nuclear Studies Research Initiative. The lesson of this research is clear. Examples of the “failures” of U.S. nonproliferation policy like Pakistan and North Korea are conspicuous and therefore receive more press. In contrast, the successes are often invisible, because they involve states’ tacit decisions not to start nuclear weapons programs. American citizens and policymakers should not lose sight of the broader success of U.S. nonproliferation.

## US-Japan Alliance Impacts

### 2nc Alliance IL

#### Japan armament causes NPT withdraw and crushes the US-Japan Alliance

Roberts 13—Brad Roberts, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy under the first Obama administration, former consulting professor and William Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a doctorate in International Relations from Erasmus University, Rotterdam, a William J. Perry Fellow in International Security, 2013.(“Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, August 9th, Available Online at <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 28-9, aqp)

A final model is sometimes proposed by Japanese politicians and pundits: a nuclear-armed Japan. This is not a model of extended U.S. deterrence. The case is sometimes made that perhaps Japan could arm itself and join Britain and France as a nuclear-armed ally of the United States. It is difficult to imagine how this step might be taken in the current security environment. Britain and France became nuclear weapon states before the NPT; for Japan to do so now would require NPT withdrawal, with significant political and economic consequences. Moreover, Japan’s decision to seek an independent nuclear deterrent would presumably reflect profound lack of confidence in U.S. credibility; it is difficult to see how or why the U.S.-Japan alliance would survive a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons. And of course Britain and France were able to acquire nuclear weapons without generating significantly adverse reactions among their immediate neighbors in Europe, whereas Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would likely generate significantly adverse reactions in Asia.

### Alliance Solves Asia War

#### U.S-Japan Alliance key to prevent Southeast Asia conflict and increase global relations.

Emma Chanlett-Avery & Ian E. Rinehart 2016 — Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs,

Ian E. Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, 2016 (“The U.S-Japan Alliance”**,** Congressional Research Service, 2/9, Available online at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf>, accessed June 29th, RKim)

Changes in the East Asian security landscape have shaped Japan’s defense approach and apparatus. North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and repeated ballistic missile tests have heightened the sense of threat in Japan. China’s military advances and increasingly bold maritime activities have also exacerbated Japan’s sense of vulnerability, particularly since confrontation over a set of islets in the East China Sea began to escalate in late 2010. Aside from such threats, Japan has also developed defense partnerships in the region, often working through the U.S.-Japan alliance. The strong ties and habits of cooperation between the American and Japanese defense establishments complement existing and emerging security partnerships. The April 2015 joint statement released by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Japanese counterparts (the so-called 2+2 meeting) praised progress in developing trilateral and multilateral cooperation, specifically with Australia, the Republic of Korea, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. 11 The U.S.-Japan alliance has been a vehicle for enhancing security ties with Southeast Asian countries, especially since maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas began to intensify in the late 2000s. Some analysts see these bilateral and multilateral links among U.S. allies and partners as beneficial to U.S. security interests by both enhancing deterrence and perhaps lessening the sense of direct rivalry with potential adversaries.12 The two main mechanisms for U.S.-Japan regional security cooperation are high-level trilateral dialogues and multilateral military exercises. There is no comprehensive multilateral institution for managing security problems in the Asia-Pacific, although young forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit have shown potential in this regard. Therefore, the established trilateral dialogues between U.S. allies are an important mechanism for coordinating regional security activities. Training exercises that The U.S.-Japan Alliance Congressional Research Service 8 allow the militaries of Asia-Pacific nations to interact and cooperate are another means to improve trust and transparency. The United States and Japan have participated in multilateral exercises with Australia, India, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and several other countries in recent years, indicating the breadth of these activities.

#### Most likely scenario for quick nuclear escalation

Przystup 2001 (Dr. James J., Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies – National Defense University and Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Research Professor – Institute for National Strategic Studies, “East Asia and the Pacific”, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/21060/ichaptersection\_singledocument/e8a91 8db-9e97-4998-810a-bfc561fc6a46/en/01\_East+Asia+and+the+Pacific.pdf)

*Overview*. The United States has enduring economic, political, and strategic interests in the Asia- Pacific region. The region accounts for 25 percent of the global economy and nearly $600 billion in annual two-way trade with the United States. Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, over the past two decades, democracy has taken root in and spread across the region. Former authoritarian regimes in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have been transformed into vibrant democracies. For over a century, U.S. strategic interests have remained constant: access to the markets of the region, freedom of the seas, promotion of democracy and human rights, and precluding domination of the region by one power or group of powers. While major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region includes some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could involve the United States could arise at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is also a major flashpoint. In each of these areas, war has the potential for nuclear escalation. At the same time, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country, threatens stability in Southeast Asia and global markets.

### Alliance Solves Disease

#### Strong alliance key to solve disease spread

Hubbard, senior associate in JCIE’s New York office and former program director for East Asia at Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict Resolution, 11 (Susan, “Revitalizing US-Japan Collaboration on Global Health,” <http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/USJapanPapers/Sase.pdf>)

While the high prevalence of life-threatening diseases, unstable governance, and poverty will inevitably make aid to Africa—and particularly subSaharan Africa—an ongoing priority, the US-Japan partnership should also regard Asia as an important region from a political and public health perspective. President Obama stated in November 2011 that Asia Pacific will be a top priority in US security policy in the coming years given the military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.30 Likewise, US-Japan partnership in global health should place more emphasis on work in Asia. Southeast Asia, which had about 3.3 million new cases of tuberculosis in 2009, accounts for roughly 35 percent of global incidents.31 HIV infection rates as a percentage of the population are much lower in Asia than in Africa, but given the size of the populations in some Asian countries, the total numbers are similarly staggering. The number of people living with HIV/AIDS is estimated to be 2.7 million in India, which has a total population of 1.2 billion. Similarly, it is estimated that 700,000 of China’s roughly 1.3 billion residents are living with HIV/AIDS.32 In addition, the persistence of several “fragile states” in Asia threatens regional efforts to fight communicable diseases. In December 2009, nine cases of H1N1 were reported in North Korea, which was forced to accept an offer of support from South Korea to provide flu vaccines for its population.33 Communicable diseases can travel easily across national boundaries, so it only takes one country to jeopardize regional efforts to fight their spread. Conclusion During a November 2010 speech, President Obama referred to the two countries’ 50-year alliance as an “indestructible partnership” based on “equality and mutual understanding” and called the United States and Japan “partners in Asia and around the world.”34 In today’s world, such an alliance cannot be limited to partnership on traditional security. Health challenges have the potential to threaten the lives and livelihoods of large numbers of people throughout the region and around the world. At the same time, the growing threat of emerging infectious diseases drives home the threat of a possible new pandemic devastating lives and economies. Global health is, therefore, an essential area for US-Japan partnership. Global health has enjoyed increasing prominence in both countries’ development agendas, in part because of the growing threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases even in high-income countries, as well as the uncertain impact of the unprecedented double burden of communicable and noncommunicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries. It is now time for the US-Japan partnership to accelerate systematic collaboration and actively promote global health. As the global health community is increasingly recognizing that we need to move beyond a debate between emphasizing either disease-specific initiatives or health system strengthening, there is an opportunity for these two major donor countries to demonstrate how success in one area can be leveraged for success in the other, creating a win-win situation. The United States and Japan should continue to support the training of health professionals, particularly of those working at the community level, in order to build robust health systems that can deal with both communicable and noncommunicable diseases and provide adequate health services beyond the 2015 target date for achieving the MDGs. By combining their efforts, the United States and Japan can take steps to help prevent the proliferation of serious diseases and public health emergencies at the earliest possible stage.

#### Extinction – burnout wrong

Kerscher 14—Professor, unclear where because every website about him is in German

(Karl-Heinz, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

### Alliance Solves Heg

#### US-Japan Alliance is key to US hegemony

Przystup 14 —Zach Przystup, master’s degree in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Assistant Director for Global Executive and Diplomatic Education at The Fletcher School, 2014. (“China-US Relations: The Return of Mao’s Noose,” *The Diplomat*, November 26th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/china-us-relations-the-return-of-maos-noose/>, Accessed 06-03-2016, aqp)

In the East China Sea, Beijing harbors doubts about Washington’s willingness to go to war over an obscure group of rocks, especially when it takes no position on their sovereignty. However, any asymmetry of interests here is less pronounced. The islets are small, but the stakes are enormous. Abandonment of the U.S.-Japan Alliance would likely signal the end of U.S. regional – and global – hegemony.

The resurgent noose strategy is as much about testing the resolve of the U.S. as it is about demonstrating China’s resolve to recapture its rightful place in the world. National visions are powerful motivators. For the U.S., a national vision of liberal democracy and free markets has translated into permanent forward deployment of the U.S. military and the world’s largest alliance system. Underlying this forward strategy is the belief that liberal democracy is the best form of government, and that it must be protected at home and given to others when possible. This American vision is less than three centuries old; China’s view of itself as the center of the universe goes back thousands of years. As scholar Yan Xuetong notes, Chinese people believe China’s fall from preeminence to be “a historical mistake which they should correct.” If it is true that old habits die hard, the main tenets of China’s national vision are unlikely to change.

### Alliance Solves LL

#### Alliance solves multiple threats---global nuclear war

Gates 11 (Robert, U.S. Secretary of Defense, “[U.S.-Japan Alliance a Cornerstone of Asian Security](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)”, Speech to Keio University, 1-14, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529)

Over the course of its history, the U.S.-Japan alliance has succeeded at its original core purpose – to deter military aggression and provide an umbrella of security under which Japan – and the region – can prosper. Today, our alliance is growing deeper and broader as we address a range of security challenges in Asia. Some, like **North Korea**, **piracy** or **natural disasters**, have been around for decades, centuries, or since the beginning of time. Others, such as **global terrorist networks**, **cyber attacks**, and **nuclear proliferation** are of a more recent vintage. What these issues have in common is that they all require multiple nations working together – and they also almost always require leadership and involvement by key regional players such as the U.S. and Japan. In turn, we express our shared values by increasing our alliance’s capacity to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief, take part in peace-keeping operations, protect the global commons, and promote cooperation and build trust through strengthening regional institutions. Everyone gathered here knows the crippling devastation that can be caused by natural disasters – and the U.S. and Japan, along with our partners in the region, recognize that responding to these crises is a security imperative. In recent years, U.S. and Japanese forces delivered aid to remote earthquake-stricken regions on Indonesia, and U.S. aircraft based in Japan helped deliver assistance to typhoon victims in Burma. We worked together in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Java, Sumatra, and Haiti, and most recently following the floods in Pakistan. These efforts have demonstrated the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is of real and life-saving value. They also provide new opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese forces to operate together by conducting joint exercises and missions. Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese troops have been working on the global stage to confront the threat of failed or failing states. Japanese peacekeepers have operated around the world, including the Golan Heights and East Timor and assisted with the reconstruction of Iraq. In Afghanistan, Japan represents the second largest financial donor, making substantive contributions to the international effort by funding the salaries of the Afghan National Police and helping the Afghan government integrate former insurgents. Japan and the United States also continue to cooperate closely to ensure the maritime commons are safe and secure for commercial traffic. Our maritime forces work hand-in-glove in the Western Pacific as well as in other sea passages such as the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia, where more than a third of the world’s oil and trade shipments pass through every year. Around the Horn of Africa, Japan has deployed surface ships and patrol aircraft that operate alongside those from all over the world drawn by the common goal to counter piracy in vital sea lanes. Participating in these activities thrusts Japan’s military into a relatively new, and at times sensitive role, as an exporter of security. This is a far cry from the situation of even two decades ago when, as I remember well as a senior national security official, Japan was criticized for so-called “checkbook diplomacy” – sending money but not troops – to help the anti-Saddam coalition during the First Gulf War. By showing more willingness to send self-defense forces abroad under international auspices – consistent with your constitution – Japan is taking its rightful place alongside the world’s other great democracies. That is part of the rationale for Japan’s becoming a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. And since these challenges cannot be tackled through bilateral action alone, we must use the strong U.S.-Japanese partnership as a platform to do more to strengthen multilateral institutions – regional arrangements that must be inclusive, transparent, and focused on results. Just a few months ago, I attended the historic first meeting of the ASEAN Plus Eight Defense Ministers Meeting in Hanoi, and am encouraged by Japan’s decision to co-chair the Military Medicine Working Group. And as a proud Pacific nation, the United States will take over the chairmanship of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum this year, following Japan’s successful tenure. Working through regional and international forums puts our alliance in the best position to confront some of Asia’s toughest security challenges. As we have been reminded once again in recent weeks, none has proved to be more vexing and enduring than North Korea. Despite the hopes and best efforts of the South Korean government, the U.S. and our allies, and the international community, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime sadly have not changed. North Korea’s ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago, but in other respects it has grown more lethal and destabilizing. Today, it is North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile equipment that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and **international stability** as well. In response to a series of provocations – the most recent being the sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s lethal shelling of a South Korean island – Japan has stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea and the United States. Our three countries continue to deepen our ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks – the kind of multilateral engagement among America’s long-standing allies that the U.S. would like to see strengthened and expanded over time. When and if North Korea’s behavior gives us any reasons to believe that negotiations can be conducted productively and in good faith, we will work with Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China to resume engagement with North Korea through the six party talks. The first step in the process should be a North-South engagement. But, to be clear, the North must also take concrete steps to honor its international obligations and comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Any progress towards diffusing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula must include the active support of the People’s Republic of China – where, as you probably know, I just finished an official visit. China has been another important player whose economic growth has fueled the prosperity of this part of the world, but questions about its intentions and opaque military modernization program have been a source of concern to its neighbors. Questions about China’s growing role in the region manifest themselves in territorial disputes – most recently in the incident in September near the Senkaku Islands, an incident that served as a reminder of the important of America’s and Japan’s treaty obligations to one another. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: we have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law. We also believe that customary international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, provides clear guidance on the appropriate use of the maritime domain, and rights of access to it. Nonetheless, I disagree with those who portray China as an inevitable strategic adversary of the United States. We welcome a China that plays a constructive role on the world stage. In fact, the goal of my visit was to improve our military-to-military relationship and outline areas of common interest. It is precisely because we have questions about China’s military – just as they might have similar questions about the United States – that I believe a healthy dialogue is needed. Last fall, President Obama and President Hu Jin Tao made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable defense ties, not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather. On a personal note, one of the things I learned from my experience dealing with the Soviet Union during my earlier time in government was the importance of maintaining a strategic dialogue and open lines of communication. Even if specific agreements did not result – on nuclear weapons or anything else – this dialogue helped us understand each other better and lessen the odds of misunderstanding and miscalculation. The Cold War is mercifully long over and the circumstances with China today are vastly different – but the importance of maintaining dialogue is as important today. For the last few minutes I’ve discussed some of the most pressing security challenges – along with the most fruitful areas of regional cooperation – facing the U.S. and Japan in Asia. This environment – in terms of threats and opportunities – is markedly different than the conditions that led to the forging of the U.S-Japan defense partnership in the context of a rivalry between two global superpowers. But on account of the scope, complexity and lethality of these challenges, I would argue that our alliance is more necessary, more relevant, and more important than ever. And maintaining the vitality and credibility of the alliance requires modernizing our force posture and other defense arrangements to better reflect the threats and military requirements of this century. For example, North Korea’s ballistic missiles – along with the proliferation of these weapons to other countries – require a more effective alliance missile defense capability. The U.S.-Japan partnership in missile defense is already one of the most advanced of its kind in the world. It was American and Japanese AEGIS ships that together monitored the North Korean missile launches of 2006 and 2008. This partnership –which relies on mutual support, cutting edge technology, and information sharing – in many ways reflect our alliance at its best. The U.S. and Japan have nearly completed the joint development of a new advanced interceptor, a system that represents a qualitative improvement in our ability to thwart any North Korean missile attack. The co-location of our air- and missile-defense commands at Yokota – and the associated opportunities for information sharing, joint training, and coordination in this area – provide enormous value to both countries. As I alluded to earlier, advances by the Chinese military in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to the ability of our forces to operate and communicate in this part of the Pacific. Cyber attacks can also come from any direction and from a variety of sources – state, non-state, or a combination thereof – in ways that could inflict enormous damage to advanced, networked militaries and societies. Fortunately, the U.S. and Japan maintain a qualitative edge in satellite and computer technology – an advantage we are putting to good use in developing ways to counter threats to the cyber and space domains. Just last month, the Government of Japan took another step forward in the evolution of the alliance by releasing its National Defense Program Guidelines – a document that lays out a vision for Japan’s defense posture. These guidelines envision: A more mobile and deployable force structure; Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities; and A shift in focus to Japan’s southwest islands. These new guidelines provide an opportunity for even deeper cooperation between our two countries – and the emphasis on your southwestern islands underscores the importance of our alliance’s force posture. And this is a key point. Because even as the alliance continues to evolve – in strategy, posture, and military capabilities – to deal with this century’s security challenges, a critical component will remain the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan. Without such a presence: North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse; China might behave more assertively towards its neighbors; It would take longer to evacuate civilians affected by conflict or natural disasters in the region; It would be more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises – such as the recent Keen Sword exercise – that hone the U.S. and Japanese militaries ability to operate and, if necessary, fight together; and Without the forward presence of U.S. forces in Japan, there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries.

#### Strong U.S-Japan Alliance key to combat multiple issues.

Roos 2016 — John V. Roos 2016, United States Ambassador to Japan, 2016 (“The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2010”, Reischauer Center, Available at <http://www.reischauercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-US-and-Japan-in-Global-Context-2010-FINAL-Ia.pdf>, Accessed June 29th, RKim)

Of course, no discussion of the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship would be complete without referencing our indispensable security alliance. During his visit to Tokyo last November, President Obama stated that “the Alliance between the United States and Japan is a foundation for security and prosperity not just for our two countries but for the Asia Pacific region.” Recent events, including the attack on the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, should remind us all of the critical importance of the U.S.-Japan Foreword iii alliance. North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs remain the most immediate concern, and the risks of proliferation and the possibility of regime collapse pose huge security challenges. But there are other challenges that have the potential to affect regional security and stability, including piracy on vital sea lanes, maritime territorial disputes, and the provocative actions of extremist groups. Unanticipated developments and unforeseen crises will undoubtedly surface, and we and our partners in the region should maintain the readiness to address them. We have already begun laying the groundwork to prepare for these contingencies. Japan and the United States are cooperating bilaterally, regionally and globally. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are assisting with rescue operations in flood-stricken Pakistan, earthquake relief in Haiti, and anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. The Government of Japan recently announced new sanctions on Iran that go beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1929, an important and very welcome addition to the international community’s united effort to combat proliferation and prevent Tehran’s development of nuclear weapons. Our two countries are working together to find solutions to urgent global issues ranging from climate change to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

### Alliance Solves North Korea

#### US Japan alliance key to deter North Korean aggression

Klinger 15—Bruce Klinger, the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, previously served 20 years with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for Korea, 2015. ("Here's What the New US-Japan Defense Pact Looks Like", *The National Interest*, April 29th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-what-the-new-us-japan-defense-pact-looks-12757?page=2, Accessed 06-04-2016,aqp)

In a Korean crisis, Japan would be the transportation and logistical rear base for American reinforcements en route to the Korean Peninsula. Japan would also be expected to contribute to defending the air- and sea-lines of communication for the United States and to South Korea. Japan not exercising collective self-defense could unnecessarily put U.S. forces in harm’s way or prevent Tokyo from providing important logistics support to the allies during a Korean conflict.

The new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation will expand Japan's global security role and provide greater flexibility, responsiveness and interoperability for alliance training, exercises, and planning on a broader spectrum of security issues. But questions remain as to whether Japan can fulfill these new or existing missions with current forces. Washington has long urged Japan to increase its defense expenditures.

While Washington strongly supports Tokyo assuming a larger international security role, Japan’s neighbors remain wary. The United States and Japan have a responsibility to augment public diplomacy efforts to assuage regional concerns, particularly those of South Korea. One way to reassure Seoul of Japanese intentions would be to more closely coordinate or integrate bilateral and trilateral security operations. But recently Seoul has been reluctant to do so, even reducing previously agreed upon cooperative security activities.

There are indeed growing security threats in Asia, but Japan exercising collective self-defense and assuming a larger security role is not one of them. Japan acting collectively in concert with partners for defensive purposes rather than unilaterally for offensive objectives are in Asia’s and the world’s best interests.

# Aff

## Top Level

### 2ac

**Assurance is failing now – funding, distractions, China**

**Green et al. ’16** (Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown, served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks, PhD in Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships” January 2016, *CSIS*, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119\_Green\_AsiaPacificRebalance2025\_Web\_0.pdf)

Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. The past 14 years of war have left the military services with significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed, reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and nonstate actors globally. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections than planned even a few years ago. China’s rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners in protecting vital regional and global interests. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by North Korea continues to decrease, but the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed significant developments that require a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some new challenges are emerging, and some existing risks are worsening. These trends span issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to China’s growing political, economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study, the authors heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies and partners that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance. The administration has taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6 The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. Nevertheless, the implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests. Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in the region shifting against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it remains a problem in terms of reassuring allies and partners and sustaining congressional support. Second, cuts to the defense budget from 2009–2015 have limited the Defense Department’s ability to pursue the rebalance. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, long-term budget uncertainty and the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the environment that existed when CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance, the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forward-operating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of China’s plans to push the United States out of the region in a conflict. These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. Absent major operational or technology breakthroughs by the United States and its allies and partners, substantial risk remains that China’s strategy could undermine the U.S. military’s ability to defend U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations—as demonstrated by Beijing’s increased operational tempo and construction of military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands. This risk tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do the same.

#### US is deeply engaged with China now – Japan should already be freaked out, with ever expanding trade, the BIT is not substantially different than US trade.

#### Not Zero Sum

Cossa, 1999 (Ralph A. Executive Director Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies “U.S.-Japan-China Relations: Can Three Part Harmony Be Sustained?” The Brown Journal of World Affairs Accessed 6/22/16 JJH)

When we look at the three bilateral relationships today, the U.S.-China link appears the most challenging. It is also the one that is most likely, if not given proper attention, to plunge the region into another bipolar confrontation which would serve no one’s long-term security interests. But if in our effort to improve Sino-U.S. relations we put U.S.-Japan relations at risk, we end up worse off than we started, since this long-standing alliance relationship provides the basis for both Washington’s and Tokyo’s broader-based national security policies. Despite the central role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the broader, all-encompassing relationship is not, and should not be viewed as, a “zero-sum” game. When one side of the three-way relationship improves, all three sides can potentially benefit. The goal is to identify and build upon the common interests and objectives shared by all three nations to avoid misunderstandings or conflict and to deal better with potential regional crises. Equally important is an examination both of current points of contention and potential varying long-term objectives which, if not properly addressed, could undermine future harmony

#### Plan helps the alliance—increases perception of U.S. involvement in the region—constructive engagement is key

Tanaka 2015 (Hitoshi, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs  
Hitoshi, “The next step for the US-Japan alliance,” Aug 4, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japan-alliance/>)

This evolution in US-Japan alliance relations has taken place as the regional balance of power shifts. Emerging economies such as China, India, and ASEAN countries are rising; Asia’s middle class is growing; and US defence spending shifting toward a more sustainable, ‘lean-but-mean’ posture. Thus as the Abe administration struggles over the next couple of months to pass legislation to expand Japan’s security role, structural shifts in East Asia are making it clear that the next step for Japan and the US must be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted partnership. Japan must strengthen regional trust. The 70th anniversary of World War II offers an opportunity to affirm Japan’s peaceful postwar identity and to mend ties with South Korea and China. In his anticipated August statement, Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of the key elements of the Murayama Statement. At the same time, Abe should set out Japan’s defence policy in a forward-looking way — clearly stating that it is aimed solely at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional security environment — to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea that the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s new security legislation to allow limited forms of collective self-defence represent a return to a more aggressive regional posture. A change in the US mindset is needed so it may truly act as a resident power in East Asia. Current projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030 and will account for more than half of global GDP by 2050. As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the US become more intimately and directly involved in the order-building process. This requires the US to move away from its tendency to act as an external balancer and toward a more engaged day-to-day involvement and leadership role in the region across political, security and economic dimensions. One channel for the US to project such political leadership would be to spearhead the establishment of a four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. Such a mechanism would be well positioned to foster reassurance diplomacy regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, and to promote agreements on military-to-military hotlines and crisis management procedures to reduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate damage in the event of a crisis. The US and Japan should strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, including contingency planning, is urgent given the uncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trilateral cooperation directed toward North Korea should take into account the need to engage China and Russia, make preparations to steer the situation toward a soft-landing unification, and utilise Track 2 diplomacy to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployment of US troops throughout East Asia needs to be re-examined regularly — through intensive consultation with alliance partners — to ensure it is politically sustainable and able to meet contemporary challenges. While the US forward deployment is a critical regional public good, it must be re-considered whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration in one area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa in the face of strident local opposition, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfil US-Japan alliance goals. Advances in new military technologies and the changing nature of regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more evenly distributed and rotated across the region — a trend that is already underway with increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. At the same time, as the SDF continues to expand its roles and functions to engage in limited collective self-defence, there will be greater potential for joint US-Japan basing arrangements, which should be utilised as an opportunity to deepen US-Japan security cooperation. Finally, Japan and the US would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas, including on multilateral financial institutions, mega-regional trade agreements, and energy and the environment.

#### Japan is in military spending deficit – cant make nuclear weapons

Bremmer 15 **—** Ian Bremmer, foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME, 2015, (“Why the World doesn’t have to fear Japan,” TIME, 9/24, Available online at <http://time.com/4047863/the-world-doesnt-have-to-fear-japan/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Trouble in the East China Sea between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, has been an uncomfortable undercurrent in global affairs. Now, 70 years after the end of World War II, ostensibly pacifist Japan has passed legislation that expands the role and reach of its military. The angry reaction from the Chinese and South Korean governments that followed owe as much to domestic politics as to memories of WW II–era Japanese militarism. Some fear that Japan’s move signals that East Asia will become the world’s next danger zone. But breathe easier–East Asia is one region we don’t have to worry about. First, it’s much easier to pass a new law than to build a new military. That’s especially true in Japan, which doesn’t have much more money to spend on defense. The country’s debt is already approaching 250% of GDP, and the International Monetary Fund warned this summer that it will rise to as much as three times the size of Japan’s economy within 15 years unless the government reins in spending. The country’s rapidly aging population demands progressively higher spending on pensions and health care. That’s why Japan’s Ministry of Defense is asking for a bump in military spending of just 2.2% for next year, a rise that owes more to increased costs imposed by a weaker yen than a desire to beat China, which is recording double-digit increases in military spending. Nor is there public support in Japan for a more hawkish foreign policy. The new law has eroded Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s popularity and provoked intense protests inside and outside Japan’s parliament. According to a recent Pew survey, 68% of Japanese want to limit Japan’s military activity, while only 23% want the country to be more active. If Japan becomes militarily aggressive, costs will become unsustainable and opposition to Abe will become entrenched. So if it’s expensive and unpopular, why did the Prime Minister push for this change? Abe wants to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the military alliance with the U.S. by showing a willingness to become a more active partner. The U.S.-Japan alliance, not a stronger Japanese military on its own, is crucial for countering China’s expansion. In addition, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are more hawkish than the average Japanese. Appeasing them helps Abe build and maintain support within the LDP for his more important drive for economic reform. And the economy is one more reason Japan is not about to stoke conflict. China is Japan’s largest trade partner. We may see more Japanese patrol boats in the East China Sea, but we’re no more likely to see open conflict than we were before this law passed.

#### North Korea should have caused cascading prolif, if it didn’t a more restrained nation like Japan getting weapons would cause prolif either.

#### Japanese rearmament doesn’t create an arms race – it’s just a distraction

Gunnar 14 **—** Ulson Gunnar, Geopolitical analyst and writer, 2014, (“Why Japan’s Rearmament might not matter,” NEO, 7/25, Available online at <http://journal-neo.org/2014/07/25/why-japan-s-rearmament-might-not-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Japan is a nation in decline. Its population is both aging and shrinking while its economy is mired in stagnation. Shifting toward greater militarization or cultivating adversarial relations with neighbors like China may be an attempt to rally its population around the flag, but that such a measure even seems necessary spells trouble for Japan. And Japan’s military contributions to whichever nations is applies “collective self-defense” to are moot, considering many of these allies are likewise in permanent decline, including the United States itself. It is unlikely Japan’s contributions will allow the US to break even in its Pacific calculus. America’s attempt to “pivot toward Asia” has experienced many setbacks and delays including the ousting of allied regimes in the region and the ever expanding sphere of Chinese influence chaffing against waning US hegemony. In fact, Japan’s remilitarization may only distract it further from devising sustainable socioeconomic reforms necessary for the nation’s recovery, let alone what it needs to thrive and expand. The other possible motive behind Japan’s saber rattling may be yet another collective effort by the West and its regional allies to force China’s hand toward an overreaching Soviet-style arms race and subsequent missteps before the hoped collapse of Beijing’s current political order. Should paranoia and bad intelligence get the better of Beijing, China may find itself overreacting to provocations, both political and tactical, along its borders and spheres of influence. It should be noted that similar saber rattling from Japan has taken place for decades. Similar rhetoric could be heard in 1989, when Japan and the US were seeking their way out of economic recessions. More recently, Japan has made militaristic announcements similar to its most recent declarations, all accompanied by the same condemnation and celebrations along predictable political fault lines. It may be that Japan’s socioeconomic condition is once again dire enough to warrant yet another round of distractions.

#### No incentive of East Asian arms race and doesn’t lead to war

Sundstrom 15 **—** Ian Sundstrom, surface warfare officer and holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College in London, 2015, (“An East Asian Arms Race: Does it Even Matter,” The Diplomat, 1/16, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the “Missile Gap” on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary’s intentions. In the context of an East Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China’s expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns. China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing’s point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China’s historical record is not obviously aggressive. China does have a recent history of aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas, though. Taken at face value, this would indicate that expanded Chinese military capabilities will be used offensively. However, talk is cheap whereas war is not, and rhetoric is just as often used to mask intentions as display them. Aggressive public statements are an easy way to placate nationalist sentiment at home and apply diplomatic pressure abroad. I do not have any doubt that China desires both de facto and de jure control over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the various islands and reefs of the South China Sea, but it is more likely that China will continue its current “salami-slicing” diplomatic tactics than it will use its expanding military to engage in campaigns to seize the islands. China currently has the capability to seize these territories (Taiwan possibly excepted), even if it couldn’t defend them against recapture, and so continued restraint speaks volumes to Chinese intent. While we fret about the PLA Navy’s newest frigate and latest stealth fighter, China will slowly use diplomatic maneuvering to achieve its ends well below the threshold of open war. Of course, intentions are slippery and can change drastically without warning. That is why military capability is so often discussed. You can count and analyze tanks with some degree of certainty that tomorrow they won’t suddenly become submarines. Capability, however, is not a substitute for intent and it does not do to study one without the other. Whether an arms race is occurring in Asia or not, it should be remembered that war is not caused by weapons, but by people. China’s defense spending continues to increase, and its neighbors’ budgets may follow suit, but this does not change anything fundamental about the region’s international relations. Keeping the capability/intent framework in mind allows you to see past the bluster about rising defense budgets and expanding capabilities and focus on what really matters: who wants what, and are they willing to fight for it.

## Aff Uniqueness Answers

### US-Japan Relations Low

#### U.S-Japan relations low.

Donnelly 2015 — Thomas Donnelly, author of the weekly standard, 2015 (“America's Collapsing Alliances”, Weekly Standard, 5/11, Available online at http://www.weeklystandard.com/americas-collapsing-alliances/article/943617, RKim)

It was a long time ago and a galaxy far, far away: In July 2008, presidential candidate Barack Obama made big, bold news by travelling to Berlin to – as The New York Times triumphantly recorded – “restore the world’s faith in strong American leadership and idealism.” With 200,000 Berliners waving campaign-provided American flags, Obama called for renewing America’s alliances and undoing the cowboy unilateralism of George W. Bush and Obama’s 2008 opponent Sen. John McCain. The events of recent months are an indication of how spectacularly Obama has failed to fulfill his 2008 promise. This week comes the news that Saudi Arabia’s newly installed King Salman and three of the other six Gulf monarchs are boycotting Obama’s Camp David summit – a meeting called by Obama to reassure the Arab states that the forthcoming nuclear deal with Iran was not a betrayal of their longstanding security relationship with the United States. Beyond their fears of Iran’s nukes, the Gulf states see the rise of an aspiring Persian hegemon – in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq – taking advantage of, if not actively conspiring with, a retreating America. In this case “no show” means “no confidence.” While the Middle East is where Obama has done the most damage to traditional U.S. alliances, the situation in Europe is not much better. The failure to respond to Vladimir Putin’s land grabs – which, to be fair, began with Georgia in the twilight of the Bush years – exposes NATO’s senility. The story of the post-Cold War Atlantic alliance, its late and limp performances in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, and now in Europe itself, is one of continuous decline. Even with the victory of David Cameron’s Tories, Britain continues to shed whatever elements of greatness it retains; with the nationalists wiping out all opposition in Scotland, another secession vote is more than possible, and Britain’s army is on course to be smaller than the NYPD. While Europe deserves most of the blame for its disarmament and indecision, the Obama Pentagon is pressing forward with plans to further reduce America’s military posture in Europe. The president came to office figuring the peace of Europe was eternal and self-sustaining, and thus there was no need to maintain the alliance that has been the key vehicle for U.S. global leadership since World War II. It is no wonder that Eastern Europeans doubt the credibility of NATO’s Article V, collective-defense guarantees. Which brings us to East Asia and Obama’s supposed “rebalance” or “Pacific Pivot.” To say that things aren’t quite so bad there would be the soft bigotry of low expectations, except it was the president who raised expectations of more energetic American leadership there. Further, as expressed in the 2012 Defense Guidance, the pivot marks the sole “doctrinal” bit of Obama thinking; it was more than a reaction to Bush-era policies. Our East Asian allies cheered the initiative but now regard more as rhetoric than a strategic reality. It’s not just that the administration’s efforts – such as the repositioning of Marines to northern Australia, the attempt to build a strategic partnership with Burma or to revive the stalled partnership with India – have been underwhelming. Indeed, since trumpeting the rebalance to Asia the administration has distanced itself from allies’ enthusiasms. Obama’s pledge of a “new era” in U.S.-Japan relations barely survived the departure of Prime Minister Abe for Tokyo. The visit of reformist Indian leader Narendra Modi was a decidedly low-key affair. More tangibly, the Chinese have resumed their various encroachments into the South China Sea. At the end of the day, the U.S. position in the region is no better now than in 2008, and arguably worse: an empty pivot is worse than no pivot.

#### US-Japan relations will inevitably be low

Yang 5-29

(Chen, 5/29/16, “Okinawa murder casts shadow over improving US-Japan relations”, Located at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/985844.shtml>, Global Times, Accessed 6/26/16, MW)

"We will continue to do what we can to reduce our footprint on this island. We take seriously our responsibility to be good neighbors," US president Bill Clinton said in a speech during his Okinawa visit for the G8 summit on July 21, 2000. Clinton is the first US president to visit Okinawa since 1960, a trip that is believed to have stirred excitement among many Okinawa residents. Interestingly, US bases in Okinawa have downsized by only less than 1 percent since 2000, and US personnel have not met their responsibility to be "good neighbors." According to the Asahi Shimbun, Okinawa police arrested Kenneth Shinzato, a former US Navy soldier and current employee at the US Kadena Air Base, on May 19 on suspicion of the murder and disposal of the body of 20-year-old Rina Shimabukuro, who had been reported missing in late April. In fact, such incidents frequently occur in Okinawa. The most serious crime dates back to 1995, when three American soldiers raped a 12-year-old primary school girl, which immediately triggered large-scale protests that saw more than 85,000 people. It is because of this incident that Okinawa residents have insisted for the past two decades that the Japanese government move US bases out of the prefecture. Although Shinzato is not a US soldier, the death of young Shimabukuro has still roused dissatisfaction among local residents. Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga on Monday last week filed a strong complaint to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe demanding changes to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Abe responded by saying that "I feel extremely strong anger against this selfish and hideous crime … I will ask [Obama] to take strict measures." Okinawa has been long plagued by scandals involving US personnel. The root of these unscrupulous scandals is the inequality of the US-Japan alliance system. US personnel have squandered their privileges in Okinawa time and time again, which has led US soldiers to believe they are not stationed in, but "occupying" Okinawa, despite the prefecture being formally returned to Japan 44 years ago. According to the Japan-US SOFA, the US has the right to exercise jurisdiction over US soldiers in cases of "offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty." For offenses that occur outside of official duties, the US can keep the accused soldier in custody until he or she is formally charged by Japan. Although Shinzato is a civilian employee at the US base, the SOFA applies to Shinzato as well. Okinawa police arrested Shinzato. He could have also been arrested by US armed forces. This unequal agreement has protected US soldiers from Japanese justice, something that has irritated Okinawa residents as US-imposed punishments only scratch the surface. For instance, US military authorities simply imposed a curfew on all US soldiers after the appalling rape of a Japanese woman by two US sailors in 2012. This latest incident occurred ahead of US President Barack Obama's Hiroshima visit, and has cast a shadow over the seemingly deepening US-Japan relationship. Earlier, Japanese media outlets were excitedly touting Obama's historic Hiroshima visit, which admittedly symbolizes US-Japan post-war reconciliation. However, the Okinawa incident has thrown a wet blanket over any such sentiments. If Hiroshima's pain is engraved deep in the Japanese consciousness, then Okinawa's traumas rub salt in those wounds. Japanese may feel relieved by the US president's historic Hiroshima visit, but the scandals in Okinawa are making Japanese face the fact that no matter how deep US-Japan relations are in the future, they will always be overshadowed by inequality.

#### Many points of dispute between Us and Japan

Beech 6/8

(Hannah, 6/8/16, “The Tense Relationship Between Japan and the U.S. Military”, <http://time.com/4360940/us-military-navy-japan-okinawa-alcohol-bases/>, Times, Accessed 6/26/16, MW)

The imposition of a total alcohol ban on all U.S. sailors in Japan, following the arrest over the weekend of an American sailor on drunk driving charges, has brought into renewed focus the sometimes tense relationship between the U.S. military and its Japanese hosts. There are more American soldiers based in Japan than in any other foreign country. Around 54,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed there, with a mission is to keep the peace in the Pacific. But the American military presence has clouded bilateral relations — nowhere more so than on the tropical island prefecture of Okinawa, which has the heaviest concentration of U.S. military bases. Here’s what you need to know. Why Japan? After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the U.S. occupied the country and devised a constitution that prevented its erstwhile enemy from forming a normal military. While Japan spends lavishly on its defense, the nation cannot form an offensive force. Instead, the U.S. promises to defend Japan, and its soldiers on Japanese soil add muscle to this obligation. (The U.S. also has a large military presence in South Korea.) Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would like to amend the constitution and allow for a more traditional military, especially as tensions proliferate with China. But the majority of the Japanese public remains skeptical of the constitutional change that would be required. Why Okinawa? Originally an independent kingdom called Ryukyu, Okinawa was absorbed into Japan by the late 19th century, even though its populace is culturally distinct from that of the rest of the country. The end of World War II brought immense tragedy to the tropical island chain at the tail end of the Japanese archipelago. In the Battle of Okinawa, the Japanese imperial army compelled local civilians to resist the Allied assault and even commit mass suicide. Around 150,000 Okinawans perished. The Americans, who after the war scattered military bases across the coral-fringed islands and occupied Okinawa for two decades longer than the rest of Japan, were originally welcomed by some locals as an improvement over the Japanese army. But local opposition to the U.S. presence has grown—even as the Japanese government presents Okinawa as a bulwark against a potentially more assertive China. Why the anti-American sentiment? Although rare, crimes committed by American soldiers and contract workers against Okinawan civilians have crystallized opposition against the U.S. bases. In May, an American military contractor was arrested on charges related to the murder of a 20-year-old local woman. The stabbing death has conjured up memories of the 1995 kidnapping and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawa schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen. U.S. President Barack Obama, who visited Japan last month, expressed regret over the alleged murder by an American. On Sunday, Okinawa police arrested an American sailor on charges of injuring two people in an alleged drunk-driving accident, prompting the alcohol ban both on and off base. “It is imperative that each sailor understand how our actions affect that relationship, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance as a whole,” said Rear Admiral Matthew Carter, the head of the U.S. naval forces in Japan. Will U.S. troops stay? For years, Okinawan politics has been dominated by the base issue. The latest question is whether a U.S. Marine air station located on prime Okinawa real estate will be relocated to a new facility in a less-populated area or whether the base will be shuttered altogether. In Sunday’s assembly elections in Okinawa, the antibase faction consolidated its majority. But previous efforts to significantly counter the U.S. military presence — even when briefly supported by a Japanese central government controlled by the now opposition — have failed. Of course, if Donald Trump, the Republican contender for the U.S. presidency, has his way, local debate over Okinawa bases could be moot. In a primary-season debate, Trump said that U.S. allies, like Japan and South Korea, should pay all costs of maintaining American bases on their soil — or else risk the U.S. pulling its troops.

### Japan Nationalism Increasing

#### Japanese nationalism rising now

Shad 15 —Nadeem Shad, freelance journalist, 2015, (“Japan is back and so is nationalism,” The Diplomat, 12/14, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/japans-back-and-so-is-nationalism/>, Accessed 6/26/16, RR)

“Japan is back,” according to Shinzo Abe in a 2013 speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That assertion has been widely debated, at least in the context of Abenomics, the Abe government’s program for reviving the Japanese economy. And Japanese nationalism: Is that back too? That question has received far less attention, and when it has been discussed, the tone tends to be either alarmist or dismissive. For years nationalism in Japan was relegated to the sidelines. Prevalent before and during the Second World War it found intellectual and political space in the Kokugaku School, the works of Inoue Tetsujirō; before being institutionalized by the state in the form of a corrupted version of Bushido or in Japan’s vision of a “Co-Prosperity Sphere.” After Japan’s defeat, nationalists faced a much more difficult environment, typified by Japan’s new pacifist constitution. For decades after the war, nationalism was kept alive by a relatively small cadre of political and intellectual elites. Incidents included the 1986 school textbook controversy, 2001 textbook controversy, and the concept of nihonjinron. However, none of these small movements gained any traction in mainstream political and social imagination. Now, under Shinzo Abe, nationalism is making a disconcerting return to the forefront of Japanese politics. This has manifest in several ways. The first example was the lightning rise of the Japan Restoration Party to become the third-largest party in the Diet in its first election in 2012, displacing the NKP in the process. The party is by perhaps Japan’s leading nationalist, former Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, whose his controversial proposal to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands prompted their nationalization by the Japanese state, a move that sparked a serious downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. The Japan Restoration Party proved short-lived. Ishihara went on to form the Party for Future Generations, while another faction, led by Tōru Hashimoto, merged with the Unity Party to become the Japan Innovation Party. An example of right-wing nationalists falling apart with their own bickering, perhaps. However the significance of the 2012 results cannot be denied. That development has, however, been overshadowed by more recent events. Take for instance, the presence of the Nippon Kaigi, or Japan Conference, an ultra-right grouping that rose to prominence this last summer. After a September reshuffle, 15 of the 19 members of Abe’s Cabinet, including Abe himself, belong to this group, which argues among others things that Japan should be applauded for its wartime role of “liberating” East Asia from Western imperialists. Those who would argue that nationalism is back in Japan can point to many other examples: Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, the creation of a disturbingly vague new state secrets law, the revisiting of the Kono Declaration on comfort women, and the appointment of far-right figures to the Board of Governors at NHK. Unsurprisingly, Japan’s relations with its neighbors have deteriorated markedly, not helped by territorial disputes in the East China Sea. Others may disagree, and point to Abe’s pragmatic attempts to mend relations with China and South Korea, and his active diplomacy elsewhere in Asia. Japan is just responding to a tougher neighborhood, they would argue. And although Abe himself has enjoyed unusually high public support (by Japanese standards) for most of his second tenure in power, many of his conservative policies have proven far less popular with the electorate. There is convincing evidence to suggest that much of the support Abe receives owes to a lack of credible alternatives. Still, it is hard to dispute the contention that Shinzo Abe and his Cabinet colleagues represent the rise of a new Japanese nationalism, even if for now it is contained by a lack of broader public support.

### No Assurance Now

**Assurance is failing now – funding, distractions, China**

**Green et al. ’16** (Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown, served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks, PhD in Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships” January 2016, *CSIS*, http://csis.org/files/publication/160119\_Green\_AsiaPacificRebalance2025\_Web\_0.pdf)

Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. The past 14 years of war have left the military services with significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed, reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and nonstate actors globally. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections than planned even a few years ago. China’s rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners in protecting vital regional and global interests. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by North Korea continues to decrease, but the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed significant developments that require a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some new challenges are emerging, and some existing risks are worsening. These trends span issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to China’s growing political, economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study, the authors heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies and partners that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance. The administration has taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6 The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. Nevertheless, the implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests. Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in the region shifting against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it comes to managing China’s rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it remains a problem in terms of reassuring allies and partners and sustaining congressional support. Second, cuts to the defense budget from 2009–2015 have limited the Defense Department’s ability to pursue the rebalance. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, long-term budget uncertainty and the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the environment that existed when CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance, the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forward-operating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of China’s plans to push the United States out of the region in a conflict. These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. Absent major operational or technology breakthroughs by the United States and its allies and partners, substantial risk remains that China’s strategy could undermine the U.S. military’s ability to defend U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations—as demonstrated by Beijing’s increased operational tempo and construction of military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands. This risk tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do the same.

## Aff Link Answers

### US-China Cooperation/Engagement Now

#### US-Sino Cooperation high now- climate and healthcare prove and any disagreements will get settled

Risen 15—Tom Risen is a technology and business reporter for U.S. News & World Report, 2015, (“U.S., China Talks Show Stability, Not Standoff”, September 23, 2015, Accessed 6/29/16, Available online at <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/23/us-china-talks-show-stability-not-standoff>, JRR)

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the White House on Thursday may seem like just another in a long line of general diplomatic meetings where much is discussed but little is resolved​​​​​​​​​​​. But behind closed doors the Obama administration has built a stable diplomatic relationship with China that shows no signs of collapsing, experts say, even as the discussion between the two superpowers becomes increasingly blunt. “They increasingly accept the table is a venue for us in a constructive way to air our grievances – trust me, they give as good as they get,” Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel tells U.S. News. “We do not merely agree to disagree.” Chinese President Xi Jinping accompanies Mauritania's President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz to view an honour guard during a welcoming ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People on Sept. 14, 2015 in Beijing. China’s Xi Jinping Flexes Business, Tech Muscle Russel, who is a former special assistant to the president and the National Security Council's senior director for Asian Affairs, has attended many of the top diplomatic meetings with Chinese officials, including during Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to China last year. He says “the Chinese often don’t like what they hear” when U.S. diplomats raise concerns on sensitive issues, like the current accusations of China sponsoring hackers and online espionage. “Some of the problem areas we go over again, and again, and again,” he says. “But these are important problem sets and we are not giving up. On other sets there is a sign that there is an evolution in Chinese thinking, and we have made real progress.” Recent partnership between China and the U.S. includes efforts to fight the outbreak of Ebola in Africa and to arrange a multinational deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program. The Obama administration views its relationship with China as “the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world,” Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications said during a press call on Tuesday. ​ In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Xi praised climate change prevention as an issue where “the interests of China and the U.S. are increasingly intertwined” but shared no specifics about other key issues like the economy, signaling that his public remarks at the White House and the UN will consist of broad platitudes, predicts Robert Daly, who formerly served as a diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Xi Jinping Comes to U.S. Amid Tense Time for Relations Xi’s goal for this trip is a “performance of power to be projected back to China” showing that he is respected by America, says Daly, who is currently the d Obama faces increasing pressure -- particularly from Republicans -- to project more strength towards China, which has refused U.S. demands to extradite indicted hackers and has tested the territorial rights of American allies like Japan and Vietnam in the East and South China seas by building artificial islands in the area . Still, the U.S.-China relationship is strong enough that discussing such sensitive topics will not drive China away the table, both Daly and Russel say. In a call with reporters, Rhodes stressed that certain sensitive topics -- like cybersecurity, trade and human rights -- would definitely be up for discussion. "We are increasingly hearing concerns about activities that the Chinese have been engaged in, so we want to make very clear this puts at risk China's ability to continue on its growth if businesses don't have confidence they won't be subjected to cyber theft," Rhodes said.

#### US-China mil-to-mil cooperation has increased substantially in recent years

Tiezzi 14—Shannon Tiezzi, Editor at The Diplomat, former Research Associate U.S.-China Policy Foundation, Master of Arts (MA), Regional Studies (East Asia) from Harvard University, 2014. (“US-China Military Relations: The Great Debate,” The Diplomat, December 19th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/us-china-military-relations-the-great-debate/>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

I’ve written before that U.S.-China military relations have improved markedly in the past two years, even as the overall relationship has suffered ups and downs. Not everyone is convinced this is a good thing, however. There’s a growing chorus of voices criticizing the U.S.-China military relationship, whether over security or broader strategic concerns.

One such voice of caution comes from Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA), the leader of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. In an open letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Rep. Forbes expressed a “growing concern with the overall trajectory to the military-to-military relationship” between the U.S. and China. Though Forbes noted that he believes “a sustained and substantive relationship with the PRC is one of the core objectives of U.S. policy” in the Asia-Pacific region, he questioned the utility of the current approach to mil-to-mil relations. “There is no indication that more engagement has helped to shape Beijing’s actions in a positive direction consistent with U.S. objectives,” Forbes argued. “To the contrary, as we have increased our mil-to-mil engagement over the past two years, China’s actions have only turned more coercive.”

#### US-China econ ties improving

Yao and Lawder 6/7 - Senior Economics Correspondent, China at Thomson Reuters and Journalist

(Kevin and David, 6/7/16, “China gives U.S. investment quota for first time to deepen financial ties”, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-rqfii-idUSKCN0YT1F2>, Accessed 6/29/16, MW)

China will give the United States a 250 billion yuan ($38 billion) investment quota for the first time to buy Chinese stocks, bonds and other assets, officials said on Tuesday, deepening financial ties and interdependence between the world's two largest economies. China has given such quota allocations to several countries, including the UK, France and Singapore, but this would be the biggest given to a single jurisdiction after Hong Kong. Chinese officials also repeatedly pledged in two days of talks with U.S. counterparts that they saw no need for sustained weakening of the yuan currency, which many investors fear could shock the already sluggish U.S. and global economies and roil financial markets as happened in January. The moves will allow Beijing to pursue its ambition of making the yuan a more widely used global currency, while giving U.S. investors greater access to China's domestic markets. A central bank vice governor, Yi Gang, announced the quota at the bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue talks in Beijing, without providing further details such as a timeframe. "We believe the U.S. market is very important, so we granted 250 billion yuan in RQFII quotas to the United States," he said. The Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor programme, which was set up in late 2011, allows overseas financial institutions to use offshore yuan to buy securities in mainland China, including stocks, bonds and money market investments. "The ability to do RMB transactions in the United States will be a real advantage, to small firms in particular and to large businesses that are not financial businesses," U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said on Tuesday. "It will make it easier, it will make it cheaper," he said. China and the United States will also each pick a qualified bank to conduct yuan clearing business in the United States, Vice Premier Wang Yang said. The new quota will significantly expand the RQFII programme, under which 501.77 billion yuan had been allocated as of May. The quota, which financial institutions will apply to use, is the first granted to the United States. Ivan Shi, head of research at Shanghai-based fund consultancy Z-Ben Advisors, said the move also increased the chances that global investment index compiler MSCI will include Chinese shares in its index, a decision that could come next week, as it broadens foreign access to China's stock market. "But its implementation depends on how widely the yuan is used in the U.S. and how much interest U.S. investors have toward Chinese stocks and bonds," he added. China's regulators have been pushing to expand foreign investors' access to domestic financial markets to make its markets broader and attract more capital inflows. But foreign interest has waned after a near meltdown in Chinese equity markets last year and subsequent heavy-handed official intervention to shore them up. China's cooling economy, growing debt levels and anxiety over its currency policy have also kept investors at bay. Some analysts said the quota move appeared to be largely symbolic, as many others channels for investing in Chinese assets have opened up since the RQFII programme was launched in 2011. China's central bank said in February it would allow all types of financial institutions that are registered outside the country to buy bonds in the interbank market and would scrap quotas for medium- and long-term investors. Yi said on Tuesday that internationalisation of the yuan currency would be market-oriented. Lew said during the talks that China was committed to continuing "market-oriented exchange rate reform that allows for two-way flexibility" of its yuan currency. In a statement following the talks, the U.S. Treasury said China agreed to allow foreign companies to have bigger equity stakes in domestic securities and fund management companies. China also committed to welcoming qualified foreign firms and joint ventures to apply to engage in the private securities fund management business, including secondary market trading of securities, Treasury said. The optimal window to make progress on a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty was before the G20 leaders meeting in September, he said. Aside from discussions about the internationalisation of the yuan, China and the United States also agreed to push forward reforms at the International Monetary Fund to increase quotas for emerging economies, which determine their voting powers in the organisation and access to financing. "Both sides reiterated the allocation of IMF quotas should be shifted towards emerging markets and developing countries," Lew said.

### Not Zero Sum

#### Not Zero Sum

Cossa, 1999 (Ralph A. Executive Director Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies “U.S.-Japan-China Relations: Can Three Part Harmony Be Sustained?” The Brown Journal of World Affairs Accessed 6/22/16 JJH)

When we look at the three bilateral relationships today, the U.S.-China link appears the most challenging. It is also the one that is most likely, if not given proper attention, to plunge the region into another bipolar confrontation which would serve no one’s long-term security interests. But if in our effort to improve Sino-U.S. relations we put U.S.-Japan relations at risk, we end up worse off than we started, since this long-standing alliance relationship provides the basis for both Washington’s and Tokyo’s broader-based national security policies. Despite the central role of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the broader, all-encompassing relationship is not, and should not be viewed as, a “zero-sum” game. When one side of the three-way relationship improves, all three sides can potentially benefit. The goal is to identify and build upon the common interests and objectives shared by all three nations to avoid misunderstandings or conflict and to deal better with potential regional crises. Equally important is an examination both of current points of contention and potential varying long-term objectives which, if not properly addressed, could undermine future harmony

#### Relations aren’t zero-sum – Japan welcomes cooperation.

Mifune 11 (Emi Mifune, Professor at Komazawa University, visiting professor at China Foreign Affairs University, “Japan’s Perspectives towards a Rising China”, in Herbert S. Yee, ed. China's Rise: Threat or Opportunity? London and New York: Routledge, 2011, http://www.la.utexas.edu/dsena/courses/globexchina/readings/yee-japan.pdf)

On his first trip to Asian countries as the US president in November 2009, President Obama said the US would seek to strengthen its tie with a rising China even as it maintains close ties with allies like Japan. There are questions about how the US perceives China's emergence as a global power, how its seeking to build stronger ties with China wields influence over the Japan-US relations and the Japan-US-China triangle relations, and how Japan should engage the expanding US-China relations. Some Japanese worry that the deepening US-China relations in a new era affects the Japan-US relations, causing Japan's position to retreat. However, others believe that Japan welcomes the idea that the US and China have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability and prosperity. It is important for Japan to welcome a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs by interacting with the United States. According to lEA (lntemational Energy Agency), China exhausted 21 percent of the world's carbon dioxide in 2007, the US exhausted 20 percent, the EU exhausted 14 percent, Russia exhausted 6 percent, India exhausted 5 percent, and Japan exhausted 4 percent. Both China and the US must find way to mitigate climate change and should combine efforts. Without dramatically significant actions by the US and China, the global climate crisis will leave human beings with no future. China's role in the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea is crucial to regional security in Asia. China's influence over North Korea is not absolute, but there is no one that can affect North Korea as much as China can. Without China's cooperation with the US on the North Korea issue, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be expected. China has recently increased its economic, military, and diplomatic influence in countries in South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China's investments in these countries are large and will continue to increase. It is seeking to develop its influence over those countries to ensure its energy import and to build its sea-lane. It has obstacles in these places because there is historical antagonism among these countries even though the governments have now developed better relations. The countries and sea around them are so important for Japan's sea-lane that Japan needs to build cooperative relationships with them without causing a confrontation with China. The US has decided to encourage more Americans to study in China by launching a new initiative to send 100,000 students to China over the forthcoming four years. China has sent the United States a lot of students in the past. This new project of sending American students to China is going to cultivate US experts on China. It will also develop personal channels between China and the US. Japan also needs to develop personal exchanges. Recently, there have been a lot of Chinese scholars and celebrities who have conveyed propaganda to Japan about the preferred ideas and politics of China. However, there have been few Chinese specialists in Japanese affairs. The current relation between US and China poses challenges for Japan. The Japan-US relation is not a zero-sum game towards the US- China relation. While the Japan-US relation is one of being allies, the US-China relation is a partnership to negotiate and resolve many issues concerning global and regional stabilities and prosperity. These two bilateral relationships are completely different. Seeking to build common ties to China and the US is necessary for Japan, and now is the appropriate time to get into the act. However, the Hatoyama Administration forms abstract ideas of the Japan-US and the Japan- China relations, which might harm those relations in the near future. Japan does not need to fear a rising China; however, the Japanese government needs a grand foreign strategy with mid-term and long- term views to cope with a rising China.

## Rearm Answers

### Japan Militarization Inevitable

#### Japan militarization is inevitable

Schreer 13[7/1/13, Benjamin Schreer is a senior analyst at ASPI, “Not really more assertive: Japan’s defence policy”, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-really-more-assertive-japans-defence-policy/>]

The notion that Japan’s defence policy is becoming increasingly assertive in the face of a rising China is gaining traction in Western media and some elite circles. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promotes the ‘normalisation’ of Japan’s foreign and security policy, including a change of the pacifist constitution and exercising the right of collective self-defence. For the first time in 11 years, Japan’s defence budget increased in 2013. As well, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has intensified joint exercises with the US; most recently simulating retaking an occupied offshore island during Dawn Blitz 2013, a major US-led amphibious exercise off the coast of Southern California. Finally, at the end of this year the government will adopt new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Analysts speculated that the new guidelines might bring Japan closer to even developing a ‘pre-emptive strike’ capability, particularly after Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera publicly claimed that Japan had ‘the right to develop the ability to make a pre-emptive strike against an imminent attack’. Undoubtedly, Tokyo is deeply worried about China’s strategic trajectory and PLA Navy activities around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). ASPI’s recent ‘1.5 track dialogue’ with Japanese think-tank analysts and officials in Tokyo (conducted in cooperation with the Japan Institute for International Affairs) confirmed the strong focus on China’s ‘anti-access/ area-denial’ threat and a desire on the Japanese behalf for a more proactive defence policy, including participation in the emerging US ‘AirSea Battle’ concept and adopting a ‘offensive defence’ posture (without specifying what that meant). But it’s important to keep things in perspective. In fact, what’s happening in Tokyo’s current defence policy is more the result of a long-term development, rather than sweeping changes. And it’s not clear that the money’s there for a growing wish list of military capabilities. The 2010 NDPG of the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government already introduced key conceptual changes such as the ‘Dynamic Defense’ concept which aims to make the SDF more agile and rapidly deployable. The aim of being able to defend Japan’s southwestern islands goes even further back to 2004; only now is it finally being underpinned by a stronger amphibious capability, as well as enhanced ISR and air combat capability. In fact, the 2010 document is in such high regard with Japanese analysts and defence officials, that the Abe government has been at pains to justify why a new NDPG is needed. It’s more to do with domestic politics than a drastically changed strategic environment, which is the key justification provided by the government. Moreover, major changes in Japan’s defence policy will probably come from further strengthening the US alliancein areas such as ballistic and cruise missile defence, joint ISR and integrating existing forces into an ‘AirSea Battle’ framework. Both sides are currently working on revising the 1997 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation, which will probably further increase operational cooperation. As for the Japanese pre-emptive ‘strike capability’, there’s much more rhetoric than hard reality. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) proposal for the new NDPG only talks about ‘starting considerations of possessing strike capability under appropriate US–Japan role sharing’, a very vague formulation. There’s also no indication that the SDF is seriously considering the acquisition of land- or sea-based missiles for strategic strike. And Japan has decided to acquire the conventional take-off and landing variant of its new Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) combat aircraft; making the emergence of a ‘tactical’ Japanese carrier for offensive strike an even more distant possibility. Indeed, as long as Japan remains comfortable under the US security umbrella it’s unclear what the SDF would gain from a capability which would only further complicate its strategic relationship with China. Finally, unless ‘Abenomics’ pulls the country out of its dire economic predicament, the gap between ambitious defence programs and financial means will remain significant. The 2013 Defence Budget shows that the hype about this year’s rise failed to recognise at least two key points. This chart shows that defence spending is still nowhere near where it was in previous years: And it’s unclear that this unhappy situation will be rectified anytime soon. Secondly, a breakdown of the budget shows that while more money was spend on new aircraft (partly to replace fighters lost during the 2011 earthquake), shipbuilding actually experienced a decline. Already, the Navy is pessimistic about its ability to maintain the current fleet built around 48 destroyers, given the ever rising unit costs of modern warships. The result could be a shrinking Japanese Navy, and planners have started to talk about smaller, more cost effective platforms such as the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In sum, while lots of ink is spilled on Japan’s new military assertiveness the reality is far more subtle. Most likely, the upcoming NDPG will confirm incremental rather than revolutionary defence policy changes.

### Japan = Pacifist

#### Japan is Pacifist – won’t develop nukes

Lind, 2016 (Jennifer, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University, “Japan’s Security Evolution” Cato POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 788 Accessed 6/24/2016 <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-788.pdf> JJH)

In East Asia’s worsening threat environment, greater Japanese military activism is not surprising, nor is it a break from Japan’s postwar policy. Rather than a major departure, the new security legislation is just the most recent recalibration of a familiar strategy. Japan does less when it can; more when it must.39 Cries of “Japan is abandoning pacifism” are not only misleading because they come 70 years too late; they also distort the magnitude of recent changes. Any discussion of increased Japanese military activism must acknowledge that Japan remains the most dovish of the world’s great powers. Japan spends 1 percent of its GDP on defense, which is less than half of the global average of 2.3 percent.40 Its people are unlikely to support higher defense spending; they are preoccupied with internal problems such as stimulating the economy and addressing debilitating demographic trends. And — as shown by the ox-walking Taro Yamamoto, his many opposition colleagues, and the tens of thousands protesting outside the Diet — the Japanese people remain deeply apprehensive about even the most minimal levels of military activism. As Adam Liff argues, “Japan’s security policy remains far more self-restrained than any other major economic power.”41 Japan’s movement into “collective self-defense” is indeed historic — but not as a dramatic abandonment of a previous strategy. It is the most recent step in a long evolution for a peaceful country that today faces a growing threat. And as such, it represents more continuity than change in Japan’s national security policy.

### Won’t Build Nukes

#### Japan won’t build nukes – multiple reasons

Berger 15 – DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR POLICY AND SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW (Andrea, 9/20/15, “Pacifism bill: Why Japan won't build a nuclear weapon quickly”, Located at <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/>, Accessed 6/24/16, CNN, MW)

Japan's new military policy making region wary 01:44 Some assess that the scale and sophistication of Japan's nuclear infrastructure would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months, should the unlikely political decision be taken to do so. Strategic rival China has sought to draw attention to this fact, issuing loud warnings over Japan's stocks of nuclear material, for example. But it should be noted that under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- which Japan ratified in 1976 -- states are entitled to peaceful nuclear technology for energy purposes if they forswear nuclear weapons. To ensure that the country's nuclear sites remain exclusively for peaceful use, they are subjected to intensive scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The Agency consistently verifies the accuracy and completeness of Japan's declarations regarding its nuclear facilities, material, and activities and conducts monitoring and inspections at relevant facilities. Its role in Japan will continue to be particularly important in order to dispel any fears that the country may harbor nuclear weapons intentions. China and the International Atomic Energy Agency are not the only ones following Japan's nuclear activity closely. Two other audiences are noteworthy. The first is Japan's public, who have become increasingly wary of the risks and dangers associated with nuclear technology -- whether for civilian or military applications -- following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011. The second is the country's closest ally, the United States, who is similarly attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of Japan's alliance with the United States that the former has even less of an incentive to build a nuclear weapon. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa are a visible reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it. As long as Japan believes in the strength of the U.S.'s so-called "extended deterrence" guarantee it is unlikely to see any merit in having its own nuclear weapons capability. For this reason, both countries work tirelessly to ensure the credibility and durability of their defence partnership -- an immeasurably important aim. Despite what many may think, the Abe administration sees the new security bill as part of this broader effort to contribute to a two-way military relationship -- not as a legal green light for offensive action. The bill creates the framework for Japan to give as much to the relationship as it receives, by enabling it to come to the aid of the United States if necessary. More than anything else, history is likely to undermine any temptation Japan might have to build a bomb. Japan was the first and only country to ever be attacked with nuclear weapons. Over 100,000 Japanese citizens were killed in the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seventy years on, Japan's nuclear history will not be forgotten any time soon. Indeed, it is because of that history that Japan has become one of the most active signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tokyo has invested significant resources into preventing the illegal spread of nuclear weapons-relevant materials and technology, promoting the conditions needed for nuclear disarmament, and reminding the world of the grotesque effects of the use of an atomic bomb. The non-proliferation norm is one that Japan will have little incentive to abandon in the short, medium, or likely even in the long-term. Contrary to the suggestions of some watching legislative developments in Japan, the new security bill is not going to change that.

#### Japan is in military spending deficit – cant make nuclear weapons

Bremmer 15 **—** Ian Bremmer, foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME, 2015, (“Why the World doesn’t have to fear Japan,” TIME, 9/24, Available online at <http://time.com/4047863/the-world-doesnt-have-to-fear-japan/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Trouble in the East China Sea between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, has been an uncomfortable undercurrent in global affairs. Now, 70 years after the end of World War II, ostensibly pacifist Japan has passed legislation that expands the role and reach of its military. The angry reaction from the Chinese and South Korean governments that followed owe as much to domestic politics as to memories of WW II–era Japanese militarism. Some fear that Japan’s move signals that East Asia will become the world’s next danger zone. But breathe easier–East Asia is one region we don’t have to worry about. First, it’s much easier to pass a new law than to build a new military. That’s especially true in Japan, which doesn’t have much more money to spend on defense. The country’s debt is already approaching 250% of GDP, and the International Monetary Fund warned this summer that it will rise to as much as three times the size of Japan’s economy within 15 years unless the government reins in spending. The country’s rapidly aging population demands progressively higher spending on pensions and health care. That’s why Japan’s Ministry of Defense is asking for a bump in military spending of just 2.2% for next year, a rise that owes more to increased costs imposed by a weaker yen than a desire to beat China, which is recording double-digit increases in military spending. Nor is there public support in Japan for a more hawkish foreign policy. The new law has eroded Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s popularity and provoked intense protests inside and outside Japan’s parliament. According to a recent Pew survey, 68% of Japanese want to limit Japan’s military activity, while only 23% want the country to be more active. If Japan becomes militarily aggressive, costs will become unsustainable and opposition to Abe will become entrenched. So if it’s expensive and unpopular, why did the Prime Minister push for this change? Abe wants to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the military alliance with the U.S. by showing a willingness to become a more active partner. The U.S.-Japan alliance, not a stronger Japanese military on its own, is crucial for countering China’s expansion. In addition, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are more hawkish than the average Japanese. Appeasing them helps Abe build and maintain support within the LDP for his more important drive for economic reform. And the economy is one more reason Japan is not about to stoke conflict. China is Japan’s largest trade partner. We may see more Japanese patrol boats in the East China Sea, but we’re no more likely to see open conflict than we were before this law passed.

#### Japan won’t make nuclear weapons – moral concerns take precedence

Amano 12 **—** Yukiya Amano, Direction General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 2012, (“The Japanese View on Nuclear Disarmament,” The Nonproliferation Review, pg. 133 – 134, Spring 2012, Available online at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/91aman.pdf>, Accessed on 6/24/16, RR)

Early disarmament treaties were motivated by humanitarian concern. The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, for example, state, “the employment of such arms (arms which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render the death inevitably) would be contrary to the laws of humanity.” The countries represented at the 1899 International Peace Conference at the Hague, which agreed to abstain from the use of bullets that expand or flatten in the human body, were “inspired by the sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg.” Humanitarian considerations unquestionably play a role in decision-making on more recent disarmament policy. The Ottawa Treaty of 1997 banning anti-personnel land mines is the latest example of a treaty that is motivated by humanitarian concerns. It goes without saying that many governments, organizations, and citizens oppose nuclear weapons, because they regard such weapons as inhumane. For Japan, humanitarian considerations are a very important motivation for pursuing disarmament. Japanese public opinion expects the government to take initiatives to promote humanitarian goals though disarmament, and the government has made disarmament one of the pillars of Japanese since the end of World War II> In general, Japanese diplomacy is pragmatic, but in the case of disarmament, the pursuit of humanitarian valuese has been a key justification. Underpinning this orientation are values instilled in the Japanese education system, the experience of World War II, and the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

#### Public opinion matters-Japan citizens don’t want nuclearisation.

William Larn 2014 — William Larn, studying a Master of International Relations at the University of Melbourne, 2014 (“THE FUTURE OF JAPAN’S NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATUS”, CSIS, 7/30, Available online at <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/the-future-of-japans-non-nuclear-weapons-status/>, RKim)

Japan’s national identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons state Japan’s national identity as a non-nuclear weapons state and the only nation to have suffered the consequences of a nuclear weapons attack has led to its development as a highly pacifist state. In Japan, citizens continue to view activity connected to the military with extreme wariness. Commitment to the idea of a non-nuclear weapons state remains strong, even among the younger generation.2 Public opinion in Japan shows an aversion to nuclearisation.3 Polling conducted by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in 1968, while China was testing nuclear weapons, found that only 21 per cent of the population favoured Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.4 In 1978 and 1981 numbers had fallen to between 15 and 16 per cent and by 1999, a poll taken by the National Institute for Research Advancement found that only 7 per cent of those polled would favour Japan acquiring nuclear weapons.5 These polls indicate a downward trend while Japan moves through periods of greater security. However, the nuclearisation debate resurfaces during periods of regional instability, challenging Japan’s anti-nuclear self- conception. For example, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 resulted in a fall in support for Japan remaining a non-nuclear weapons state, with the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reporting that 28.6 per cent of people polled agreed that there is sufficient reason to discuss whether or not Japan should possess nuclear weapons.6 The aftermath of North Korea’s actions caused conservative political leaders like former Foreign Ministers Nakagawa and Aso to suggest “chipping away at the nuclear taboo and [preparing a] national agenda for a fundamental re-examination of Japan’s security policy that includes consideration of the nuclear option”.7 The polls do not reflect mainstream anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, but they do suggest that there is a need to discuss the nuclear option. This offers the chance for politicians to use public debate to shift Japan’s national identity. However, this will remain a difficult task, as after North Korea’s satellite launch in April 2009, 19.4 per cent of respondents supported Japan’s nuclearisation, but 72.8 per cent disagreed with it.8 These polls do, however, suggest that North Korea’s belligerent actions could push Japan to adopt a more hard-line defence policy. What remains influential in Japan maintaining a non-nuclear weapons status in the near-future is the almost universal antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese people.9 This suggests that the engrained national identity of Japan as a non-nuclear weapons state remains influential in maintaining this status. Commitment to the global non-proliferation regime Japan maintains a strong public commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament in an effort to “realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons”.10 Japan remains a committed proponent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and continues to be heavily engaged in their proceedings. Japan’s engagement is most evident through its involvement in submitting resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) First Committee each year and working papers to the NPT review conferences and preparatory committees on disarmament.11 Its commitment is evident in its opening remarks for the 2010 NPT Review Conference that states, “the threat [of ] nuclear weapons [are] among the most serious challenges that humankind faces… Japan has a moral responsibility to act at the forefront of efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and is firmly committed to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles”: not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country.12 Moreover, Japan has intentions to “advance its nuclear disarmament diplomacy and further enhance the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation”.13 This is noticeable through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) that sets out to encourage greater transparency surrounding nuclear disarmament.14 The NPDI submitted a working paper to the preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference that sets out the framework for NPT signatories to implement, in order to strengthen IAEA safeguards and promote a more effective non- proliferation regime.15 Japan maintains a multiple international obligations on this front, so if it seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons it would have to remove itself from these international institutions; a “withdrawal from the NPT could damage the world’s most durable international non-proliferation regime.”16

### Abe Won’t Nuclearize

#### Abe won’t nuclearize

Fifield 15 — Anna Fifield, Bureau Chief in Tokyo for the Washington Post, 2015 (“70 years after bomb, Japan's Abe calls for a world without nuclear weapons”, The Washington Post, August 6th, Available Online at [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japans-abe-calls-for-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-on-hiroshima-anniversary/2015/08/05/95eecffe-3c13-4924-aa2d-814c873d20a8\_story.html#comments](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japans-abe-calls-for-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-on-hiroshima-anniversary/2015/08/05/95eecffe-3c13-4924-aa2d-814c873d20a8_story.html), Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

Japan’s prime minister called for an end to nuclear warfare Thursday as the country stopped to remember the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 70 years ago. At 8:15 a.m. local time, the exact time that U.S. forces dropped the “Little Boy” uranium bomb on Aug. 6, 1945, tens of thousands who had gathered in the city’s peace park stood in silence to honor the 100,000-plus people who died as a result of that attack. It was the first time a nuclear weapon had been used in war. Three days later, a plutonium bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. “Seventy years on, I reemphasize the necessity of world peace,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said at the memorial service. “We have to continue our effort to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. It is our responsibility, and it is our duty.” Speaking in Malaysia, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry said the anniversary was a “very, very powerful reminder” not only of the impact of war, but also of the significance of the nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers, the Associated Press reported. About 55,000 people from 100 countries attended the ceremony in Hiroshima, including U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy and Rose Gottemoeller, undersecretary of state for arms control.

### Public Support Blocks

#### Public still against nuclearization despite trends

Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 09 — Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, Chanlett-Avery is a specialist in Asian Affairs, Nikitin is an analyst in non-proliferation, 2009 (“Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests”, Congressional Research Service, February 19th, Available Online at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)

In general, public opinion on defense issues in Japan appears to be shifting somewhat, but pacifist sentiment remains significant. In the past, Japanese public opinion strongly supported the limitations placed on the Japanese military, but this opposition has softened considerably since the late 1990s. Despite this overall shifting tide, the “nuclear allergy” among the general public remains strong. The devastation of the atomic bombings led Japanese society to recoil from any military use of nuclear energy. Observers say that the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly opposed to nuclearization, pointing to factors like an educational system that promotes pacifism and the few surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who serve as powerful reminders of the bombs’ effects.

### A2: Arms Race Impact

#### Japanese rearmament doesn’t create an arms race – it’s just a distraction

Gunnar 14 **—** Ulson Gunnar, Geopolitical analyst and writer, 2014, (“Why Japan’s Rearmament might not matter,” NEO, 7/25, Available online at <http://journal-neo.org/2014/07/25/why-japan-s-rearmament-might-not-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Japan is a nation in decline. Its population is both aging and shrinking while its economy is mired in stagnation. Shifting toward greater militarization or cultivating adversarial relations with neighbors like China may be an attempt to rally its population around the flag, but that such a measure even seems necessary spells trouble for Japan. And Japan’s military contributions to whichever nations is applies “collective self-defense” to are moot, considering many of these allies are likewise in permanent decline, including the United States itself. It is unlikely Japan’s contributions will allow the US to break even in its Pacific calculus. America’s attempt to “pivot toward Asia” has experienced many setbacks and delays including the ousting of allied regimes in the region and the ever expanding sphere of Chinese influence chaffing against waning US hegemony. In fact, Japan’s remilitarization may only distract it further from devising sustainable socioeconomic reforms necessary for the nation’s recovery, let alone what it needs to thrive and expand. The other possible motive behind Japan’s saber rattling may be yet another collective effort by the West and its regional allies to force China’s hand toward an overreaching Soviet-style arms race and subsequent missteps before the hoped collapse of Beijing’s current political order. Should paranoia and bad intelligence get the better of Beijing, China may find itself overreacting to provocations, both political and tactical, along its borders and spheres of influence. It should be noted that similar saber rattling from Japan has taken place for decades. Similar rhetoric could be heard in 1989, when Japan and the US were seeking their way out of economic recessions. More recently, Japan has made militaristic announcements similar to its most recent declarations, all accompanied by the same condemnation and celebrations along predictable political fault lines. It may be that Japan’s socioeconomic condition is once again dire enough to warrant yet another round of distractions.

#### No incentive of East Asian arms race and doesn’t lead to war

Sundstrom 15 **—** Ian Sundstrom, surface warfare officer and holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College in London, 2015, (“An East Asian Arms Race: Does it Even Matter,” The Diplomat, 1/16, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the “Missile Gap” on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary’s intentions. In the context of an East Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China’s expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns. China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing’s point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China’s historical record is not obviously aggressive. China does have a recent history of aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas, though. Taken at face value, this would indicate that expanded Chinese military capabilities will be used offensively. However, talk is cheap whereas war is not, and rhetoric is just as often used to mask intentions as display them. Aggressive public statements are an easy way to placate nationalist sentiment at home and apply diplomatic pressure abroad. I do not have any doubt that China desires both de facto and de jure control over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the various islands and reefs of the South China Sea, but it is more likely that China will continue its current “salami-slicing” diplomatic tactics than it will use its expanding military to engage in campaigns to seize the islands. China currently has the capability to seize these territories (Taiwan possibly excepted), even if it couldn’t defend them against recapture, and so continued restraint speaks volumes to Chinese intent. While we fret about the PLA Navy’s newest frigate and latest stealth fighter, China will slowly use diplomatic maneuvering to achieve its ends well below the threshold of open war. Of course, intentions are slippery and can change drastically without warning. That is why military capability is so often discussed. You can count and analyze tanks with some degree of certainty that tomorrow they won’t suddenly become submarines. Capability, however, is not a substitute for intent and it does not do to study one without the other. Whether an arms race is occurring in Asia or not, it should be remembered that war is not caused by weapons, but by people. China’s defense spending continues to increase, and its neighbors’ budgets may follow suit, but this does not change anything fundamental about the region’s international relations. Keeping the capability/intent framework in mind allows you to see past the bluster about rising defense budgets and expanding capabilities and focus on what really matters: who wants what, and are they willing to fight for it.

### A2: Prolif

#### Prolif is slow, won’t happen, and has no impact – reject their evidence

Keck 13 (Zachary, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, 12/4/13, “Why Nuclear Weapons Don't Spread (Quickly)”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-nuclear-weapons-dont-spread-quickly/)

Cartwright is hardly alone in holding these views. Indeed, the general consensus when it comes to nuclear weapons has long been “when there’s a will there’s a way.” And yet, the spread of nuclear weapons has always been **surprisingly slow**. Moreover, despite the diffusion of nuclear technology, nuclear weapons have actually been spreading much more slowly than they did during the first few decades of the nuclear era. Consider that, in the three decades following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no less than seven countries developed at least a nascent nuclear weapon capability. In the nearly four decades since, only three countries — Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea — have developed a nuclear weapons capability, and one of these states — South Africa — voluntarily dismantled its arsenal. So what explains this great nuclear slowdown? Two converging trends seem to be at work. First, there has been an **undeniable decline** in the number of states interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Harald Muller and Andreas Schmidt have documented this well. In their **comprehensive study** of states with nuclear weapons activities between 19**45** and 20**05**, they find that “states with nuclear weapons activities were **always a minority**, and today they are the **smallest minority** since 1945.” Specifically, in 2005 they identified 10 states as having nuclear weapons activities (including those with nuclear weapons), which constituted **less than six percent** of UN members. Today the only non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) that might be interested in an atomic weapon is Iran. The fact that states have **by and large been uninterested in nuclear weapons** is somewhat perplexing from a historic perspective. After all, what other revolutionary military technology hasn’t elicited strong interest from most states competing in the international system? At the same time, when one examines the properties of nuclear weapons more closely, the lack of interest is easier to understand. Nuclear weapons have basically served one purpose for states possessing them; namely, they have deterred others from challenging that state’s survival and other fundamental interests. But the nuclear era has also been characterized by a sharp decline in warfare and today fewer states face fundamental external threats to their existence. Given the high costs of building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, it makes little sense to acquire nuclear weapons without such an existential threat. While lack of interest explains why some states have renounced nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to build them, the difficulty in building them has prevented others states that seek nuclear weapons from acquiring them. Despite the view that “where there is a will there’s a way,” and a strong sense that globalization has exacerbated this, the historical record tells a very different story. As Jacques Hymans has pointed out, before 1970 seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapon programs and all seven succeeded in an average of seven years. Since 1970, ten states have launched dedicated nuclear weapons programs and only three have succeeded (the jury’s still out on Iran). These three have taken an average of 17 years to succeed and Iran under the Islamic Republic has been working towards a nuclear weapon capability for some three decades. Just as pundits have routinely underestimated the difficulty of building nuclear weapons, so too do they grossly overstate the number of states who are technically capable of building them. Both journalists and scholars regularly cite 40 as the number of non-nuclear weapon states who are technically capable of building them. This figure is often attributed to the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, who said in 2004: “Some estimates indicate that 40 countries or more now have the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, which means if they have the required fissile material — high enriched uranium or plutonium — we are relying primarily on the continued good intentions of these countries.” As Scott Sagan has pointed out, most of those citing ElBaradei omit the latter part of his statement about having the required fissile material. But this statement is crucial as only a handful of NNWS are capable of producing or otherwise procuring fissile material, which is necessary for a nuclear bomb. Moreover, thanks in no small part to President Obama’s focus on nuclear security, the global availability of fissile material has been declining as the U.S. and its allies help remove fissile material from some states while downsizing the stockpiles in many others. Furthermore, compared with the Cold War era and even the 1990s, nuclear weapon holding and nuclear capable states are much less willing to sell NNWS crucial dual use technology that can be used to indigenously produce fissile material. Thus, contrary to common perception, there is **no impeding nuclear domino about to fall.**

#### Prolif doesn’t cause war

Waltz 3/22/2007 (Kenneth, Professor – UC Berkeley, “A Nuclear Iran”, Journal of International Affairs, Lexis)

First, nuclear proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that'sobviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons. Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. Forinstance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with **caution** and **moderation**. Every country--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution behaves with such caution. It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses.Well, I have one: If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is **100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years**. Pretty impressive.

### A2: Domino Theory

#### Domino theory wrong for east asia

Weiner, research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, ‘12 (Sarah, “The Dominos Won’t Fall,” November 9, <http://csis.org/blog/dominos-wont-fall>)

The narrative is compelling. Fortunately for us, however, it makes much more sense in theory than it is likely to play out in practice. The first glaring problem with the nuclear domino theory is that it has been wrong for almost 70 years. Since the United States successfully detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1945, eight additional nuclear powers have emerged: Russia (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964), (presumably) Israel (late 1960s), India (1974), Pakistan (1998), and North Korea (2006). That averages out to about one new nuclear state every 7.5 years (and just one every 14 years since the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970). **If this is “domino” proliferation, then it is the slowest domino chain in history.** Some may look at this list and see the domino theory confirmed: the Soviet Union pursued a nuclear weapon because its adversary the United States was doing so; Maoist China went nuclear in response to U.S. and Soviet nuclear build up; and India nuclearized in response to China, sparking subsequent proliferation in Pakistan. The trouble with this chronicle is that it walks right into a classic stats 101 trap: **choosing based on the dependent variable.** If we are interested in understanding why states proliferate, **analyzing a sample of nuclear states is bound to skew our examination because,** by our own definition, only nuclear states made it into the dataset. It’s like interviewing a sample of Republican voters, discovering that the state of the economy determined their votes, and concluding that anyone worried about the economy would vote for the GOP. In this scenario, we would need to sample all voters. So to understand proliferation, we need to understand all states. The decision not to proliferate is **just as significant as the opposite**, and the list of non-proliferating states tells quite a different story. After China’s first successful nuclear test, for example, the U.S. administration predicted India, Indonesia, and Japan could nuclearize, followed by a menacing crew including Sweden, Italy, Canada, and several nations in Eastern Europe. Viewed from this lens, India’s nuclearization hardly confirms the domino theory. Look at all the dominos that didn’t fall! **The same dog-that-didn’t-bark problem holds true in more modern cases**. A long list of Asian countries should feel threatened by North Korea’s nuclear program, especially Japan and South Korea. **Yet, in contrast to dire predictions, the rest of the East and Southeast Asia dominos remain upright.**

### A2: Accidents Impact

#### No accidental launch

Williscroft 10 (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan* & *Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### No accidents

Dr. Leonid Ryabikhinet all (Executive Secretary, Committee of Scientist for Global Security and Arms Control; Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute), General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov (Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom), and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov (Senior Research Scientist, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies) “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context” in Yverdon, Switzerland, 21-23 June 2009. http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf

Most of the experts define de-alerting as implementing some reversible physical changes in a weapon system that would significantly increase time between the decision to use the weapon and the actual moment of its launch. The proponents of this concept consider it as one of the ways to maintain strategic stability. They provide the following arguments in support of this concept. Radical changes have occurred in US-Russian relations. Russia and the United States are building strategic partnership relationship. In such situation the high alert readiness of strategic offensive forces targeted at each other does not correspond to the character of our relations. Strategic nuclear forces high alert readiness in combination with a concept of launch-on-warning strike increases the risk of “accidental” nuclear war (as a result of mistakes in the C3I system, inadequate situation analysis, mistaken decision-making, unauthorized action of personnel or even terrorists, provocation from the “third” states or non-state actors, etc.); False signals about missile attacks obtained from early warning system that may trigger an accidental launch. This assumption was very popular when the Russian early warning system was weakened as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union. Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

### A2: China-Japan War

#### 7 reasons they’ll never go to war

Moss, 13 (Trefor, former Asia-Pacific editor at Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/10, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

The sequel seldom improves on the original. Yet Shinzo Abe, Japan’s newly re-elected prime minister, has already displayed more conviction during his second spell at the Kantei than in the entire year of his first, unhappy premiership. Political energy is a plus only when it’s wisely deployed however, and some fear that Abe is picking a fight he can’t win when it comes to his hardline stance on China. Rather than attempting to soothe the tensions that built between Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, Abe has struck a combative tone, especially concerning their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – a keystone for nationalists in both countries. Each time fighter aircraft are scrambled or ships are sent to survey the likely flashpoint, we hear more warnings about the approach of a war that China and Japan now seem almost eager to wage. The Economist, for example,recently observed that, “China and Japan are sliding towards war,” while Hugh White of the Australian National University warned his readers: “Don't be too surprised if the U.S. and Japan go to war with China [in 2013].” News this week of another reckless act of escalation – Chinese naval vessels twice training their radars on their Japanese counterparts – will only have ratcheted up their concerns. These doomful predictions came as Abe set out his vision of a more hard-nosed Japan that will no longer be pushed around when it comes to sovereignty issues. In his December op-ed on Project Syndicate Abe accused Beijing of performing “daily exercises in coercion” and advocated a “democratic security diamond” comprising Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. (rehashing a concept from the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). He then proposed defense spending increases – Japan’s first in a decade – and strengthened security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, which both share Tokyo’s misgivings about China’s intentions. An alliance-affirming trip to the U.S.is expected soon, and there is talk of Japan stationing F-15s on Shimojijima, close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. However, Abe would argue that he is acting to strengthen Japan in order to balance a rising China and prevent a conflict, rather than creating the conditions for one. And he undoubtedly has a more sanguine view of the future of Sino-Japanese relations than those who see war as an ever more likely outcome. Of course, there is a chance that Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft will clash as the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands rumbles on; and, if they do, there is a chance that a skirmish could snowball unpredictably into a wider conflict. But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war would be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

### A2: Japan Econ Impact

#### Japan economy collapsing now

Ezrati 16 — Milton, Ezrati is Senior Economist and Market Strategist for Lord, Abbett & Co. as well as an associate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He writes frequently on economies and finance and is just completing a book on demographics and globalization, 2016 (“What Ails Japan’s Economy?”, National Interest, May 1st, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-ails-japans-economy-16003>, Accessed 06-29-2016, SP)

A quarter of a century of failure and economic stagnation has built a strong consensus on what ails Japan. All sources of analysis—domestic, foreign, government, corporate and nonprofit—identify two problems: the country’s aging demographics and its deeply entrenched, top-down approach to economic organization. This analysis is wrong. Demographics and entrenched structures are challenges facing Japan. The real problem is Tokyo’s inability to do any of the many things that might mitigate their ill effects. Demographic pressures are indeed real and relentless. Fertility rates in Japan have fallen dramatically; at 1.3 births on average in a woman’s lifetime, they are well below the replacement rate. Low birth rates have slowed the flow of young people into the workforce, medical and public-health advances have increased life expectancies. The combination has left Japan with fewer than three people of working age for each person of retirement age, down by half in the last twenty-five years and is set to fall farther. Such a relative loss in the number of working hands and minds cannot help but limit the economy’s growth potential, especially since the need to care for the elderly has siphoned large portions of the country’s limited workforce from growth-promoting activities. The lack of youth has further impeded growth by constraining the country’s innovative spirit, while the tendency for retirees to support their consumption by drawing on accumulated wealth has taken funds that might otherwise finance productivity-enhancing, growth-promoting investments. Tokyo, however, has always had ways to mitigate such strains. Workplace flexibility, for instance, might have encouraged older workers to stay on the job longer, simultaneously boosting the workforce and reducing the relative population of dependent retirees. But the government’s lack of initiative has left Japan with the oldest population of any major country and one of the lowest average retirement ages at about sixty. Japan’s government has not tried to encourage more women to work, perhaps through more flexible work schedules and by developing affordable, reliable childcare. Though Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has offered what he calls “womanomies,” only some 50 percent of working-age Japanese women seek or engage in paid employment, compared, for example, to some 70 percent in the United States. Nor has Japan looked to increase levels of economically productive immigration, though culturally that might be impossible. Most telling, Japanese policy has done little or nothing to make needed trade adjustments. An advanced economy, such as Japan, can cope with relative shortages of youthful labor by giving up on the production of simpler, labor-intensive products, such as textiles and assemblies, and importing them, effectively using foreign labor even as it stays at home. It can further mitigate the strain by concentrating its domestic economic efforts on more complex, high-value products, thereby using its limited but well-educated working population to best advantage. Though some firms in Japan have moved in this direction, government has done nothing to facilitate or encourage the process. On the contrary, its policy of depressing the foreign exchange value of the yen, and so reducing the global price of all Japanese-made products, has actually impeded this adjustment by artificially extending the life of Japan’s remaining simple, labor-intensive activities. This last disappointment brings up the government’s second great failure: its insistence on retaining a rigid, top-down approach to economic direction. For decades Japan has set its economic emphasis on close cooperation among big business, the permanent government bureaucracy and elected politicians—what the Japanese call the iron triangle. It has long marshaled the economy’s resources—natural, financial, labor and organizational—to a limited number of clear economic objectives. Theoretically, it could do the same now to manage demographic pressures. But a seemingly strong conservative streak within the triangle has prevented it taking the lead in refocusing the economy’s emphasis. Actually the triangle’s behavior would have failed Japan even if there were no demographic pressures. Its approach really only worked while the economy remained relatively underdeveloped and the triangle could look for guidance to trends in the West. As Japan caught up to the United States in the 1980s, it lost that clear direction. Since then, Japan has needed to innovate for itself, and that has required an economic environment that fosters experimentation in a number of different directions simultaneously—in other words one that is antithetical to the old heritage of clear, overriding direction. The triangle has refused to adjust, even denying innovative startups financing from either the country’s big banks (more important in Japan than in the United States) or new stock issues. It speaks to this resistance that until relatively recently a company had to have ten years of earnings to list on the Tokyo stock exchange, hardly a way to encourage the new. So it is Tokyo that has permitted Japan to squander more than two decades during which it could have begun adjusting to its challenges. To be sure, the economy would have faced an uphill battle even if the government had taken concerted action immediately. The best policy could ever have done is mitigate the demographic effects, not erase them. Still, Japan has wasted time. Even if it were to adopt a more proactive policy tomorrow morning, it could not recover what has been lost much less re-establish its economy’s once enviable rates of growth and development. Still, a change in policy could lift the country’s growth trajectory from its present, disappointing, almost flat slope and brighten prospects.

#### Japan economy low – even worse post brexit.

Soble 6/24 - New York Times reporter in Tokyo. (Jonathan, 6/24/16, “Brexit’s effects Hit Hard in Japan”, <http://www.nytimes.com/live/eu-referendum/japanese-markets-brexit>, Accessed 6/29/16, MW)

Brexit’s Effects Hit Hard in Japan Photo An electronic board in Tokyo displaying the Nikkei stock index on Friday. An electronic board in Tokyo displaying the Nikkei stock index on Friday.Credit Takashi Aoyama/Getty Images Some of the sharpest initial financial turmoil after Britain’s voting to leave the European Union was felt in Japan, as investors simultaneously bought the yen and dumped Japanese stocks. The yen, a currency that is often seen as a haven in times of crisis, jumped 13 percent against the British pound and 5 percent against the United States dollar. That pushed it across the psychological threshold of 100 yen to the dollar for the first time since 2013. The Nikkei 225 stock average plunged 8 percent. A stronger yen is generally considered to be bad for the export-oriented Japanese economy, and especially for large multinationals like Hitachi or Toyota, whose overseas revenue are squeezed when foreign currencies lose their value against the yen. “Stability in foreign exchange and financial markets is important for Japanese economic growth, and it looks like the markets are skittish,” Taro Aso, Japan’s finance minister, said at a hastily convened news briefing. He declined to say whether Japan would intervene in the market to reverse the rise of the yen, something it has done at times of unusual market volatility in the past, including in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011.

### A2: NPT Impact

#### NPT collapse doesn’t cause prolif

Kimura 5 (Akira, Professor – Kagoshima University, “What Can We Do to Resolve the Crisis in the NPT Regime?”, 5-6, http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/anew/KimuraE.pdf)

The NPT regime was not established with the sole aim of obligating the member nations to simply ensure nuclear nonproliferation, that is the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations. Rather, it must be emphasized that the regime clearly stipulates the duty of nuclear powers to act on nuclear disarmament, and includes the logical necessity or latent possibility of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as a vision of a nuclear free world. Although the ‘prohibition and prevention of nuclear proliferation’ and the ‘duty to implement nuclear disarmament’ are two sides of the same coin, there is no room for doubt that it is the latter that is the decisive factor for the survival of the NPT regime. The reason for this is the fact that non-nuclear nations have only accepted this unfair treaty based on the assumption that the nuclear nations would faithfully fulfill their duty of nuclear disarmament, and if that duty is not fulfilled there will be almost no meaning in continuing with the NPT regime. Yet, the collapse of the NPT regime would not necessarily bring about the chaos and confusion of immediate and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, nor would this necessarily represent the worst case scenario. This is because non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would have the option of establishing a new ‘nuclear weapon prohibition treaty’ on their own to put pressure on nuclear nations to prohibit the preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and fulfill their duty to eliminate nuclear weapons in a more effective manner. The important point here is that it is anticipated that the majority of non-nuclear nations that withdraw from the NPT regime would not choose to take the path of nuclear armament themselves, but rather on the contrary, they would implement initiatives and efforts to pursue not only promotion of nuclear non-proliferation but also the elimination of nuclear weapons ever more proactively. This is evident when one looks at the past activities and assertions of the member nations of the New Agenda Coalition or NPT nonmember nations.

#### NPT is worthless paper – ad hoc approaches are inevitable

Terzuolo, 8/5/2015 (Eric R. Terzuolo was a U.S. Foreign Service officer from 1982 to 2003, and focused on international security affairs. In 2001-2003, he was the senior U.S. resident representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. “How the Iran Deal Erodes the Nonproliferation Treaty” The National Interest <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-iran-deal-erodes-the-nonproliferation-treaty-13492>)

Diplomats and other experts often refer to nonproliferation “regimes,” i.e. systems of laws, norms, and practices intended to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction **The nuclear nonproliferation regime**, based on the 1968 **N**on**p**roliferation **T**reaty and the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the implementing body, **has a spotty record.** It did not succeed in preventing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from developing an advanced weapons program, though the IAEA, under UN authority, clearly did an excellent job of dismantling Iraqi nuclear infrastructure after the first Gulf War, as became clear later on, after the 2003 invasion. Intensive U.S. bilateral diplomacy helped block North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, initially announced in 1993, for a decade. But Pyongyang then tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. Iran remains party to the NPT, but nonetheless managed to flaunt its obligations under the treaty for quite some time. There is, in fact, a solid “pragmatic” argument, to borrow a term from outgoing Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey, for the ad hoc Iran nuclear deal signed July 14. Former U.S. ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey is right that, at this point, Congressional rejection of the deal would not open the way to a better agreement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, at least as written, portends a better outcome than was achieved with North Korea, and one should avoid overstretching the analogy between the two cases. But the Iran deal does confirm, in my view, a **definitive turn** in how the international community deals with cases of suspected nuclear proliferation. It is no accident that Security Council Resolution 2231, endorsing the JCPOA, states explicitly that it “should not be considered as setting precedents,” but, practically speaking, that will prove **no more than a pious hope.** Instead of talking about the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we now should admit that the North Korean and Iranian cases have moved us into the realm of ad hoc approaches to individual cases of suspected nuclear proliferation. In the future, the international community may have to address new concerns that some state is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. (This might come in response to past or future Iranian actions, though not necessarily.)

### Japanese Militarization Good

#### Japanese rearmament good

Balbierz 14 — Patrick Balbierz, editorial assistant at World Policy Journal, written when he was a graduate student in International Relations and Foreign Affairs at Seton Hall University, 2014. ("Remilitarizing Japan: An Enticing Prospect,” World Policy Blog, March 19th, Available Online at <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/03/19/remilitarizing-japan-enticing-prospect>, Accessed 06-04-2016)

The U.S. is hoping to reduce defense expenditures as well as the size of its military in the coming year. Following the conclusion of two prolonged ground wars, the U.S. is beginning to focus on high tech options, along with a “pivot towards Asia.” So while there is cause for concern with a rising and ambitious China, why is the U.S. reducing its overall force in face of a looming global challenger to its status? Furthermore, why is the U.S. not shifting the greater military responsibility to Japan to keep the growing Chinese empire in check? Japan spens only 1 percent of its GDP on their military. The U.S. currently spends between 4 and 5 percent; China sits above 2 percent with projections for growth. Logan higlights that while nothing in the U.S. budget reductions are forcing Japan to rebuild its military, “it would be in the U.S. interests to allow them to do so.”

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has led conservative members of his party in an effort to remilitarize Japan. Acknowledging a growing threat and anxiety over whether the U.S. really would challenge China over a territorial sea dispute far from its own borders, Abe believes Japan is ready to take on a larger role in its defense.

Japanese politicians are not the only ones who believe there is impending conflict with China. Many newspapers within Japan have published articles suggesting that military conflict with China is in the near future, pinpointing 2014 as the start. Citing economic slowdown, ambitious foreign policy, and a desire to reclaim what China views as its lost territories, the Japanese newspapers predict a confrontation pulling the U.S. into the fray. John Kerry recently reiterated the U.S. commitment to Japan in face of the East China Sea dispute, stating, “I...underscored that the United States remains as committed as ever to upholding our treaty obligations with our Japanese allies.” Perhaps the speculative newspapers aren’t far off in their predictions.

The prospect of a remilitarized Japan haunts the region, particularly China. However, the U.S. should utilize the momentum created by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe efforts, and allow Japan to utilize some of its economic strength (it ranked 3rd in GDP in 2012 behind #1 U.S. and #2 China) and share some of the security burden in East Asia. Japan has an extremely capable force for self defense, it will lose influence and security if they simply stand by and watch.

If Japan is to remilitarized, not only would the U.S. release a potential burden both economically and militarily, but it would gain a formidable ally in the growing hostile east Asian theatre. Japan would be an ally capable of utilizing one of the most advancement missile defense system in the world if an attack was launched at the U.S. from the East Asian peninsula. Coupled with a reduction of housing of troops and base expenditures within Japan, the U.S. could meet its reduced military spending goals but also bolster its defense by utilizing Japan’s increased willingness to shoulder the responsibility.

The “pivot to Asia” by the U.S. should focus on both upcoming challengers to its global dominance, but also strengthening relationships with its allies. A remilitarized Japan, despite old fears of aggression could be precisely what the U.S. is looking for in East Asia. Japan could serve as a means of easing the burden of containing a growing and aggressive China, as well as one that could actively defend attacks by a volatile North Korea. The only thing better than an ally is one who, when given the means, can fight alongside you.

#### Japanese militarization good—economy and strategy

Alexeef 13—Kathryn Alexeef, holds a Master’s degree in Security Studies from Georgetown University, former employee of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, Content Manager for Africa with Tesla Government Inc., 2013. ("The Case for Japanese Militarization,” Real Clear Defense, November 14th, Available Online at <http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/11/14/the_case_for_japanese_militarization_106957.html>, Accessed 06-04-2016)

The ongoing dispute between China and Japan in the South China Seas has led to increased focus on the future of Japanese security. Since the end of World War II, Japan’s constitution has forbidden it from developing a military, but Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has indicated his desire to develop a more active security role for Japan. As the United States currently has a strong military presence in Japan, particularly with its bases in Okinawa, the prospect of Japanese militarization may be viewed with some hesitance, especially for those who fear such an action would provoke China. However, on the balance of things, Japan’s militarization would actually benefit the United States.

There are two cases to be made for the positive impact of Japanese militarization, one economic and one strategic.

The economic case is fairly straightforward. Japanese militarization will decrease the need for U.S. resources to defend Japan. Given the continuously sluggish economy, decreasing American military presence in Japan could free up money for other priorities, without leaving our close ally out to dry. It will also bolster future containment of Chinese power in the Pacific without creating an additional drain on American resources. With Japan as a contributor, rather than a recipient, of military aid, the security of the Asia-Pacific region could be enhanced without an extra American dime spent.

The strategic argument is a bit more delicate. Japanese militarization would give China a much more urgent military threat than the United States. Tensions between China and Japan are already fairly high over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute. If Japan develops real military power, tensions will only increase, putting the United States in the perfect position to negotiate between the two Asian nations. With Japan as an independent military actor, the need increases for an external power with close relations with the Japanese to prevent tensions from escalating. The United States is the most logical option to fill that role. Our diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis China would increase, but the direct risk to the United States would remain minimal.

Outside of relations with China, increased Japanese military power would also give the United States a stronger ally in the region. While the pivot to Asia is still more theory than practice, there is little doubt that Asia will be the crux of global security in the 21st century. Stronger allies will better enable the United States to face the upcoming challenges successfully. Moreover, Japan has been a reliable ally for the United States. This makes a more powerful Japanese military far less risky for the United States than empowering our “frenemy” Pakistan, or even India, which has fewer historical ties with the United States and collaborated with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Maintaining our alliance with Japan while it develops a stronger military will only bolster U.S. interests in Asia.

## Alliance Answers

### Alliance Collapse Inevitable

#### U.S-Japan Military Alliance Decline Inevitable.

Wu 2015 — Wu Zurong 2015, research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies, 2015 (“US-Japan Military Alliance Poised to Decline”, East Asia Forum, 2/15, Available online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-japan-military-alliance-poised-to-decline/, RKim)

The United States-Japan military alliance embarked on the path of decline on July 16, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe forced his new security bill through the Lower House against the popular will in Japan. Abe and his cabinet have violated the constitution by giving up the defense policy upheld by previous cabinets since the end of World War II. They want to make Japan a strong military power again and to send Japanese troops to any part of the world in support for military operations conducted by the United States. This political orientation of his governing the country has aroused very strong public opposition and protest from all walks of life. Abe’s revealed intention to militarize Japan and the public protests resulting from it are two important symbolic events, indicating the inevitable gradual decline of the US-Japan military alliance. The declining process may have ups and downs, and will last a long time. It will naturally have a deep impact on the international order. Firstly, it is against the tide of our times of peace and development to strengthen the US-Japan military alliance. In appearance, the alliance will become the most powerful military force in the world when Japan, the third largest economy with advanced military equipment technologies, joins the US, the only military superpower in the world, in military operations in any part of the world. In an addition, the alliance could enter into a perfect state when it gets all kinds of possible support from other allies. But the alliance would turn into its opposite when it reaches the extreme, as the old is always superseded by the new — an eternal and inviolable law of universe. Everything changes, without exception, in the world. Misguided by the overestimate of the role in war of sophisticated weapons, the alliance tends to increase its military activities in the world for various short-term goals. Such military expansion will inevitably create more enemies and add to their burdens, wearing down the alliance. In fact, the alliance has already started to decline even before reaching its anticipated peak. Secondly, the US and Japan have different strategic goals in the Alliance, and internal strife can hardly be avoided. The key element of the new guidelines of US-Japan defense and cooperation released on April 27 is that the US will support the Japanese self-defense force in playing an active role in any part of the world. Abe has used the Alliance as a tool to break the prohibition of “the right of belligerency” as stipulated in Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and to fully exercise collective self-defense, with the long-term goal of building a strong military force. In his August 14 speech on the war of aggression launched by Japanese fascists, Abe himself refused to honestly recognize the heinous crimes committed by Japan during World War II, nor did he personally make sincere apologies to the countries that suffered so bitterly under Japanese aggression and colonial rule. Abe’s attitude on the history issue demonstrates that the rightwing Japanese politicians are going along a dangerous road. On the part of the US, the use of Japanese military forces in the world could help overcome some of the difficulties resulting from the federal budget constraints when implementing its strategy of rebalance in Asia. But in the long term, with profound changes of the world situation in the not too distant future, the US would have to confront a powerful military force of Japan, which would possibly revive militarism and compete with the US for hegemony in Asia. The current US policy on Japan shows that the US has failed to draw necessary lessons from the 1941 Pearl Harbor incident. History reveals that a strong military force of Japan is the cause of wars in Asia and the world. In this sense it is undoubtedly dangerous for the US to foster Japan’s military forces for its immediate interests. Thirdly, the earnest aspiration and strong will of the Japanese public to oppose Abe and his cabinet in dragging Japan into war will inflict a severe wound on the alliance. As Abe’s new security bill is now under deliberation in the Upper House, more and more Japanese have come to see through the tricks surrounding the new security bill, played by the Japanese rightist political forces in collusion with the American hawks. They call Abe’s new security bill a “war bill”. As they still have fresh memories of the massive destructions caused by the explosions of atomic bombs and the bombing of Tokyo during World War II, they are determined to oppose war and seek peace, and will never allow another destructive large-scale modern war to occur in Japan. Abe’s new security bill has been unpopular when deliberated by the Diet. Even though it is expected to be adopted during the current Diet session before the end of September due to the LDP majority, its implementation will have more difficulties. Without the support of the Japanese common people, the Japanese military force fighting outside of Japanese territory is weak, and doomed to failure. Fourthly, the growth of forces for peace and the international strategic stability in the world since the end of the Cold War would keep the alliance’s military expansion in check. People in all countries of the world are now concentrating their efforts in invigorating their economies and improving the livelihood of their people, with a common goal of building up the destiny community of the mankind. Under such circumstances, in order to cook up a pretext for their Alliance’s military expansion, the US and Japan have resorted to creating regional tensions and military threats. Their perverse propaganda and activities may deceive some people for a time, but can never let people believe them forever. It is an eloquent example that US military bases in Japan, which are not helpful to regional peace, are often denounced by local people for the damages of various kinds done to the localities. US and Japanese politicians may find it is a smug strategy to strengthen their military alliance right now. But in the face of the growing force for peace in Japan, the US and other parts of the world, their alliance appears to be weak and subject to challenges. The powerful trends of economic globalization and world multi-polarization do not in any way support the strengthening of the US-Japan military alliance, but helps its disintegration.

### Okinawa Alt Cause

#### Okinawa crushes relations

Avery et al 14— Emma Chanlett-Avery Is a Specialist in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, William H. Cooper is a Specialist in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service, Mark E. Manyin is a Specialist in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Ian E. Rinehart is an Analyst in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, 2014 (Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, February 20, 2014, Accessed 6/27/16, Available online at <http://mansfieldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/USJ.Feb14.RL33436.pdf> JRR)

Henoko area of Nago City, would replace the functions of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, located in the center of a crowded town in southern Okinawa. Although the recently reelected mayor of Nago City has displayed firm opposition to the new facility, most experts agree that his powers to obstruct and delay its construction are limited. The governor’s approval of the landfill permit in theory should allow Washington and Tokyo to consummate their agreement to return the land occupied by MCAS Futenma to local authorities, while retaining a similar level of military capability on Okinawa. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated that the new base at Henoko would be completed no earlier than 2022. Despite the decision by Governor Nakaima, most Okinawans oppose the construction of a new U.S. base for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-of-life reasons. U.S. and Japanese officials on Okinawa asserted in 2013 that law enforcement authorities are prepared to manage disruptive protests, but Okinawan anti-base civic groups may take extreme measures to prevent construction of the facility at Henoko. The Abe Administration, having invested significant time and money in meeting Nakaima’s conditions for approval, will likely need to invest additional political capital to ensure that the base construction proceeds without significant delays and without further alienating the Okinawan public. Failure to implement the Futenma relocation could solidify an impression among some American observers that the Japanese political system struggles to follow through with difficult tasks. On the other hand, the risk remains that heavyhanded actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to stridently anti-base politicians making gains in Okinawa, particularly in the gubernatorial election in late 2014. Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island’s key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the U.S. military presence in Japan. About 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan and over half of the U.S. military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area. The attitudes of native Okinawans toward U.S. military bases are generally characterized as negative, reflecting a tumultuous history and complex relationships with “mainland” Japan and with the United States. The anti-base movement remains strong and vocal in Okinawa. Opposition to U.S. military bases derives from two main areas: one, quality-of-life issues such as personal safety, noise, crime, and environmental degradation; and two, pacifism and anti-militarism. These two strands are often interwoven in the rhetoric of the anti-base movement, but not all residents oppose the U.S. military presence on principle. There are those who support the U.S.-Japan security alliance while objecting to the significant and disproportionate “burden” imposed on Okinawa. Because of these widespread concerns among Okinawans, the sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Japan remains a critical challenge for the alliance.

#### Okinawa is a place of tension between us japan relations

Yoshikawa 15 — (Yukie, 4/28/15, “The Okinawa Threat to U.S.-Japan Defense Ties”, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-okinawa-threat-to-u-s-japan-defense-ties-1430240988>, The Wall Street Journal, Accessed 6/26/16, MW)

U.S.-Japanese security ties are a major theme of this week’s U.S. tour by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during which he and President Barack Obama have announced updated defense-alliance guidelines for the first time in two decades. Amid strong bilateral cooperation concerning joint military training, missile defense and other issues, however, the matter of U.S. military bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa remains unsettled and potentially explosive. Especially controversial is whether the U.S. Marine Air Station at Futenma, in the densely populated city of Ginowan, will be relocated to a rural part of the island—as Washington and Tokyo agreed in 1996—or moved out of Okinawa, as the local governor and many voters demand. During my tenure as a fellow of the Okinawa prefectural government from 2012 to 2014, I visited most of the U.S. military bases and their local city halls in Okinawa. This is the island where nearly 75% of U.S. military facilities (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated. I met with many local residents and members of the U.S. military and learned a great deal about U.S.-Japan relations on the ground. To my dismay, and despite much high-level rhetoric from Washington and Tokyo about the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, most Okinawans had very low opinions of the U.S. military. Some local government officials told me it had been several years since a U.S. military officer last visited their offices. Few Okinawan officials had a clear understanding of the chains of command within the military institutions based on the island. Local U.S. Marine commanders may provide the prefectural government with an organization chart, I was told, but there would be no accompanying explanation of how each department within the organization functions. Part of this stems from wariness on the part of the Americans. When one U.S. Marine commander suggested that more information be shared with the prefectural government in order to minimize the chances of miscommunication, his advisors rejected the proposal, believing that Okinawan officials would leak the information to local interest groups opposed to the presence of U.S. bases there. This lack of communication helps create a climate of animosity, as local officials seeking clarity on military procedures are routinely stonewalled and frustrated, lending credence to their belief that the U.S. military doesn’t care about them. They, in turn, become more uncooperative toward U.S. military personnel. The onus, however, is on the Americans. The Americans need to maintain good relations with the locals, especially given that many locals question the very existence of the bases. The base issue has always been a touchy one, driving risk-averse local bureaucrats to avoid military contact. The language barrier stands tall, while the fence surrounding the U.S. bases creates a physical divide that allows little space for interaction. Americans have tried to build good relations with the locals and contribute to Okinawa’s quality of life—for instance, by cleaning up beaches, teaching English or organizing sporting events. But such actions don’t always succeed. Often they are viewed by locals with suspicion or cynicism. These acts of goodwill should not be a goal but merely a starting point. I found during my interviews, with very few exceptions, that the most successful U.S. base commanders and liaison officers were those who had developed deep local relations. These officers and commanders are frequently visiting city halls and befriending ward chiefs. They also clean beaches and teach English, but they focus first on establishing friendships with the locals, sometimes going for coffee together after beach events or having dinner after language lessons. Such relationships make it easier to establish the necessary lines of communications when potential controversies arise, such as car accidents or crimes committed by U.S. service members. The locals would inform the liaison officers and base commanders of incidents soon after they occur, helping them understand how and when to apologize, and to whom—all of which would be vital for effective damage control. Meeting in person with local leaders and residents, therefore, is the essential first step to reducing mistrust between the U.S. military and the people of Okinawa. As one successful U.S. commander said he learned from his Okinawan interlocutors: “If I see you in person, it is difficult to hate you.”

#### Tensions over Okinawa threaten to derail the US-Japan Alliance

Lind 15—Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Political Science and Government from MIT, Master of Pacific International Affairs from University of California San Diego, 2015. (“Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?” *National Interest,* April 2nd, Available Online at [*http*://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3), Accessed 06-26-2016, p. 2-3)

Peculiar, for two reasons. First, although the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan was legislated in 1971, it was actually an important accomplishment of the Kennedy administration. Reischauer believed that a crisis over Okinawa could happen at any time, and would damage or even destroy the alliance. So as ambassador he devoted tremendous energy to negotiating the reversion of Okinawa with both the U.S. military and the Japanese. This effort floundered for a while after the president’s assassination, and was not realized until the Nixon years. But Reischauer’s contribution was an important Kennedy-era legacy, and thus a strange omission from a panel on that topic. But that’s the problem with non-events; though always eager to assign blame for a crisis that did happen, we forget to confer praise for one that didn’t.

Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment.

In fact, just a few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban location.

But Okinawans didn’t want the facility moved to a different part of Okinawa—they wanted it off the island completely, and elected Governor Onaga on that platform. On March 22 he issued a deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit. Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand as “very regrettable,” and suspending the governor’s work stoppage order.

Onaga responded by vowing, “I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the will of the Okinawans.”

What happens next? “Once again,” wrote DC scribe Chris Nelson, “the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in our face.” The Okinawans are, in Carol Fulp’s words, becoming visible. They’re shouting louder and louder—and want to be onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was Reischauer and Kennedy’s challenge. Averting another one is ours.

#### Okinawa and the Futenma airbase are perpetual issues

Yuki Tatsumi, senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C, a non-resident senior fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies in Tokyo, Japan, 2015. (“Abe’s Okinawa Problem, ” *The Diplomat,* Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/abes-okinawa-problem/>, Accessed on 06-26-16)

To be fair, the problem associated with the relocation of Futenma Air Station is not of Abe’s making. In 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, then the prime minister and head of the Democratic Party of Japan, promised that his government would look for an alternative to the current relocation plan that is “at minimum outside Okinawa.” With that promise, a sense of hope quickly emerged and spread in Okinawa that the Futenma relocation issue could be resolved under the new political leadership. When Hatoyama admitted nine months into his premiership that he had come to realize that the existing plan was indeed the best option available for Okinawa, disenchanted political leaders in Okinawa (who lost whatever little confidence they may have had in Japan’s central government) came together behind the banner of “no new construction in Henoko.” In other words, five years after Hatoyama left office, the Abe government still struggles to recover from the situation aggravated during the Hatoyama administration.

Still, the reality remains that the relocation of Futenma Air Station has not been achieved almost 20 years after the U.S. and Japanese governments first agreed on it in 1996. The local government holds a great deal of authority in issuing various permits required for the construction of the replacement facility to proceed. Therefore, even if Onaga cannot stop the construction in Henoko, he can still make the process as difficult as possible for the Japanese government.

Theoretically, Abe can counter these moves by trying to enact a Special Measures Law that would allow the central government in Tokyo to proceed with the relocation without having to subject the process to the approval by the governor and/or mayor, essentially overriding their authority. There is precedent for this — in 1996, the Japanese government revised the Special Measures Law to practically allow the Japanese government to continue to rent the land for U.S. military bases and other facilities from private landowners regardless of the owners’ request for the land to be returned. However, doing so prematurely would damage the Abe government as it has the risk of triggering anti-U.S. base sentiment across Japan. The approval rating for Abe’s cabinet is on the decline since the government hit a major speed bump in its deliberation of national security legislation after three constitutional scholars unanimously argued that the proposed legislation is “unconstitutional.” Under the circumstances, Abe will not want to force the issue.

The current situation, where Futenma Air Station’s ultimate fate remains in limbo, is unsustainable. As Tokyo’s relationship with Okinawa remains deadlocked with no real prospect of a breakthrough, Futenma remains, as it was 20 years ago, one of the most tangible vulnerabilities for the political sustainability of a U.S. military presence in Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance writ large.

### Alliance Resilient

#### Japan alliance resilient

Pilling 15 — David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times. 2015 ("An unsinkable Pacific alliance," Financial Times, April 22nd, Availabale Online at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e32282d8-e8cf-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cPkFBAkt>, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)

The closeness between America and Japan, forged in the ashes of war, goes beyond the ideological¶ If the Americans and Japanese went in for that kind of thing they might describe themselves as being as close as lips and teeth. In actual fact, that it is how China and North Korea have traditionally categorised their relationship. Washington and Tokyo prefer to talk soberly about their “shared values” as fellow democracies and market economies. Yet, despite the lack of colourful language, theirs has been one of the closest and most enduring of postwar relationships. They stand shoulder to shoulder on most issues from terrorism to intellectual property.¶ That closeness, forged in the ashes of the second world war, goes beyond the ideological. In tangible ways, the two lean on each other heavily. The US regards Japan as its representative in Asia. It depends on Japan to help fund its debt: Tokyo not Beijing is the biggest holder of US Treasuries, if only just. Japan has supported Washington’s military interventions, with cash and, increasingly, with logistical support. Tokyo relies on the US nuclear umbrella and on the protection afforded by 35,000 US troops stationed on its territory. In a candid description of the relationship, Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister in the mid-1980s, referred to Japan as Washington’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific.¶ Next week Shinzo Abe, perhaps Japan’s strongest leader since Mr Nakasone, will celebrate 70 years of that relationship with a rare speech to a joint session of Congress. He will stress Japan’s concerted effort to revive its economy. He will urge Congress to give Barack Obama, the US president, the fast-track authority he needs to conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership. He will express some contrition for the war, though perhaps not enough for the taste of some in congress. He will paint a future in which Japan, released from postwar constitutional handcuffs, can play a more active role in helping the US to keep the world a safe and lawful place. He is unlikely to mention China. But everyone will know what he means.¶ Mr Abe will mostly be warmly received. Washington hopes Abenomics will work and is prepared to tolerate a little “Abenesia” — the downplaying of Japan’s war record — if that is the price of a strong leader. Indeed, many in Washington regard Mr Abe as the best Japanese prime minister in a generation.

#### The alliance is resilient – incentives to cooperate outweigh bubbling tensions

Xu 14 (Beina, Editor/Writer Council on Foreign Relations 7/1/14, Citing Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College & Sheila Smith, CFR Senior Fellow, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437)

"It's been very corrosive for the alliance," Smith says of the Okinawa issue. "It has focused our attention on this one particular base, when the real challenge for the alliance has been to come up with a broader framework for the sustainability of U.S. forces in Japan." The Future of the Alliance The coordination between U.S. and Japanese military forces after the devastating March 2011 earthquake and consequent tsunami that struck Tohoku demonstrated the resilience of the alliance. The SDF conducted rescue operations in tandem with thousands of U.S. forces under Operation Tomodachi, the largest bilateral mission in the history of the alliance. U.S. forces aided the SDF in clearing Sendai's airport, assisted in search-and-rescue teams, and prepared Japan's defense readiness. This high level of support echoed Japan's own cooperation during the Gulf and Iraq wars. In November 2001, the government of Junichiro Koizumi dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, marking Japan's first overseas military action during a combat operation. A year later, Japan drafted a bill that would allow the SDF to be dispatched to postwar Iraq, and in 2003 it sent forces to aid in postwar reconstruction efforts. At a 2 + 2 meeting in early October 2013, the United States agreed to deploy reconnaissance drones to Japan, which also pledged up to $3.1 billion to relocate five thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Ministers also agreed to rewrite the guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation for the first time since 1997 in revisions that would expand cooperation on counterterrorism and bolster the allies' ability to respond to an attack on Japan. In July 2014, Japan took a step toward a more active role in regional security when Abe announced that his cabinet had approved a reinterpretation of the antiwar Constitution that would allow Japanese forces to aid friendly nations under attack. The decision marks a significant shift from a position that had strictly limited Japan to act solely in its own defense. "Japan, for half a century, has expanded its military capability in ways that raise questions about the interpretation of Article Nine in its constitution," says Smith. "And the question has become, 'How much can Japan do in the alliance?'" Some experts have defined the modern-day alliance to be more inclusive, advocating initiatives such as trade and energy cooperation as the road to a future framework. "This is bigger than just the military. These are instruments we use to improve our own national prosperity and security, and that's fundamentally what this alliance should be about," Smith says. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership has been a highly promising economic development that observers hope will tighten the alliance. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster forced Japan to reconsider its energy policies, Washington agreed to a long-term liquefied natural gas export deal with Japan that could see the United States become a supplier for the island country. "This is the most relevant the alliance has been in a long time," says Lind. "With the ebb and flow of what's going on in the region, these are two countries that are highly incentivized to make this work."

### US-Japan Alliance Bad

#### A stronger US-Japan Alliance risks a “new Cold War”

Chen 15 —Dingding Chen, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute, Founding Director of 海国图智研究院（Intellisia Institute), a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China, 2015. (“A Deepening US-Japan Alliance: Be Careful What You Wish For,” The Diplomat, May 1st, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/a-deepening-us-japan-alliance-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/>, Accessed 05-02-2016, aqp)

A more serious problem is Japan’s intended target in Asia. Although unstated, everyone knows that the real target of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is China. A new disturbing development is that Japan and the U.S. may start joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea, with an aim to counterbalance China’s growing presence there. This is a puzzling move on Japan’s part. There is already a high chance of an accidental clash of plans and vessels between China and Japan in the East China Sea—why risk another clash with China in the South China Sea? Plus, Japan is not part of any South China Sea disputes, so why does Japan want to be dragged into the already very complex situation? Perhaps the pressures come from the United States, and perhaps Japan sees a good opportunity in mobilizing smaller Southeast Asian states to balance against China. Whatever the motivation, Japan’s move is a highly risky one and it would only lead to higher levels of tensions between Japan and China.

In the realm of international politics, action begets reaction and a new alliance invites a counter-alliance. So we now have a stronger and firmer U.S.-Japan alliance, what will China do? The most likely case is that China will counteract the U.S.-Japan alliance with its own alliance with Russia (most likely). Already, because of America’s strategic mistakes in Europe, Russia is quickly moving closer to China, both economically and politically. It is no longer unthinkable that we might see a China-Russia alliance in the near future, particularly if the U.S. and Japan increase their pressures on China. If indeed someday that happens, we might enter a ‘new cold war’ in Asia—real bad news for everyone.

#### US-Japan alliance collapse good—withdrawal of US presence in Asia prevents Sino-American war

Glaser 15—John Glaser, Media Relations Manager for the Cato Institute, master's degree in International Relations and National Security Studies from George Mason University, BA, Political Science from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2015. ("The US and China Can Avoid a Collision Course – If the US Gives Up Its Empire,” The Guardian, May 28th, Available Online at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire>, Accessed 06-05-2016, aqp)

To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire.

Americans fear that China’s rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor Graham Allison has found: “in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war.” Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: “China cannot rise peacefully.”

But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China’s rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China’s neighbors. Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that’s inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn’t see it that way.

According to political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” (All of which is true.) They think that the US “seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harm China’s interests” with a “militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish” foreign policy.